Burnett v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, 96,793.
Decision Date | 02 February 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 96,793.,96,793. |
Citation | 151 P.3d 837 |
Parties | Karen BURNETT, Plaintiff, v. SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE, L.P., Defendant. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Alan V. Johnson, of Sloan, Eisenbarth, Glassman, McEntire & Jarboe, L.L.C., of Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for plaintiff.
Bruce A. Ney, of Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P., of Topeka, argued the cause, and Timothy S. Pickering and Melanie N. Sawyer, of Topeka, were with him on the brief for defendant.
This case comes before us on a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3201. Karen Barnett filed suit in federal court against her former employer, Southwestern Bell Telephone, L.P. (Southwestern Bell), alleging that she was wrongfully terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2611 et seq. (2000), and § 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
Southwestern Bell moved to dismiss Barnett's ERISA claim on the basis that it was brought more than 2 years after she was terminated, and thus is barred by the 2-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4). Barnett countered that the proper statute of limitations was the 3-year period in K.S.A. 60-512(2), which applies to liabilities created by statute. Because the statute of limitations issue could be determinative of Barnett's claim under ERISA, and because the district court found no controlling Kansas precedent on this issue, it certified the question to this court.
For reasons set forth in this opinion, our answer to the certified question is that the plaintiff's claim is one created by statute which is governed by a 3-year statute of limitations in accordance with K.S.A. 60-512(2).
The following factual account is taken directly from the certification order from the United States District Court in this case:
On its own motion pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3201, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas certified this question regarding the applicable statute of limitations for actions brought under ERISA § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140, to this court on June 14, 2006.
This court has jurisdiction to answer questions certified to it by a United States District Court under K.S.A. 60-3201, which provides that the Kansas Supreme Court may answer certified "questions of law of this state which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme court and the court of appeals of this state." Because certified questions must, by definition, turn on legal issues, this court's review of such questions is unlimited. Danisco Ingredients USA, Inc. v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., 267 Kan. 760, 764-65, 986 P.2d 377 (1999). Furthermore, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. See Foster v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 281 Kan. 368, 374, 130 P.3d 560 (2006). "The answer to a certified question must be based on [Kansas] precedent, not on federal rulings interpreting Kansas law." Hysten v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Ry. Co., 277 Kan. 551, 554, 85 P.3d 1183 (2004) (citing Flenker v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 266 Kan. 198, 201-02, 967 P.2d 295 [1998]).
Federal Courts' Determinations of Claims Predicated Upon a Violation of Rights Under § 510 of ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1140)
Before discussing the legal question regarding the proper analogue to a § 510 ERISA claim under Kansas law, it is helpful to review how federal courts have treated the nature of ERISA claims generally, and § 510 in particular, with regard to the appropriate statute of limitations.
ERISA, first enacted in 1974, is a "comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). ERISA's initial policy statement explains the policy of the respective chapter of the Act:
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000).
"It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the interests of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the equitable character and the soundness of such plans by requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance." 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c).
One of the primary reasons for Congress' adoption of such a broad-sweeping statute was "to enable employers `to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.'" Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148, 121 S.Ct. 1322, 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001) (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 [1987]).
In enacting ERISA, Congress recognized that "[u]niformity is impossible, however, if plans are subject to different legal obligations in different states." Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148, 121 S.Ct. 1322. To effectuate this goal of uniformity in application and administration, ERISA contains a provision that specifically preempts any state law that "relates to" employee benefits plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000) (). The Act defines "`State law'" to include "all law, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted ERISA's preemption provision broadly, finding that a statute "relates to" an ERISA program for preemption purposes "`if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan.'" Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147, 121 S.Ct. 1322 (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890).
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