Bennett v. Schmidt
Decision Date | 31 August 1998 |
Docket Number | No. 97-4198,97-4198 |
Citation | 153 F.3d 516 |
Parties | 77 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1210, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,622, 41 Fed.R.Serv.3d 522, 129 Ed. Law Rep. 32 Valerie BENNETT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Marie SCHMIDT, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Douglas M. Grimes (argued), Gary, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Thomas J. Canna, John F. Canna, Dawn M. Hinkle (argued), Canna & Canna, Orland Park, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before BAUER, HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.
The district court dismissed this employment-discrimination case, 1997 WL 760495, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19034, ruling that, at 12 "repetitious, rambling, and disorganized" pages, the complaint is not "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief". Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Because the complaint did not lay out facts that would be essential to support a decision for plaintiff on the merits, the district judge also dismissed it under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The tension between these two reasons--which imply that the complaint is simultaneously too long and too short--has led to plaintiff's appeal.
Twelve pages is longer than the model complaints appended to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and we agree with the district court that most averments after page five could have been omitted. By page five the complaint has told us who the plaintiff is, what position the defendants occupy (members of the Board of Directors of School District 15 in DuPage County, Illinois), stated that the plaintiff was turned down for teaching jobs at District 15, and asked to proceed on behalf of a class of similarly situated applicants. The essential allegations that make these events into a "claim for relief"--that Bennett was qualified and that she "was not permitted to interview for the position(s) because of her race"--appear on page five. Page 12 contains the demand for relief. The intervening six pages add detail (much of it repetitive, though some is potentially applicable to the class aspect), state that plaintiff wants to pursue a disparate-impact theory as well as a disparate-treatment claim, and assert four separate claims that appear to be different legal characterizations of the same events.
Complaints need not plead law or match facts to every element of a legal theory, so most averments in these six pages were unnecessary. See Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1992). But "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f). This objective is defeated if excess length becomes a fatal misstep. Prolixity is a bane of the legal profession but a poor ground for rejecting potentially meritorious claims. Fat in a complaint can be ignored, confusion or ambiguity dealt with by means other than dismissal. It takes a lot worse than using 12 pages to set out a claim that could have been stated in 6 pages to justify a dismissal under Rule 8(a). See In re Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 702-03 (3d Cir.1996) ( ); Kuehl v. FDIC, 8 F.3d 905, 905 (1st Cir.1993) ( ); Michaelis v. Nebraska State Bar Association, 717 F.2d 437, 439 (8th Cir.1983) ( ). Twelve pages of gibberish is no better than 240, so it may be appropriate to dismiss a short complaint under Rule 8 because it is not "plain". It is even possible to justify dismissal with prejudice if the complaint remains incomprehensible after opportunity to amend. See Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5 Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (2d ed.1990) (collecting cases). Bennett's complaint could be improved, but it is intelligible and gives the defendants notice of the claim for relief.
As for Rule 12(b)(6): a requirement that complaints contain all of the evidence needed to prevail at trial, or at least all the facts that would have been required under the pre-1938 system of code pleading, would induce plaintiffs to violate Rule 8(e) () by larding their complaints with facts and legal theories. The Rules of Civil Procedure make a complaint just the starting point. Instead of lavishing attention on the complaint until the plaintiff gets it just right, a district court should keep the case moving--if the claim is unclear, by requiring a more definite statement under Rule 12(e), and if the claim is clear but implausible, by inviting a motion for summary judgment.
Because racial discrimination in employment is "a claim upon which relief can be granted", this complaint could not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). "I was turned down for a job because of my race" is all a complaint has to say. Because success on a disparate-treatment approach under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, requires proof of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff might want to allege intent--although this is implied by a claim of racial "discrimination". Rule 9(b) provides: "Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally." Bennett's complaint contains a general allegation of intent, which need not be elaborated. See Nance v. Vieregge, 147 F.3d 589 (7th Cir.1998). To the extent the district court required plaintiff to include in the complaint allegations sufficient (if proved) to prevail at trial, the court imposed a requirement of fact-pleading. But as we said of another claim of employment discrimination: American Nurses' Association v. Illinois, 783 F.2d 716, 727 (7th Cir.1986) (emphasis added).
Defendants urge on us another supposed defect in the complaint. They observe that the complaint seeks relief under state as well as federal law but that it does not identify any "state causes of action." This is a defect, however, only if a complaint must identify legal theories. It need not. This is the difference between notice pleading and code pleading; abandonment of code pleading is the fundamental choice behind Rule 8, the reason why it does not contain the phrase "cause of action," a term of art in code-pleading days. Reishauer discusses this history. Defendants received notice that Bennett believed that their refusal to hire her was racial discrimination; that is all the notice a complaint has to convey. A general reference to state law would not support, say, a claim that Bennett slipped on ice and was injured while applying for a job, for the complaint does not give notice about any claim other than employment discrimination; but having stated a discrimination claim the complaint need not offer specifics about which rules of law, state or federal, racial discrimination offends.
Pressure from the flux of cases makes early disposition of weak claims attractive, freeing judicial time for others that appear to have superior prospects. Matters...
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