Snyder's Case

Decision Date01 October 1930
Docket Number260,34
Citation152 A. 33,301 Pa. 276
PartiesSnyder's Case
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued May 26, 1930

Appeals, No. 260, Jan. T., 1930, and No. 34, Jan. T., 1931 by Charles A. Snyder from orders of Q.S. Schuylkill Co Miscellaneous Docket 2, page 15, for disbarment and for contempt, In re Rules on Charles A. Snyder. Order reversed in No. 260, Jan. T., 1930, and order modified in No. 34, Jan. T., 1931.

Rules for contempt and for disbarment. Before KOCH, P.J., HICKS, J., and HOUCK, J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Rules absolute. Charles A. Snyder appealed.

Errors assigned, inter alia, were the orders, quoting bill of exceptions.

In appeal No. 260, January Term, 1930, the order making absolute the rule to show cause why the respondent, Charles A. Snyder, should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of court is reversed as is also the sentence imposing a fine of $2,500 upon him therefor. The costs of this appeal to be paid by appellant.

In No. 34, January Term, 1931, being the appeal of Charles A. Snyder from the order making absolute the rule for his disbarment, the order is modified and in place of being disbarred the respondent is suspended from practice in the several courts of Schuylkill County for the period of one year, beginning at the date of the filing of this order, saving to him the right to appear as district attorney and represent the Commonwealth whenever his duty so requires. The costs to be paid by Schuylkill County.

John Robert Jones, with him R. J. Graeff, James J. Gallagher and R. Albert Freiler, for appellant. -- The court does not have the power to try and to punish a person summarily as a contempt of court for publications out of court: Com. v. Davies, 1 W.N.C. 18; Jared Ingersoll's Case, 1 W.N.C. 18; Foster v. Com., 8 W. & S. 77; Com. v. Newton, 2 Phila. 262; Com. v. Crans, 2 Pa. L.J. 441; Passmore Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9; Steinman and Hensel's Case, 95 Pa. 220.

Plaintiff, who has an interest in a matter at issue, should not sit even though the case be one in which a jury is a part of the tribunal: Phila. Library Co. v. Ingham, 1 Wharton 72; Phila. v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169; Com. v. White, 161 Pa. 576.

The rule to adjudge defendant guilty of contempt of court, the verdict of guilt thereon being for a contempt committed out of court, was irregularly, improperly and improvidently issued because it was not founded upon any complaint supported by affidavit.

The rule issued by the common pleas against defendant to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of court and should not be disbarred, the trial on the merits on such rule, and the judgment of the court dismissing the rule, were conclusive and invalidate the rules issued by the quarter sessions, the joint trial of defendant on such rules and the judgment, orders and sentence rendered and imposed by the court thereon.

There was no contempt of court: Com. v. Widovich, 295 Pa. 311; Steinman and Hensel's Case, 95 Pa. 220.

In view of the fact that the contempt of which the court found defendant guilty was a constructive contempt committed in the course of a political campaign, that defendant was tried for contempt of court and for disbarment in one and the same trial and was disbarred on the same finding of the court at one and the same time, it is submitted that such sentence constitutes not only the imposition of an excessive fine but also the infliction of a cruel punishment: Breen's Case, 93 P. 1104.

A district attorney cannot be removed from office by a summary disbarment proceeding: Maginnis's Case, 269 Pa. 186.

The acts charged were those of a citizen.

George H. Kaercher and C. E. Berger, with them John B. McGurl, for appellee. -- The court had jurisdiction: Com. v. Myers, 19 Pa. Dist. R. 1136; Williamson's Case, 26 Pa. 9; Greason v. Ry., 54 Pa.Super. 595; Wilhelm's Case, 269 Pa. 416.

Although Judge HOUCK sat throughout the proceedings, neither his right to do so, nor the propriety thereof, was questioned by the respondent. On the contrary, counsel for respondent expressly disavowed any such intention. It is irregular and improper to raise this question here in view of the failure to raise or discuss it in the court below.

"But independent of supporting affidavits and prior notice of such grounds, a court has jurisdiction, of its own motion, to direct the issuance of a rule, either for contempt of court or for disbarment, or both": Steinman and Hensel's Case, 95 Pa. 220; Scouten's App., 186 Pa. 270; Wilhelm's Case, 269 Pa. 416.

