Kingman v. City of Brockton

• Decision Date: 24 February 1891
• Parties: KINGMAN et al. v. CITY OF BROCKTON et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

153 Mass. 255

26 N.E. 998

KINGMAN et al. v. CITY OF BROCKTON et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

February 24, 1891

COUNSEL

White & Goddard, for petitioners.

H Kingman, for defendants.

OPINION

C ALLEN, J.

The counsel for the petitioners do not controvert the constitutionality of the statute itself, (St.1890, c. 432,) under which the city council has assumed to act. That statute authorizes the city to appropriate a sum of money for the erection of a memorial hall, to be used and maintained as a memorial to the soldiers and sailors of the war of the Rebellion. This may properly be deemed to be a public purpose, and a statute authorizing the raising of money by taxation for the erection of such a memorial hall may be vindicated on the same grounds as statutes authorizing the raising of money for monuments, statues, gates, or archways celebrations, the publication of town histories, parks, roads leading to points of fine natural scenery, decorations upon public buildings, or other public ornaments or embellishments, designed merely to promote the general welfare, either by providing for fresh air or recreation, or by educating the public taste, or by inspiring sentiments of patriotism, or of respect for the memory of worthy individuals. The reasonable use of public money for such purposes has been sanctioned by several different statutes and the constitutional right of the legislature to pass such statutes rests on sound principles. Pub.St. c. 27, §§ 10, 11; St.1882, cc. 154, 255, § 5; St.1883, c. 119; St.1884, c. 42; St.1886, c. 76; St.1889, c. 21; Higginson v. Nahant, 11 Allen, 530. Assuming to act under the authority of the statute of 1890, c. 432, the city council of Brockton proceeded to pass an order appropriating $40,000 for the purpose of erecting a "memorial hall and public library building, *** a portion of said building to be for the use of Fletcher Webster Post, G.A.R., No. 13, so long as it shall exist as an organization; *** the said plans [of the building] to be approved by the trustees of the said G.A.R. Post." By this vote a portion of the contemplated building is to be devoted to the use of the said Grand Army post during its existence as an organization, and the plans are to be approved by the trustees of said post. The defendant contends that this vote is within the authority of the statute. This is certainly open to doubt, but, assuming it to be so, the question presented for determination is whether the purpose thus expressed is a public purpose, for which money can be raised by a town by taxation, even with legislative sanction. It might, perhaps, be sufficient to declare, as the petitioners contend, that the statute is not broad enough to cover the vote of the city council, and that the real question to be determined is merely whether money can be lawfully raised by the city for the purpose expressed, in the absence of any statute expressly authorizing it; but it is better to meet the broader question, whether the legislature can authorize a city or town to make such a use of public money, and, in the opinion of the majority of the court, it cannot. The general rule is well established, and is illustrated by a great variety of decided cases, that taxation must be limited to public purposes. It was accordingly held in the recent case of Mead v. Acton, 139 Mass. 341, 1 N.E. 413, that a statute authorizing a town to pay bounties to soldiers who re-enlisted in 1864, and were credited to the town, was unconstitutional; the purpose being to benefit individuals, and not the public. The Fletcher Webster Post, G.A.R., No. 13, is not a public body, but it is an association of individuals. To support and maintain such an association cannot be deemed to be a public purpose. If a city or town may be authorized to erect a building to be devoted in part to the use of such an association so long as it shall exist as an organization, it is not easy to see why it may not be authorized to erect one exclusively for that purpose, and to provide the necessary furniture, and indeed to bear all the expenses of maintaining the association. If a city or town may be authorized to give such assistance to a body of persons who have been soldiers or sailors in the war, the same principle would seem to extend so far as to include those who have rendered other great and meritorious services, and thus are entitled to public gratitude; such, for example, as societies of disabled or past firemen or policemen. If once the principle is adopted that a city or town may be authorized to raise money by taxation for conferring benefits on individuals merely because in the past they have rendered important and valuable services for the benefit of the general public, occasions will not be wanting which will appeal strongly to the popular sense of gratitude or to the popular emotion, and...