Schneider v. Schneider

• Decision Date: 05 December 1930
• Docket Number: 46.
• Citation: 152 A. 498,160 Md. 18
• Parties: SCHNEIDER ET AL. v. SCHNEIDER.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

152 A. 498

160 Md. 18

SCHNEIDER ET AL. v. SCHNEIDER.

No. 46.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

December 5, 1930

Appeal from Baltimore City Court; Robert F. Stanton, Judge.

Action by Antonie Schneider against Ludwig Schneider and others. Verdict was rendered in favor of one defendant, and from a judgment for plaintiff against defendants Ludwig Schneider and James Schneider, they appeal.

Reversed as to each appellant without a new trial.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and PATTISON, URNER, OFFUTT, DIGGES PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

Ogle Marbury, of Baltimore (Webster C. Tall, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellants.

John E Magers and Roszel C. Thomsen, both of Baltimore (Walter L Clark, of Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

BOND C.J.

Two sons appeal in this case from a judgment recovered against them by their mother, for personal injuries sustained by her while riding in an automobile owned by one son and driven by the other. And the rulings questioned are those of the trial court on prayers for instructions on the liability of each son to the mother.

The important facts of ownership and use of the automobile are undisputed. It had been bought by the father and licensed in the name of the son, Ludwig, as owner. The father had paid for it, in part by trading in an automobile which he had previously bought in the name of an older son, now in the Navy. The two sons now sued both had drivers' licenses but the father had none. And he did not often ride in the car. The mother did not ride often, and when she did, it was usually Ludwig that drove her. Ludwig used the car to ride to and from his work. Both of the sons sued are unmarried and still live at the home of their parents, paying board. Ludwig is twenty-four years old; James was eighteen at the time of the accident, nineteen at the time of the trial. It is not suggested that James was other than a competent driver. While there might be some question whether the car was not in fact owned by the father, it is doubtful whether the evidence would support a finding that it was, and in the view we take of the case it would not be necessary to consider the possibility. We decide the case, as it was argued, upon the supposition that Ludwig alone was the owner.

The family lived at Curtis Bay, in the extreme southeast of Baltimore. And on the afternoon of Christmas, 1928, the mother, as she said in her testimony, "just decided to see a friend" of hers, a Mrs. Novak, who lived in Northeast Baltimore. The father said the visit had been arranged some time before. She asked her son Ludwig to drive herself and her husband there, but Ludwig had a meeting to attend, and said he could not go. And then he asked James to take the parents, and gave James the registration card. James drove the parents and made the visit with them. On the return late at night, the car collided with another and the mother was injured. She sued the driver of the other car along with her sons, but a verdict was rendered in favor of the third defendant. No question of the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of negligence on the part of James in driving is raised on appeal, and we need consider only the question whether on the facts stated Ludwig or James Schneider, or both, could in law be held answerable to their mother for injuries caused by negligence of James. We conclude that neither could be so held.

Ludwig Schneider we find not liable because he was neither the driver nor the master of the driver. Mere ownership of a car does not impose liability for injuries caused in the driving of it. Liability, when it exists, is not for the car, but only for the act or omission of the person driving. And when the owner has not himself been the negligent cause of an injury, he can be held liable vicariously only when the negligence has been that of his servant engaged in his affairs. He is not even liable for the negligence of his general servant, his chauffeur, for instance, unless at the time the servant has been conducting the owner's affairs. Salowitch v. Kres, 147 Md. 23, 127 A. 643; Pollock v. Watts, 142 Md. 403, 121 A. 238. And here it is not suggested that James Schneider was a general servant of his brothers; and, in our opinion, the expedition of the parents could not be regarded as an affair of Ludwig's at all. It is settled that the mere fact that it may afford an owner pleasure and satisfaction to have members of his family transported in his car, entirely on their own affairs, does not render their expedition his business, so that he will be liable for the results of negligence in its conduct. Whitelock v. Dennis, 139 Md. 557, 116 A. 68; Myers v. Shipley, 140 Md. 380, 116 A. 645, 20 A. L. R. 1460; Baitary v. Smith, 140 Md. 437, 116 A. 651; Hynes v. Wilson, 147 Md. 360, 128 A. 70. Nor can the request by Ludwig of James in this case, that the latter drive their parents on their visit render the visit or the transportation the business of Ludwig. He merely asked James to accommodate the parents when he (Ludwig) could not do so. James was completely independent of Ludwig, not at all subject to Ludwig's direction, and, indeed, as an infant, was subject to the parental control of his passengers. On the evidence, Ludwig can, in our opinion, be considered only as having lent the car to the parents. Except for the fact that the driver was not, in this instance, even in the general service of the owner, the case is, as respects Ludwig, closely similar to that of Salowitch v. Kres, supra, and is disposed of by that case as an authority. And see Legenbauer v. Esposito, 187 A.D. 811, 814, 176 N.Y.S. 42. The fourth prayer of the defendants, which was refused, for direction of a verdict in favor of Ludwig Schneider on the ground that James, at the time of the accident, was not the agent, servant, or employee of Ludwig, should have been granted.

The obstacle to the mother's recovery against James Schneider is in the fact that she sues a minor son, of whom she jointly with the father, is the natural guardian. Acts 1929, c. 561, § 1; Code, art. 72A,§ 1. The ordinary position of parent and guardian of a minor, and that of plaintiff seeking to recover from the minor, are positions which cannot both be occupied by one person at one and the same time. Maintenance of the suit is inconsistent with the parent's status or office, and the dependence of the minor upon her, and also with the dependence of the law upon her, for the fulfillment of necessary legal and social functions. A right of action at law is not one open to any and all persons against any others, without reference to relationships which may exist between them. This court has decided that a wife cannot sue her husband for damages sustained in an automobile accident. Furstenburg v. Furstenburg, 152 Md. 247, 136 A. 534. It appears that a majority of courts in which the question has arisen have decided that a minor child cannot maintain such an action against its parent--a question differing somewhat from the one now decided. Hewlett v. George, ...