Town of Hartland v. Jensen's, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 November 1959
• Parties: TOWN OF HARTLAND et al. v. JENSEN'S INC. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Page 754

155 A.2d 754

146 Conn. 697

TOWN OF HARTLAND et al. v. JENSEN'S INC.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Nov. 3, 1959.

Howard J. Mexwell, Hartford, with whom was George E. Merwin, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Edward J. Quinlan, Jr., Winstead, for appellee (named plaintiff).

Charles M. Rice, Simsbury, for plaintiffs in a companion case.

Before BALDWIN, C. J., and KING, MURPHY and MELLITZ, JJ. ^*

BALDWIN, Chief Justice.

The defendant, Jensen's, Inc., has appealed from a judgment enjoining the use of its land in the town of Hartland as a site or park for trailers or mobile homes in violation of an ordinance. The defendant claims that the ordinance denies it rights guaranteed by § 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. $The defendant presses only one of several claimed errors in the finding. The correction sought, if made, would not be of sufficient consequence to alter the decision of the case. The court found the following facts: On August 21, 1957, the defendant acquired title to ninety acres of land in Hartland. On the same day, it filed in the town clerk's office a map showing a subdivision of the land into 412 spaces for mobile homes. On July 30, 1956, the town had adopted an ordinance which limited the occupancy of land by a trailer or mobile home to a period of sixty days. ¹ Hartland is a sparsely settled rural town. Of the 21,568 acres contained within its borders, the metropolitan district owns 5131, including a reservoir, and the state 7438, devoted to forestry purposes. There are 549 residents and 325 dwelling houses. There is no public water supply or sewerage. One hundred and fifty-one children attend two elementary schools, which are overcrowded. High school pupils attend school in nearby Granby or Winsted. There is no paid police force, and fire protection is provided by two volunteer companies. The grand list of the town is $2,163,000, and its bonded indebtedness is within $76,000 of the limit imposed by statute. Rev.1958, § 7-374(b).

The defendant sells units for household living which are known as mobile homes. The most popular type is forty-five feet long and ten feet wide, mounted on wheels which are not removed when the unit is placed in a park. It has sanitary facilities, plumbing, shower baths, sinks and and heating equipment. Such units are usually sold for about $5000 on a five-year plan of payment secured by a chattel mortgage. The defendant proposes to rent space in its park on a month-to-month basis to owners of mobile homes. Some portions of the land are swampy and others are hilly and steep. The natural course of drainage and the condition of the soil are such that Salmon Brook, which flows through Granby, could be contaminated. Statistics indicate that 80 per cent of the occupants of mobile home units remain in a park for a maximum period of one to two years. If all of the 412 spaces in the defendant's park were occupied at one time by mobile homes, the population of the park might exceed the present population of the town. On August 21, 1957, there was no provision for zoning in Hartland. The trial court concluded from these facts that the ordinance was a reasonable exercise of the police power and enjoined the defendant from using its land as a park for mobile homes.

Section 248d of the 1955 Cumulative Supplement (Rev.1958, § 7-148) empowers towns which do not have duly constituted local zoning or planning commissions to 'regulate and provide for the licensing of parked trailers, when located off the public highways, and trailer parks or mobile home parks.' The defendant concedes, as it must, that this statute gives the town authority to adopt proper regulations concerning trailers and trailer or mobile home parks. The first claim of the defendant is that the ordinance does not purport to regulate mobile home parks or mobile homes but to regulate transient trailers or camp trailers or vehicles adapted to temporary living or camping purposes. The defendant draws a distinction between trailers, so-called, and mobile homes. Be that as it may, the all-inclusive phraseology of the ordinance expresses a plain legislative intent to embrace both. When, as here, a legislative enactment is unambiguous, there is no occasion to construe it, for it speaks for itself. Wilson v. Town of West Haven, 142 Conn. 646, 654, 116 A.2d 420; Watrous v. Connelly, 141 Conn. 257, 263, 105 A.2d 654.

Claiming unconstitutionality of the ordinance, the defendant asserts that the ownership and operation of a mobile home park is a legitimate business and a legally authorized use of land. Any business or land use which affects the public health, safety or welfare is subject to the police power, exercised in a reasonable manner. United Interchange, Inc. v. Spellacy, 144 Conn. 647, 654, 136 A.2d 801, and cases cited; Calve Bros. Co. v. City of Norwalk, 143 Conn. 609, 616, 124 A.2d 881. The defendant charges that the ordinance provision limiting the occupancy of space in a mobile home park is unreasonable because, as applied to a mobile home, it is prohibitory and not regulatory. The obvious purpose of the time limitation is to prevent either a trailer or a mobile home from becoming a permanent habitation in the town. It appears from the finding that the development of a park for the number of mobile homes contemplated by the defendant could involve the town in civic problems affecting the public health, safety and welfare which the resources of the town could not adequately meet. Zoning regulations prohibiting the operation of trailer parks in residential areas are a constitutional exercise of the police power. Jensen's, Inc. v. Town of Plainville, 146 Conn. 311, 314, 150 A.2d 297; People v. Lederle, 206 Misc. 244, 250, 132 N.Y.S.2d 693, affirmed 309 N.Y. 866, 131 N.E.2d 284; Davis v. McPherson, Ohio App., 132 N.E.2d 626, appeals dismissed 164 Ohio St. 375, 130 N.E.2d 794; 164 Ohio St. 296, 130 N.E.2d 342. It is true that the town must rely upon the authority given by the statute, which confers the power to regulate but not, in those terms, the power to prohibit. The power to regulate, however, entails a certain degree of prohibition. 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed.) § 10.26. The word 'regulate' implies, when used in legislation, the bringing under the control of constituted authorities the subject to be regulated. Webster, New International Dictionary (2d Ed.). It infers limitations. The statute relating to zoning, now § 8-2 of the 1958 Revision, speaks of the power to regulate and not of the power to prohibit, but it cannot be denied that zoning regulations may in their operation result in prohibition under some circumstances. Calve Bros. Co. v. City of Norwalk, 143 Conn. 609, 617, 124 A.2d 881. In the case at bar, the legislative authority of the town properly could have determined that its geographical situation and its resources were such that temporary occupancy of land within its borders by trailers and mobile homes was feasible, but more or less permanent occupancy would overtax the abilities of the town to cope with the problems which would arise.

The defendant contends that the limited occupancy permitted by the ordinance is an unreasonable interference with its business because it is compelled,...