Murphy v. Dilworth

Decision Date21 May 1941
Docket NumberNo. 7629.,7629.
PartiesMURPHY v. DILWORTH et al.
CourtTexas Supreme Court

House & Irvin, of San Antonio, for plaintiff in error.

Wm. H. Shireman, Hull & Oliver, and Dilworth & Marshall, all of San Antonio, for defendants in error.

ALEXANDER, Chief Justice.

On July 12, 1928, A. L. Dilworth owned a certain tract of land in McMullen and Duval counties, upon which he had previously executed a 10-year oil and gas mining lease in the usual form. On the above date, and while said lease was still in force, Dilworth and wife conveyed said land to John E. Murphy by general warranty deed, with the following reservation: "Grantors expressly reserve unto themselves for a period of fifteen years from the date hereof an undivided one-sixteenth interest and estate in and to all of the minerals of every character, including oil and gas, in and under and appurtenant to all of the above described property, and said undivided interest in said minerals is not intended in any wise to be conveyed hereby, but the same is hereby excepted from this conveyance; provided, however that in the event both of the grantors herein should depart this life prior to the expiration of said fifteen years from date hereof, then this reservation shall be null and void and of no further force and effect, and the full title to said undivided interest shall then vest in said John E. Murphy, his heirs and assigns."

The oil and gas mining lease above referred to expired in 1932. In 1936 Dilworth and wife brought this suit against Murphy and others, and alleged that at the time of the execution and delivery of the deed above referred to it was contracted and agreed between the parties that the grantors should have and be entitled to receive a royalty interest of 1/16 of all the oil and gas and other minerals produced from said land under the lease then outstanding, or any other lease that might be given thereon. They further alleged that the defendant, Murphy, was asserting a greater interest in the minerals in said land than he was entitled to under said conveyance, and sought a judgment removing cloud from their title to said mineral rights.

The trial court permitted the introduction of parol evidence as to what was said by the parties in their negotiations leading up to the making of the contract, as well as their interpretation thereof afterwards, and, based thereon, held that the reservation contained in the deed was actually "a mineral reservation of one-half of the royalty under said lease then on said land, and any and all mineral leases thereafter to be placed on said land * * *," and entered judgment accordingly. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 129 S.W.2d 418.

The reservation contained in the deed appears on its face to be plain and unambiguous. In clear language it reserves an undivided 1/16 interest in the minerals in and under said land, and makes no reference whatever to any royalty to be paid under any existing or subsequent lease. There is no suggestion in the pleadings of fraud in the making of the contract or of accident or mistake in reducing it to writing. Ordinarily, where the terms of a written contract are thus plain and unambiguous, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms or to show the construction placed thereon by the parties at the...

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  • Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of State of Pa.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 17, 1995
    ...light thereof for the purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement." Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 36, 151 S.W.2d 1004 (1941). This court, moreover, has used the term "latent ambiguity" to encompass ambiguity in the plain language of an insuranc......
  • Templeton v. Dreiss
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 21, 1998
    ...clearly alleged and proved that the execution of the instrument was procured by fraud, accident or mistake. See Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 151 S.W.2d 1004, 1005 (1941). But even if the instrument is not uncertain, if the meaning of language used therein becomes uncertain when an attem......
  • McGinnis v. Union Pacific R. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas
    • March 16, 2009
    ...Incorp. v. Alamo Savings Assoc. of Texas, 611 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1980, no writ) (quoting Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 151 S.W.2d 1004, 1005 (1941) ("[W]here a question concerning the interpretation of a contract arises, a court will `take the wording of the instru......
  • Pitman v. Lightfoot
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • August 7, 1996
    ...kinds of evidence."). A party may not introduce parol evidence to vary the terms of an unambiguous contract. Murphy v. Dilworth, 137 Tex. 32, 151 S.W.2d 1004, 1005 (1941); Markert v. Williams, 874 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied). When a writing is intended ......
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