State v. Quinnell, 39818

Citation277 Minn. 63,151 N.W.2d 598
Decision Date09 June 1967
Docket NumberNo. 39818,39818
PartiesSTATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Curtis QUINNELL, Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Syllabus by the Court

Where defendant without bona fide claim of right entered upon the premises of the stockyards landowner to participate in a hostile demonstration of livestock farmers against the landowner, including physical obstructions of the landowner's business operations, and defendant refused to leave the premises as directed by police officers called upon by landowner for assistance, Held, the misdemeanor arrest of defendant for criminal trespass, Minn.St. 609.605(5), by such police officers without a warrant was valid, and the evidence on this record was sufficient to sustain his conviction of the offense.AT Bentson & Kalina, Lakeville, for appellant.

Douglas Head, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Roger Miller, City Atty., South St. Paul, for respondent.

OPINION

PETERSON, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a district court judgment 1 convicting him of criminal trespass, a misdemeanor. 2 The sole issue for decision is one of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant 3--whether under the evidence the arrest of defendant for a misdemeanor and without a warrant was valid, it being defendant's contention that no offense was committed or attempted in the presence of the arresting officer.

Defendant's arrest and conviction arose out of his participation in an organized 'demonstration' of livestock famers on September 24, 1964, upon the premises of the St. Paul Union Stockyards Company (hereafter referred to as 'Stockyards'), protesting existing methods of marketing livestock. Stockyards is engaged in the business of providing facilities and services incident to the selling and buying of livestock upon property owned by it in South St. Paul, Minnesota. Its private properties are traversed by various roadways which are also its private property and are so marked by signs. The roadways give access to the various interior pen structures, called 'chutes,' one of which roadways is called East Chute Road. The chutes are variously used for unloading and holding hogs, sheep, and cattle, and are assigned by Stockyards to various commission firms as Stockyards in its sole discretion determines. The hog unloading chutes, most directly involved here, and located directly west of the East Chute Road, however, were not assigned to any firm but were in the exclusive possession and control of Stockyards. Ordinarily, visitors and anyone who has business at the stockyards are permitted to enter upon its premises for such purpose.

On the morning of September 24, 1964, a large group of individuals, with farm trucks and other vehicles, 4 gathered at the stockyards for purposes of a demonstration. The apparent general objective of the demonstration was to promote changes in established marketing methods, making the sale of livestock Before unloading the animals into the chutes or holding pens. 5 The immediate objective of the demonstration, more specifically stated, was physically to prevent the unloading of hogs into the chutes. The first trucks congregated at the hog chutes and were so parked that the Front of the trucks faced against the loading docks. Some of the trucks of the demonstrators may have had animals in them, but otherwise their trucks were empty. Under the circumstances, however, it would have been physically impossible for the trucks of demonstrators or nondemonstrators to have been unloaded at the hog chutes. There were so many persons and vehicles, moreover, that other trucks were spread out and obstructed the sheep and cattle holding pens and access roadways as well.

The effect of this activity was such that by 11:30 a.m. the hog unloading and other stockyard operations were at a complete halt. 6 At about 11:55 Joel Bennett, a Stockyards' vice president, talked to the crowd over a loudspeaker mounted on a police vehicle 7 on East Chute Road. He stated his name and his position with Stockyards, told the demonstrators that they were on private property, and asked them to clear the area because Stockyards was unable to conduct its business. He warned the demonstrators that if they did not clear the area within 15 minutes he would ask for police assistance, but the crowd did not disperse. Robert L. Ketcham, the South St. Paul police chief, thereafter made an announcement over the loudspeaker at about 12:15. He identified himself and asked the demonstrators to leave, but the crowd still did not disperse. Thereupon, at about 12:30, Chief Ketcham instructed his police officers to tell the demonstrators to move and if they did not do so to arrest them for trespassing.

Defendant, Curtis Quinnell, was one of seven persons thereafter arrested. Quinnell was once a hog raiser himself, but he had not raised hogs since 1962 and was at the time of arrest a grain farmer and milk hauler. He had, in fact, been hauling milk that morning and, after having completed one trip to the creamery, had set out to pick up milk at five other farms, the first of which was the farm of a Mrs. O'Rourke. On his way to her farm, he had heard a radio broadcast concerning the disturbance at the stockyards. He knew that his brother was among the demonstrators there, so after he was loaded he left his partially filled milk truck and came to the stockyards with Mrs. O'Rourke in her automobile to see what was going on and, in his words, to 'see if they was getting any place.' While Mrs. O'Rourke parked the car somewhere, defendant walked down East Chute Road over to the crowd by the hog unloading chutes. The exact time of his arrival is not certain. An acquaintance of defendant testified that defendant arrived at about 12:30 p.m., which would have been After the announcements to the crowd by Bennett and Ketcham. 8 Captain Arne Jensen of the South St. Paul Police Department testified that he saw defendant in the crowd about the time of the public announcements. In our view of the case, however, the exact time of his arrival is not of crucial significance.