"Where a case has not been decided on its merits, res adjudicata cannot be interposed as a bar": Weigley v. Coffman, 144 Pa. 489; Pennebaker v. Parker, 33 Pa.Super. 458; Robb v. Gas Coal Co., 216 Pa. 418; Pittsburgh Construction Co. v. R.R., 227 Pa. 90.

Respondent was guilty of contempt.

The court had power to disbar the district attorney: McGinnis's Case, 269 Pa. 186.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE WALLING:

The transactions which form the basis of the two orders here appealed from were heard together by the trial court and we will so consider them. The appellant, Charles A. Snyder, is the district attorney of Schuylkill County, to which office he was elected for a term commencing January, 1928. The court of common pleas of that county consists of three judges, learned in the law, of whom, Hon. HENRY HOUCK, having been appointed by the governor, was chosen as his own successor at the election in 1929. In the primary campaign of that year, the respondent bitterly opposed the candidacy of Judge HOUCK, and, as found by the trial court, caused a cartoon to be printed and circulated, representing, inter alia, the judge as being controlled by his father, Paul W. Houck, in refusing the district attorney's request to bring to trial two of the county commissioners who were under indictment for alleged official misconduct. This cartoon appeared on September 10th, and three or four days thereafter, because of it, Judge HOUCK'S father, Paul W. Houck, made informations against the respondent, charging him with criminal libel and also with conspiracy to violate the Act of May 25, 1897, P.L. 85, which makes the circulation of anonymous defamatory matter a misdemeanor. The respondent was arrested and, so far as appears, the charges are still pending.

On the morning before the cartoons appeared, in opposing the application for continuance of the county commissioners' cases (which was made to and granted by Judge HICKS, another member of the court), the respondent made certain remarks, claimed to reflect upon the integrity of the court. During that primary campaign, Snyder also made political speeches in various parts of the county against Judge HOUCK; the one made at Tamaqua on the evening of September 14th, was stenographically reported and not only assails Judge HOUCK and his father, but also the county commissioners, who were then under indictment, and severely and unfairly criticized the disposition previously made by the court of a criminal case.

Some months previously, what appeared as an interview with the respondent as district attorney, was published in the Philadelphia Record. This made serious charges against the county commissioners, then being prosecuted by him and also reflected upon the judges. Just before the primary election the respondent, as the court found, made statements in the sheriff's office, as follows: "This is a campaign of decency. HENRY HOUCK is all right, but I have him so covered with pitch that no matter what his decisions are within the next ten years nobody will have any confidence in them." On September 30, 1929, the three judges of that court filed of record in the court of common pleas a statement embodying the matters, somewhat as above outlined, and entered a rule upon Mr. Snyder to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and why his name should not be stricken from the roll of attorneys. Respondent made answer in the nature of a demurrer which was overruled and the case proceeded to a hearing, three prominent members of the local bar acting by appointment as amici curiae, and the respondent being represented by counsel. At the conclusion of this hearing, at which respondent had been called for cross-examination and interrogated at some length, the court made an order as follows: "And now, February 3, 1930, the bases for the rule in this proceeding are the speech and conduct of the respondent in referring to certain cases pending in our court of quarter sessions of the peace at the time when the rule was issued. But, owing to a misapprehension by some of us as to the law and practice in proceedings of this kind, this proceeding was filed in the court of common pleas. The question whether or not this court has jurisdiction of all that the rule implies is debatable, and we shall, therefore give the respondent the benefit of the doubt in the premises and give the matter no further consideration here and now.

"And now, February 3, 1930, the rule is discharged at the costs of the county without prejudice, however, against the right of the court of quarter sessions of the peace to take such action in the premises as it may deem advisable, or of this court hereafter to take any action that it may deem proper. KOCH, P.J."

On the same day the judges filed a new but similar statement against the respondent in the court of quarter sessions, to which he also submitted a like answer which was overruled and the testimony retaken, although the respondent was not again called for cross-examination. No testimony was submitted in his behalf at either hearing. In due course the court submitted findings of facts sustaining the...

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