Hickman v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 10 December 1945
• Docket Number: No. 9035.,9035.
• Parties: HICKMAN v. TAYLOR et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

153 F.2d 212 (1945)

HICKMAN v. TAYLOR et al.

No. 9035.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued October 1, 1945.

Reargued November 10, 1945.

Decided December 10, 1945.

Writ of Certiorari Denied April 22, 1946.

Samuel B. Fortenbaugh, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa. (Shields, Clark, Brown and McCown, of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellants.

Thomas E. Byrne, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa. (Krusen, Evans & Shaw, of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for Krusen, Evans & Shaw, amicus curiae.

Harrison G. Kildare, of Philadelphia, Pa. (Rawle & Henderson, and Joseph W. Henderson, all of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for Joseph W. Henderson, amicus curiae.

Abraham E. Freedman, of Philadelphia, Pa. (Freedman, Landy & Lorry, of Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee Hickman.

Howard Burtt, of Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee Baltimore & O. R. Co.

Before BIGGS, ALBERT LEE STEPHENS, MARIS, GOODRICH, McLAUGHLIN, and O'CONNELL, Circuit Judges.

Writ of Certiorari Denied April 22, 1946. See 66 S.Ct. 961.

GOODRICH, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which adjudged the appellants guilty of criminal contempt and imposed sentence therefor. The appellants are two clients and their lawyer. The basis of the contempt order was their refusal to answer a certain interrogatory propounded by the plaintiff's counsel in a personal injury suit. They took the position that what was asked for was beyond the proper scope of the discovery process under the Federal Rules. The court ruled against them and upon their disobedience of the order adjudged them guilty of contempt. We, therefore, have the basis for appeal.¹

The case tests the limits, if any, of the scope of the discovery procedure under the Federal Rules. A reversal of the judgment for contempt would of necessity compel us to decide that the District Court had gone too far. In considering the question we have the help of the host of District Court decisions upon the relevant paragraphs of the Rules. Some of them will be noted below. It is sufficient here to refer to the complete collection in Federal Rules Service, Chapters 26, 33 and 34. There is little appellate authority for the obvious reason that these orders are nearly always interlocutory, R. D. Goldberg Theater Corp. v. Tri-States Theater Corp., D.C.D.Neb.1944, 8 Federal Rules Service, 34.64, Case 1, and cases there cited; the question seldom comes before a Circuit Court of Appeals.² The instant case had thorough consideration in the District Court. It was heard en banc by all the Judges of the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the thoroughly considered opinion by the Senior Judge was concurred in by all of his colleagues. 1945, 4 F.R.D. 479, 481. The opinion in that Court premises that "The guiding principle is the broad conception of the Rules that discovery of all matters relevant to a suit should be allowed to the fullest extent consistent with the orderly and efficient functioning of the judicial process." Starting from that premise the District Court concluded that the information sought to be elicited was relevant to the suit and that counsel for the defendants could be compelled to disclose it to the opposing party.

Such facts as are needed for an understanding of the controversy may be very briefly stated. A tug owned by Taylor and Anderson had capsized and five seamen met their deaths in the accident. Action was brought by the administrator of one of them under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688. Through her counsel she filed thirty-nine interrogatories. The appellants answered all but one. This one is Number 38 which reads as follows:

"(38) State whether any statements of the members of the crews of the Tugs `J. M. Taylor' and `Philadelphia' or of any other vessel were taken in connection with the towing of the car float and the sinking of the Tug `John M. Taylor'. Attach hereto exact copies of all such statements if in writing, and if oral, set forth in detail the exact provisions of any such oral statements or reports."

There were some supplemental interrogatories including a request for the production of memoranda.³ Mr. Fortenbaugh, the lawyer concerned, filed a written statement and later testified by deposition telling how and why the statements were obtained. So much for background of fact. Was the District Court correct in its law?

