United States v. Denver Ry Co

• Decision Date: 23 October 1893
• Docket Number: No. 3,3
• Citation: 14 S.Ct. 11,150 U.S. 1,37 L.Ed. 975
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. DENVER & R. G. RY. CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

150 U.S. 1

14 S.Ct. 11

37 L.Ed. 975

UNITED STATES

v DENVER & R. G. RY. CO.

No. 3.

October 23, 1893.

Sol. Gen. Maxwell, for the United States.

E. O. Wolcott, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the court.

The record in this case presents for our consideration and determination the following questions: First. Is the defendant a railway company, duly chartered and organized in 1870 under the laws of the territory of Colorado, for the purpose of locating, constructing, and operating an extensive system of railway and telegraph lines, entitled to the benefits of the act of congress approved March 3, 1875, (18 Stat. 482,) entitled 'An act granting to railroads the right of way through the public lands of the United States?' And, second, if so entitled, is the defendant authorized or permitted, under a proper construction of said act, to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of the railroad, timber, or other material necessary for the construction of its roadway, station buildings, depots, machine shops, side tracks, turnouts, water stations, etc., and use the same on portions of its line remote from the place from which such timber or material may be taken, or does the act limit the railroad company to timber or other material found in the vicinity of the place where the work of construction is going on?

These questions constituting the matters in controversy between the parties arise in this way: The plaintiffs in error, who were the plaintiffs below, brought their suit against the defendant in the district court of the United States for the district of Colorado, to recover the value of timber alleged to have been taken by the defendant from the public domain between October 1, 1882, and November 1, 1883. The defendant, by its answer, interposed a general denial of the allegations of the complaint, and for a further defense justified the taking of the timber under the special act of congress approved June 8, 1872, (17 Stat. 339,) and under the general act of March 3, 1875. The case was tried upon the following agreed statement of facts:

'(1) That the timber sued for in said action was cut by William A. Eckerly & Co., as agents for the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Company, and delivered to said railway company.

'(2) That the attached statement correctly shows the kinds and amounts of timber so cut and delivered, and also shows the time of cutting, the purposes for which it was cut and used, and the prices paid for cutting and delivering the same.

'(3) The said timber was cut in Montrose county, Colorado, and near the town of Montrose, and upon public, unoccupied, and unentered lands of the United States.

'(4) That the lands from which the timber was cut were along and near and adjacent to the line of railway of said company.

'(5) That the portion of the line of railway through said county of Montrose, and in the vicinity of said town of Montrose, was not constructed or completed until after June 8, 1882, and that on June 8, 1882, said line of railway was only constructed and completed as far westward as Cebolla, in Gunnison county, Colorado.

'(6) That said company had not completed its line of railway to Santa Fe on June 8, 1882, nor has it ever so completed it.

'(7) That of the timber cut as aforesaid a part was used on portions of the line of railway out to Grand Junction, constructed and completed after June 8, 1882, and for the purposes of construction of railway, erection of section and depot houses, snow sheds, fences, etc.

'And a part was shipped by the Denver & Rio Grande Railway for similar purposes to the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway, to be used in the territory of Utah, as shown in the attached statement, and $1,000 worth was used for repairs on portions of road completed prior to June 8, 1882.

'(8) That as to all of its line of railway constructed after June 8, 1882, the said company strictly complied with all the requirements of the act of congress approved March 3, 1875, entitled, 'An act granting railroads the right of way through the public lands of the United States."

On this agreed statement of facts there were submitted to the court for decision several legal propositions and questions, which were not, however, separately considered and passed upon, and need not be here specially noticed. The case made by the facts agreed upon was intended to be a test case to obtain a definite and positive adjudication by the court of the rights of the railway company with regard to cutting timber from public lands under the provisions of the two acts which have been referred to.

The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $24,926.25, the agreed value of the timber taken. From this judgment the defendant took its writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Colorado, which modified the judgment of the district court by charging the defendant first with the sum of $1,000 as the value of the timber used for repairs on that portion of the road east of Cebolla, Colo., which had been completed prior to June 8, 1882, and for the further sum of $1,229.45 as the value of the timber shipped by the defendant to the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Company to be used in the territory of Utah; but as to the rest of the timber used on portions of the road west of Montrose, out to Grand Junction, for the purpose of constructing the defendant's railway, erecting bridges, section houses, depots, bunk houses, stockyards, water tanks, etc., held that the defendant was not liable therefor, and to that extent reversed the judgment of the district court. The plaintiffs prosecute the present writ of error to review and reverse this judgment of the circuit court. The defendant has sued out no cross writ of error, and concedes its liability for the timber with which it has been charged by the judgment of the circuit court.

If the defendant is not entitled to the benefits of the act of March 3, 1875, or if that act, properly construed, does not permit or allow the defendant to use timber taken from adjacent lands except for the construction of adjacent portions of its line of road and structures connected therewith, then the judgment of the circuit court is erroneous. If, however, the defendant can rightfully claim the benefits of the act of March 3, 1875, and if that act authorizes it to take from the public lands adjacent to its line of road timber necessary for the construction of its railway, and use the same at points distant from the place at which the timber was taken, then the judgment below should be affirmed.

By the act of congress approved June 8, 1872, 'the right of way over the public domain, one hundred feet in width on each side of the track, together with such public lands adjacent thereto as may be needed for depots, shops, and other buildings for railway purposes, and for yard room and side tracks, not exceeding twenty acres at any one station, and not more than one station in every ten miles of the road, and the right to take from the public lands adjacent thereto stone, timber, earth, water, and other material required for the construction and repair of its railway and telegraphic lines,' was granted and confirmed unto the defendant in error, its successors, and assigns. Attached to this grant was a proviso 'that said company shall complete its railway to a point on the Rio Grande as far south as Santa Fe within five years of the passage of this act, and shall complete fifty miles additional south of said point in each year thereafter, and in default thereof the rights and privileges herein granted shall be rendered null and void so far as respects the unfinished portion of said road.'

By the general act of 1875 it was enacted:

'Section 1. That the right of way through the public lands of the United States is hereby granted to any railroad company duly organized under the laws of any state or territory, except the District of Columbia, or by the congress of the United States, which shall have filed with the secretary of the interior a copy of its articles of incorporation, and due proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of one hundred feet on each side of the central line of said road; also the right to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said road material, earth, stone, and timber necessary for the construction of said railroad; also ground adjacent to such right of way for station buildings, depots, machine shops, side tracks, turnouts, and water stations, not to exceed in amount twenty acres for each station, to the extent of one station for each ten miles of its road.'

By the fourth section of this act it was declared:

'Sec. 4. That any railroad company desiring to secure the benefits of this act, shall within twelve months after the location of any section of twenty miles of its road, if the same be upon surveyed land, and if upon unsurveyed lands, within twelve months after the survey thereof by the United States, file with the register of the land office for the district where such land is located a profile of its road; and upon approval thereof by the secretary of the interior the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office; and thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way: provided, that if any section of said road shall not be completed within five years after the location of said section, the right herein granted shall be forfeited as to any such uncompleted section of said road.'

As shown by the agreed statement of facts, the railway company, on June 8, 1882, had completed its line westward only as far as Cebolla, Colo., and has never completed it to Sante Fe. The right of the railway company, under the special act of 1872, to take timber west of Cebolla for the construction of its line accordingly terminated on June 8, 1882. The timber in controversy was taken after...