Grannan v. Westchester Racing Ass'n

• Decision Date: 05 October 1897
• Parties: GRANNAN v. WESTCHESTER RACING ASS'N et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

153 N.Y. 449

47 N.E. 896

GRANNAN

v.WESTCHESTER RACING ASS'N et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 5, 1897.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Second department.

Action by Charles R. Grannan against the Westchester Racing Association, the New York Jockey Club, and others, to declare null and void a certain resolution, and to enjoin defendants from enforcing said resolution against plaintiff, and from depriving the plaintiff of any of the privileges enjoyed by the public at the various meetings controlled by it. From an order of the appellate division (44 N. Y. Supp. 790) reversing an order of the general term denying plaintiff's motion for an injunction, defendants appeal. Reversed.

The New York Jockey Club is a corporation which was duly organized in 1894, under chapter 213 of the Laws of 1891. That act was entitled ‘An act to provide for the formation of corporations for improving the breed of domestic animals,’ and provided for the organization of corporations for the purpose of promoting and holding exhibitions of domestic animals, and of improving the breed thereof. The Westchester Racing Association was organized under chapter 570, Laws 1895, an act for the incorporation of associations for the improvement of the breed of horses, to regulate the same, and to establish a state racing commission. This statute authorized the formation of corporations for the purpose of raising, breeding, and improving the breed of horses, and conferred upon them the right, upon complying with its provisions, to hold one or more trotting or running race meetings in each year, and to conduct trotting or running races thereat. If a corporation organized under that act desired to conduct running races or running race meetings, it was required to file a certificate stating that it actually maintained a race track of not less than one mile in length or circumference, and to obtain a license from the state racing commission. It likewise conferred upon the racing commission the power, in a proper case, to issue a license for the term of one year, but expressly provided that every such license should contain a condition that all running races or running race meetings conducted thereunder should be subject to the reasonable rules and regulations from time to time prescribed by the jockey club, and that any such rule or regulation might be modified or abrogated by the state racing commission on giving the jockey club an opportunity to be heard. It further provided that if any corporation or association to which a license should be granted should fail or refuse to comply with the provisions of that act, or with the terms and conditions of its license, the racing commission, upon complaint of the jockey club, should have power to cancel and revoke it. That act, as well as section 352 of the Penal Code, also forbade racing for any bet, stake, or reward, except such as was allowed by special laws, declared such racing a public nuisance, and made every person acting or aiding therein, or being interested in any such bet, stake, or reward, guilty of a misdemeanor. Among the rules and regulations of the jockey club were the following: ‘They [the stewards of the jockey club] shall have power to make inquiry into and deal with any matter relating to racing, and to rule off any person concerned in any fraudulent practices on the turf.’ Rule 4. The stewards of the meetings of the associations holding races under these rules, or their deputies, ‘shall exclude from all places under their control every person who is warned off the turf.’ Rule 16. ‘No jockey shall bet on any race except through the owner of and on the horse which he rides, and any jockey who shall be proved to the satisfaction of the stewards to have any interest in any race horse, or to have been engaged in any betting transaction, or to have received presents from persons other than the owner, will have his license at once revoked. Any person knowingly * * * aiding or abetting in any breach of the orders of the stewards will be ruled off.’ Rule 150. ‘If any person give or offer or promise, directly or indirectly, any bribe in any form to any * * * jockey, * * * every person so offending shall be ruled off.’ Rule 162. ‘Every person ruled off the course of a recognized association is ruled off wherever these rules have force.’ Rule 163. ‘When there is no specified penalty for violation of the rules of racing, or of the regulations of the course, the stewards have power to disqualify, fine, suspend, expel from, or rule off.’ Rule 165. ‘If any case occur which is not or which is alleged not to be provided for by these rules, it shall be determined by the stewards in such manner as they think just and conformable to the usages of the turf.’ Rule 166.