The parties are not entirely clear which of the Federal Rules is involved. The appellant says it is 34 or perhaps 33 and 34. The appellee in oral argument stated that he was proceeding under Rule 33. The District Court considered the plaintiff to be proceeding under Rule 33, although it said that the plaintiff could have elected to take depositions or, in case of written statements, have filed a motion to produce under Rule 34. Then the District Court stated that "What is said in this opinion applies to all three forms of discovery."

We take up this point first before getting to the main question. We think that 33 is the Rule involved and, for reasons which appear later, Rule 26 also. Plaintiff is not seeking to see an original document and copy or photograph it as provided in Rule 34. He is proceeding by interrogatory and, in connection with an interrogatory, wants the defendant to give him a copy of a memorandum. This is, in our opinion, concerned with Rule 33 rather than 34. But since the District Court, as above quoted, proceeded upon the theory that what is said applied to all the discovery Rules we are required to point out a difference in language in these Rules which we think must be given attention. Rule 34 requires good cause to be shown.⁴

The opinion of the District Court states that it amends its statement in Stark v. American Dredging Company, 3 F.R.D. 300, and that the rule be restated "Unless, under the circumstances of any particular case, the Court is satisfied that the administration of justice will be in some way impeded, discovery will be granted when asked." We think this is the proper approach to the exercise of discretion under Rule 33. We do not think that it is correct under the language used in Rule 34. The requirement in Rule 34 for showing of good cause cannot be disregarded. Insofar as the remarks of the learned District Court apply to Rule 34, they went too far. Insofar as they apply to Rule 26 and Rule 33 they are approved. This point does not change the result in the instant case or relieve us from facing the problem it presents. We pass on it because the District Court passed on it by applying its opinion to all the Rules which provide for discovery. We go on then to the difficult question involved in the appeal.

The important matters called for in the interrogatory are statements which the lawyer, acting in an investigating capacity, has taken from persons who have, or purport to have, knowledge about the facts which gave rise to the lawsuit. Two things are asked for. One is a copy of the statements which are in writing, whether signed or not, or merely memoranda; the other is that the lawyer reduce oral statements to writing and give his opponent a copy thereof.

As we approach the question we must discard some favorite craft notions of the advocate. We must discard, for instance, the concept that there is something close to a property right in the information which the lawyer digs up about the client's case and has in his possession.⁵ We must also discard the notion that questions from the other side can be fended off on the ground that the opponent's lawyer is simply engaged in a fishing expedition.⁶ These notions are hard to get rid of, but we take it that they are contrary to the idea of this discovery portion of the Federal Rules. The premise taken by the District Court, quoted above, is not dissimilar to that of Justice Holtzoff.⁷ In speaking of discovery he says there are two guiding principles (page 70): "First, every party to a litigation is entitled to secure all evidence, information and documents germane to the issues, even if they are in possession of an adverse party. Second, such evidence, information and documents should be made available before the trial. The purpose is not only to facilitate the obtaining of evidence for use at the trial, but also to reduce the element of surprise to a minimum and shorten trials."

How much of a jolt this theory is to the practicing lawyer depends, in part, upon how far the practice with which he was familiar before the Federal Rules calls for something of the kind. The Rules probably go further than any State practice, but they are a much greater distance from the practice in some States than in others. See (1931) Note, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 633, "The Bill of Discovery Under Reformed Procedure."

We must start any discussion of the use of discovery in a particular case from the premise that the Rules are intended to go far in making information known by one party available to the other. Perhaps it is helpful if we start from a case which all would agree to be within the Rules and see how much further we are called to go here. Suppose the plaintiff needs the information contained in an operating report of a particular department of a defendant employer for a particular day. Such document, we take it, could be called for as a matter of course under the Rules.⁸ Does the demand in this case really go essentially further?⁹ It is true that the defendants, through their lawyer, were diligent in going out and getting these statements before the plaintiff did. We have already indicated that this fact does not prevent the other side from sharing the fruits of that diligence. The Rules sometimes speak of evidence. But whether the documents turn out to be competent as evidence themselves is not the test in discovery proceedings.¹⁰ They may, nevertheless, contain statements of fact which may be the source of other information which would be admissible at the trial. We think...