Smigelski, Application of, A--123

• Decision Date: 03 August 1959
• Docket Number: No. A--123,A--123
• Citation: 154 A.2d 1,30 N.J. 513
• Parties: Application of Frederick W. SMIGELSKI for a writ of habeas corpus. In the matter of Frederick Walter SMIGELSKI.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 513

30 N.J. 513

154 A.2d 1

Application of Frederick W. SMIGELSKI for a writ of habeas corpus In the matter of Frederick Walter SMIGELSKI.

No. A--123.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued May 18, 1959.

Decided Aug. 3, 1959.

Clive S. Cummis, Newark, for appellant and respondent Smigelski (Clive S. Cummis, Attorney; Raymond Del Tufo, Jr., Newark, of counsel).

David M. Satz, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellant State and respondent Board of Managers, New Jersey Reformatory, Bordentown (David D. Furman, Atty. Gen., attorney; Stephen F. Lichtenstein, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

HALL, J.

These consolidated appeals bring before the court again the question of the validity and duration of the continued confinement of one of those individuals originally convicted and sentenced in the criminal courts for murder committed prior to having attained the age of 16 years and before the decision in State v. Monahan, 15 N.J. 34, 104 A.2d 21, 48 A.L.R.2d 641 (1954), which held jurisdiction over such an offense resided exclusively in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. That Monahan did not automatically entitle such persons to release from imprisonment imposed under the law as it previously existed was determined in Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955), certiorari denied 350 U.S. 942, 76 S.Ct. 318, 100 L.Ed. 822 (1956). Smigelski, another of the very few so imprisoned when Monahan was decided, re-presents the question in a somewhat different factual and legal setting. The facts are not in dispute.

On September 12, 1947, when he was 14 years old, admittedly he feloniously killed another and was subsequently indicted for murder by the Hudson County grand jury. After a not guilty plea was entered, his motion to quash the indictment or to transfer the matter to the juvenile court on the ground the latter tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction under the Juvenile Court Act was denied by the Court of Oyer and Terminer, and the denial upheld on appeal. State v. Smigelski, 137 N.J.L. 149, 58 A.2d 780 (Sup.Ct.1948), appeal dismissed 1 N.J. 31, 61 A.2d 583 (1948). The appellate tribunals held, following In re Mei, 122 N.J.Eq. 125, 192 A. 80, 110 A.L.R. 1080 (E. & A. 1937), that murder by a juvenile could not constitutionally be removed from the jurisdiction of the criminal courts despite statutory directions otherwise. Thereafter he changed his plea to Non vult (R.S. 2:138--3, now N.J.S. 2A:113--3, N.J.S.A.) and in January 1949, before he had become 16 years of age, was sentenced in the Court of Oyer and Terminer to a term of 25 to 30 years. Under the law as it then existed, there was no question but that the court had jurisdiction and the proceedings, conviction and sentence were entirely proper and regular.

Monahan was decided March 22, 1954, overruling Mei. On the strength thereof Smigelski, through the same experienced personal counsel who had represented him previously, promptly petitioned the court to vacate the plea and sentence. On June 29, 1954 (ten months before the decision in Johnson) the assignment judge so ordered, and further directed, assumedly over objection, that 'the petitioner be proceeded against forthwith in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Hudson County, in accordance with the statute in such cases made and provided, and the petitioner remain in custody * * *' No statute of limitations on the offense had, of course, run. A transfer order was signed on August 21, followed by a formal complaint in the juvenile court charging him with delinquency by reason of the killing.

The hearing before the juvenile court judge was held on August 25, 1954 when the complaint was filed. At that time Smigelski was just over 21 years of age. (Institution records show his birth date as August 13, 1933. He claims to be a couple of months older. The difference is of no moment as we see it, even though on the basis of the record birth date he had not reached 21 when the law court ordered him to be proceeded against in the juvenile court.) His counsel moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction in the court on the ground that such power did not extend over persons who had passed 18 years of age. The judge denied the application, holding the age when the act was committed and not that when the party is tried controls. No plea or contention of double jeopardy or Autrefois convict was made. Smigelski then, saving his jurisdictional contentions, admitted the commission of the act and pleaded guilty to the charge of juvenile delinquency based thereon. He was remanded to Bordentown Reformatory pending the requisite investigation preparatory to disposition of the charge. On September 30, 1954 he was committed to the reformatory 'for an indefinite term' and has since been confined there. Without a doubt the proceeding in the juvenile court met every requirement of constitutional due process from the procedural aspect.

