Snider v. City of Excelsior Springs, Mo.

• Decision Date: 02 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-1004,98-1004
• Citation: 154 F.3d 809
• Parties: Linda SNIDER; Robert Carver; Donna Carver; Dennis Murphy; Lea Murphy; Fred Thorp; Ruth Thorp; Albert Teepen; Barbara Teepen; Ronald Tavernaro; and Barbara Tavernaro, All Parties Above Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v. CITY OF EXCELSIOR SPRINGS, MISSOURI; Land Clearance For Redevelopment Authority of Excelsior Springs, Missouri; and Millennium Management Company, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 809

154 F.3d 809

Linda SNIDER; Robert Carver; Donna Carver; Dennis Murphy Lea Murphy; Fred Thorp; Ruth Thorp; Albert Teepen Barbara Teepen; Ronald Tavernaro; and Barbara Tavernaro All Parties Above Individually and On Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Appellants, v. CITY OF EXCELSIOR SPRINGS, MISSOURI; Land Clearance For Redevelopment Authority of Excelsior Springs Missouri; and Millennium Management Company, Appellees.

No. 98-1004.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted June 12, 1998.

Decided Sept. 2, 1998.

Angela K. Green, Kansas City, MO, argued (John P. O'Connor, Frank Wendt, and John M. Waldeck, on the brief), for Appellant.

Douglas R. Richmond, Kansas City, MO, argued (David R. Barnard, Brian E. Engel, David L. Heinemann, and Michael W. Atchison, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before HANSEN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and PANNER, ¹ District Judge.

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

After the plaintiff class filed a complaint alleging civil rights violations and asking for damages and relief from a state court condemnation proceeding, the district court ² held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case and dismissed it. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

The plaintiffs in this action purchased time-share interests for use at the Elms Hotel in Excelsior Springs, Missouri. Each made a one-time cash payment, signed a time-share agreement, and agreed to pay annual fees. In return, the plaintiffs were permitted to reserve rooms on designated floors of the Elms Hotel, or to exchange their time for stays at other resorts, for a specified number of days each year.

Despite the revenue from the time-share scheme, the Elms Hotel experienced financial difficulties and filed for bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy court dismissed the case after the creditors could not agree on a plan to resolve the hotel's financial difficulties. Shortly thereafter, the City of Excelsior Springs (City) declared the hotel and surrounding properties a blighted area and condemned them.

The City and the Land Clearance and Redevelopment Agency (LCRA) then filed a petition in condemnation in a Missouri state court. The petition named nine of the time-share holders as representatives of a defendant class to represent the interests of the more than 800 time-share holders. The City and the LCRA moved to certify the class and notified the nine named class defendants. Shortly thereafter, the state court certified the class of time-share holders. The state court then appointed commissioners, who valued the property being condemned and determined each defendant's interest in the condemnation award. The commissioners determined net damages of $675,000. When the state court entered its order condemning the Elms Hotel, it found that six deeds of trust securing obligations in excess of $20 million that encumbered the hotel were entitled to priority and that the City and the LCRA were beneficiaries under those deeds. The state court therefore gave the City and the LCRA superior rights and interests to the property and the $675,000 condemnation award.

The time-share owners brought this action in federal district court, alleging that the City and the LCRA secretly planned the condemnation to eliminate the time-share interests so that the property could be redeveloped free of any encumbrances. The plaintiffs alleged that the time-share class was certified by the state court but did not participate in the condemnation proceeding. They further alleged that notice was not sent to the class members until after the order of condemnation was signed. The plaintiffs maintained that the actions that the City and the LCRA took in the course of the condemnation proceeding violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because these actions denied the plaintiffs substantive due process rights, procedural due process rights, access to the courts, and the right to petition the government to redress grievances. The plaintiffs also asserted state-law claims, including tortious interference with contract, breach of non-disturbance agreement, and interference with the right to quiet enjoyment.

II.

Under the so-called Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over challenges to state court decisions in judicial proceedings. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). Instead, federal review of state court decisions is vested exclusively in the United States Supreme Court. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. 1303. A federal district court has jurisdiction over constitutional challenges only if they are not inextricably intertwined with the claims asserted in the state court, see Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296 (8th Cir.1990), and a state claim is inextricably intertwined if the federal challenge succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. See id. at 296-97. That is, Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal action if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its holding. Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied 513 U.S. 811, 115 S.Ct. 62, 130 L.Ed.2d 20 (1994). Deciding whether Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiffs' federal suit therefore requires that we determine what the state court held and whether the relief that the plaintiffs requested in their federal action would void the state court's decision or would require us to determine that that decision was wrong. See Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir.1995).

The state court, as we indicated, entered an order approving the condemnation of the Elms Hotel. Under Missouri law, the purpose of condemnation proceedings is " 'to ascertain and...