Captain Jensen approached Quinnell at about 12:30 p.m., told him that he was trespassing, and directed him to leave. He did not leave. Defendant said nothing in reply but just 'walked a little bit back and forth.' After waiting about 3 minutes, Captain Jensen placed him under arrest.

Defendant's conviction of trespass must be sustained on either of two principles: (1) Defendant was a trespasser from the moment of his entry upon the premises on that day because, under the circumstances of this case, he had no right to be there present, irrespective of whether or not he was present to hear personally the announcement of Stockyards' official, Bennett, or that of Chief Ketcham; or (2) even assuming he had a right by implied license to be on the premises initially such license was duly revoked before his arrest and this was adequately communicated to him by the arresting officer.

1. Defendant was, in the circumstances of this case, a trespasser from the moment he entered upon the premises. Stockyards' consent to the public to enter upon its premises for public relations tours or business purposes constitutes a license to the public For those purposes. 53 C.J.S., Licenses, § 84. Whatever may be the implied license to enter upon the premises of another for purposes of ordinary business intercourse with the landowner, commonsense dictates there can be no implied license to enter upon the premises of another to engage in extraordinary activity Hostile to the business of the owner. Defendant acknowledged at oral argument that he 'does not claim he was there on a specific business purpose,' and the evidence establishes beyond doubt the irrelevance of his purpose. He was there only as a meddler who had abandoned his own normal activity to participate in the abnormal activity of an organized mass demonstration instigated by others. Where a person deliberately joins and remains with a crowd engaging in unlawful activity, the inference is inescapable that such person is there for the same unlawful purpose.

2. Even assuming that defendant's original entry upon the premises was pursuant to an implied license, such license was affirmatively revoked by Stockyards. 9 If, as the trial court could have found contrary to defendant's claim, Quinnell was in fact present and heard Bennett ask the demonstrators to leave, there could be no question whatever that he was guilty of trespass. 10

The more critical question posed by defendant, assuming that he did not himself hear Bennett's announcement that the demonstrators were trespassers and must quit the premises, is whether the same instructions from either Chief Ketcham or Captain Jensen were authorized notice and demand from the landowner. The thrust of defendant's argument is the technical claim that a police officer during duty hours cannot be the agent of a private landowner for the purpose of conveying such revocation or demand. We think it is, at best, an ad hoc claim to exculpate him from the consequences of his own mistaken militancy. We are not at all persuaded that we must thus reject the dictates of commonsense. The term 'agent' is one of wide signification. It is not a question of actual agency in the technical sense of making one person, as principal, responsible for the actions of another person, as agent; nor is it in this case a question of a public official performing an act incompatible with his public employment. It is simply a case, if any bona fide doubt existed in defendant's mind,...

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15 cases
  • State v. Brechon
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • August 3, 1984
    ...court the trial court's requirement that she make an offer of proof to present a prima facie case of claim of right. State v. Quinnell, 277 Minn. 63, 151 N.W.2d 598 (1967), involved the issue whether defendant's misdemeanor arrest was valid. Quinnell's arrest arose from his participation in......
  • Peterson v. Kopp
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • June 11, 2014
    ...upon being asked to leave). Under this statute, a refusal to depart does not have to be verbal or protracted. See State v. Quinnell, 277 Minn. 63, 151 N.W.2d 598, 602 (1967) (upholding trespass conviction when a police officer told a man to leave, but the man “said nothing in reply,” and wa......
  • Johnson v. McCarver
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • November 1, 2019
    ...or his agent. State v. Dubose , No. A15-0069, 2015 WL 9437521, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2015) ; see State v. Quinnell , 277 Minn. 63, 151 N.W.2d 598, 602-03 (1967). The term "agent" is "one of wide signification" in this context, and a police officer can be the agent of a private land......
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    • April 18, 2018
    ...v. Kopp, 754 F.3d 594, 598-99 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing State v. Zimmer, 478 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Quinnell, 151 N.W.2d 598, 602 (Minn. 1967)). From Officer Buhta's perspective, and based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable to believe that Kushner......
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