The defendants, other than the jockey club and the Westchester Racing Association, were the stewards of the jockey club, who controlled its affairs and constituted its governing body. It appears from the papers contained in the record that there was a meeting of the stewards held about the 1st of September, 1896, when the plaintiff was called before them, and examined with respect to his practices in connection with races, and, in response to a question put to him, admitted that in September, 1895, he made a present of $500 to Fred Taral, who was a jockey licensed by the club, and that it was proved that he offered Henry Griffin, another licensed jockey, $500, which he declined to accept. Thereafter, at a special meeting held September 28, 1896, the stewards adopted the following resolution: ‘It has come to the knowledge of the stewards of the jockey club that Fred Taral, jockey, received a present of $500, during the season of 1895, in violation of the rules of racing. Owing to Taral's universally accepted good character, he is reprimanded by the stewards, ordered to refund the money received by him in violation of the rules, and all jockeys are warned that the penalty for accepting presents, under rule 150, will be strictly enforced. Resolved, that Riley Grannan be warned and ruled off the turf for offering and making presents to jockeys, in violation of the rules of racing.’ On the 17th day of October, 1896, at the office of the Westchester Racing Association, at Morris Park, the plaintiff purchased a ticket to the races which were then being held by it at that place. The ticket in form entitled the bearer to enter the race track, and enjoy the privilege of witnessing the races. Upon presenting it, and demanding the right to enter, he was denied admission and excluded therefrom by the association. By this action he sought to have the resolution of the jockey club declared null and void, and to enjoin the defendants from enforcing it, or depriving him of the privileges enjoyed at the various meetings controlled by the club. The plaintiff applied for an injunction to restrain the enforcement of that resolution, and to restrain the defendants from depriving him of any of the privileges enjoyed by the public at the various meetings held under its rules and regulations. An order to show cause at special term why such an injunction should not be issued was granted, and made returnable on the 31st day of October, 1896. The defendants were also enjoined by it from enforcing such resolution until the hearing and determination of the special term. After a hearing, the special term denied the plaintiff's motion, and vacated the temporary injunction already issued. From that order the plaintiff appealed to the appellate division, where it was reversed, and the plaintiff's motion to continue the injunction was granted.

Thereafter the defendants applied to the appellate division for leave to appeal to the court of appeals, which was allowed, the court holding that certain questions of law had arisen which, in its opinion, ought to be reviewed by the court of appeals; and thereupon it certified to this court two questions, which are as follows: ‘(1) Whether, under the law, any person who presents himself in fit condition, and demeaning himself properly, and who tenders compliance with the reasonable rules and regulations of the racing association, including its price of admission, is entitled to admission to the grounds of such racing association when races or other public amusements are being held; or has said association the right to admit as spectators those whom it may elect, and to exclude others, solely of its own volition? (2) If the meetings of the racing association be open to the public generally, can such association lawfully exclude a person solely because that person has upon a former occasion failed to observe its reasonable rules and regulations, if at the time when he presents himself for admission he expresses a willingness to comply with the rules and regulations of such racing association, and there is nothing to justify the conclusion that he will not do so?’

Julien T. Davies and Joseph S. Auerbach, for appellants.

Benjamin F. Tracy, for respondent.

MARTIN, J. (after stating the facts).

To a clear and proper comprehension of this case as presented, it is necessary at the outset to understand precisely what is before us, and how far we are authorized to pass upon the various questions determined by the special term and learned appellate division. Section 190 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers upon the court of appeals jurisdiction to review every actual determinationmade by the appellate division of the supreme court where the appellate division allows the same, and certifies that one or more questions of law have arisen which, in its opinion, ought to be reviewed by the court of appeals; and it expressly provides that in such a case the appeal brings up for review the question or questions so certified, and no other. As this court has no jurisdiction except such as is conferred upon it by statute (Szuchy v. Iron Co., 150 N. Y. 219, 44 N. E. 974), it is manifest that it has no authority to...