In September 1956, after unsuccessfully seeking parole, he sought discharge from confinement by Habeas corpus, claiming he was rehabilitated and had been unjustly denied parole by the reformatory board of managers. The writ issued and a hearing was held, at which Smigelski was represented by competent court-appointed counsel. The board denied he was yet fit for return to society even on parole, although there was no trial of the issue, since the court discharged the writ on the determination that Habeas corpus did not lie to review alleged arbitrary action or abuse of discretion by a paroling authority, such being the proper subject only of an appeal to the Appellate Division under R.R. 4:88--8. No appeal was taken or further proceedings had along this line. It is to be noted that on this occasion it was not urged that the detention was invalid for lack of jurisdiction in the juvenile court, but on the contrary the validity of the commitment and confinement was expressly conceded.

Smigelski obtained another writ in 1958 on a complaint brought by his present assigned counsel (who are to be commended for their conscientious and able presentation both in the trial court and on these appeals), charging unlawful imprisonment on the basis of lack of jurisdiction in the juvenile court in 1954 because he was then over the age of 21. A full hearing was held and the matter defended on behalf of the board of managers. The trial judge discharged the writ on the basis of the decision in Johnson (which had been handed down May 2, 1955). Smigelski appealed to the Appellate Division from the judgment.

After that appeal was taken, the State moved before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to amend the commitment to conform to a 1957 amendment (L.1957, c. 220) of N.J.S. 2A:4--37, N.J.S.A., relating to the duration of the confinement of a juvenile to be more fully referred to later. Smigelski opposed the application, and it was denied on the ground that the amendment was not retroactive in effect. The State appealed therefrom and the appeals were consolidated by the Appellate Division. We certified on our own motion before argument in the court. R.R. 1:10--1(a).

Considering first Smigelski's appeal from the discharge of the writ of Habeas corpus, it is initially urged that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has no jurisdiction over a person who first appears before it when over 21 years of age, even though the act of delinquency occurred before the age of 18, and so the commitment by that court was invalid and void. It is frankly conceded the contention is contrary to Johnson and a reversal of that decision is sought. We see no reason to depart from its conclusion here.

The question is involved both with the basic philosophy of the juvenile court and our own statutory provisions. The former is thoroughly discussed in Monahan and succinctly stated by Justice Brennan in In re Lewis, 11 N.J. 217, 224, 94 A.2d 328, 331 (1953):

'* * * the statutory policy for the treatment of juvenile offenders is directed to their rehabilitation for useful citizenship through reformation and education and not to their punishment, even when the offense underlying the adjudication of juvenile delinquency is of a kind which when committed by an older person would merit indictment, conviction and punishment.'

See also the policy declaration found in N.J.S. 2A:4--2, N.J.S.A. The judicial approach and kind of treatment should, of course, vary with the age of the delinquent, and that is made plain by our statutory scheme. Children under 16 have been legislatively declared incapable of committing a crime, N.J.S. 2A:85--4, N.J.S.A., and must be handled exclusively in the juvenile court. Monahan held this included murder, and such is the factual situation before us. Offending minors 16 or 17 years of age may be dealt with in that tribunal, but if the court finds that the person is an habitual offender or has been charged with an offense of a heinous nature 'under circumstances which may require the imposition of a sentence rather than the disposition permitted by this chapter for the welfare of society,' the matter is referred to the county prosecutor to 'thereafter be dealt with in exactly the same manner as a criminal case.' N.J.S. 2A:4--15, N.J.S.A. Also juveniles 16 and 17 may, at their option, demand indictment, trial by jury and treatment as adult offenders where the offense would be indictable if committed by one over 18. N.J.S. 2A:4--15, N.J.S.A. And where the treatment of the juvenile under the particular circumstances can, in the opinion of the court, be carried out only in an institution, the court may commit. N.J.S. 2A:4--37, N.J.S.A.; R.R. 6:9--11. The commitment is not a 'sentence,' that term being confined to adult cases. If the institution must be a correctional one (and we have no state institutions for juveniles alone, other than the state homes for boys and girls), the choice is controlled largely by the offender's age in the light of...