Logan Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co.

• Citation: 154 F. 497
• Decision Date: 01 July 1907
• Docket Number: 66.
• Parties: LOGAN COAL CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

154 F. 497

LOGAN COAL CO. v. PENNSYLVANIA R. CO.

No. 66.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

July 1, 1907

D. L Krebs, for petitioner.

Francis I. Gowen and John G. Johnson, for defendant.

HOLLAND District Judge.

This is a petition for mandamus, filed the 17th day of December 1906, by the Logan Coal Company, a corporation organized and existing under the laws of Pennsylvania, relator, against the Pennsylvania Railroad Company, also a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the same state, requiring the defendant to cease from subjecting the relator to undue unjust, and unreasonable discrimination in the distribution of cars for the transportation of coal from the relator's mines, and to compel the defendant to supply the relator at all times an adequate and sufficient supply of coal cars to receive and transport the bituminous coal mined and produced by it at its mines on the South Fork and Cambria & Clearfield branches of defendant's railroad to the points and places beyond the state of Pennsylvania. To this petition for a mandamus the defendant filed an answer, admitting many of the facts set forth in the petition, denying others, and stating some new matters important in the determination of the questions at issue. The case was argued upon bill and answer and the facts, as we gather them from the petition and answer, are briefly: That the relator is engaged in mining and producing bituminous coal along the mountain division of the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, which mountain division extends from Altoona, in the state of Pennsylvania, west to a point near Conemaugh. Its mines are situate on the South Fork branch and the Cambria & Clearfield branch of the defendant's railroad. The railroad company failed to provide a supply of cars to the extent demanded at times for the transportation of bituminous coal produced along its lines, and the relator, about two years ago, purchased 150 coal cars, of 100,000 pounds capacity each, for the transportation of coal produced at its mines to its trade beyond the lines of the state of Pennsylvania. This purchase was made with the knowledge and approval of the railroad company, and the cars were placed upon and used on the company's line for more than two years last past. Prior to January 1, 1906, these cars, thus owned by the relator, were distributed to its mines, and in addition thereto the relator received its pro rata share of the cars owned and controlled by the railroad company for the transportation of bituminous coal, which pro rata share was based upon the output capacity of the relator's mines, as ascertained and fixed by the railroad company, and was in addition to complainant's individual cars used by it. By this system of distribution, the relator prior to that time had been receiving the benefit and advantage of its individual cars, and, in addition thereto, its share, without any deduction whatever, of the railroad company's daily distribution of its own cars. On January 1, 1906, the officials of the defendant company put into force and operation the following order:

'Commencing January 1, 1906, assigned cars, i.e., cars for Pennsylvania Railroad Company fuel supply, foreign railroad cars especially consigned for the fuel supply of railroads consigning such cars, and individual cars assigned by the owners to specified mines for loading, will be charged against the capacity of the mines at which they are placed. The difference between the rated capacity of a mine and the capacity of the assigned cars placed for loading will be the rated capacity on which all cars will be prorated.'

Since the adoption of the order of January 1, 1906, 'Pennsylvania Railroad fuel cars,' 'especially consigned fuel cars,' and 'individual cars' have been taken into consideration by the railroad company in the assignment of cars to the coal mining companies along its route, and these cars have been charged against the capacity of the mines to which they have been assigned and placed, and the owners of individual cars receive a prorated share of the company's cars on a rated capacity represented by the difference between the rated capacity of such mines and the capacity of the assigned cars received by it. The object of the adoption of this rule was to place all shippers on an absolute equality as near as possible, and yet not discriminate against individual car owners, or those to whom cars were especially consigned for fuel. To illustrate the effect of the order on an individual owner of cars as compared with a competitor receiving only company cars; take two operators each having mines rated at 500 tons a day, and assume that on any given day the company has enough of its own cars on hand to deliver to all mines, cars which will take care of 70 per cent. of the output. Assume that one operator has individual cars available on that day for the shipment of 200 tons, while the other has no individual cars at all. The latter receives railway company cars capable of carrying 70 per cent. of 500 tons, or 350 tons. The former, on the day in question, will receive individual cars in which he can ship 200 tons, and his rating for a distribution of the company's cars for that day will be reduced to 300 tons, 70 per cent. of which is 210 tons, for the transportation of which he will receive company cars, so that the operator with the individual cars will be able to ship on the day instanced 410 tons as against a shipment of 350 tons by the operator who has no individual cars. To this extent the relator has the advantage over its competitors who do not own individual cars, and it receives the exclusive use of its cars at all times.

Since the date mentioned, the defendant company has enforced this order of distribution of cars, and it is claimed by the relator that its adoption has resulted in a practical assumption of ownership of its individual cars by the railroad company, and works an undue and unreasonable discrimination against relator in favor of other bituminous miners who do not own individual cars; and it is further claimed that the defendant's system of distributing other cars assigned to relator by foreign railroads for their fuel supply and cars of the defendant railway company for its fuel supply works an unjust, undue, and unreasonable discrimination against relator in favor of other mine owners to which such consignments of cars are not made.

That a distribution of cars in accordance with the order of January 1, 1906, works an unjust and undue discrimination is denied in the answer, and is the question at issue in the case. Can the defendant railway company, in the distribution of its cars to bituminous mine owners along its route, treat individual cars and fuel cars especially assigned as it assumes to do in this order? The defendant company is engaged in the transportation of the relator's bituminous coal, together with that of other miners along its route, from points within the state of Pennsylvania to points beyond the state of Pennsylvania; that is to say, it is engaged in interstate commerce, and is subject to the provisions of the commerce act of the 4th day of February, 1887, and its supplements, the third section of which act it is claimed the defendant violates in its method of distributing cars. Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 380 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3155). This section provides:

'That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.'

Any violation of the provisions of this section, it was held in U.S. ex rel. Greenbrier, C. & C. Co. v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 143 F. 266, 74 C.C.A. 404, can be remedied by mandamus proceedings, under section 10 of the Act of March 2, 1889 (chapter 382, 25 Stat. 862 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3172)), amending the commerce act, part of which is as follows:

'That the Circuit and District Courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction upon the

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