State v. Bumpers, 826

• Decision Date: 20 June 1967
• Docket Number: No. 826,826
• Citation: 270 N.C. 521,155 S.E.2d 173
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Wayne Darnell BUMPERS.

Page 173

155 S.E.2d 173

270 N.C. 521

STATE of North Carolina v. Wayne Darnell BUMPERS.

No. 826.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 20, 1967.

Smith, Moore, Smith, Schell & Hunter, by Norman B. Smith, Greenboro, for defendant. Of counsel: Lee, High, Taylor & Dansby, by Herman L. Taylor, Greensboro.

T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen., Harry W. McGalliard, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the State.

PLESS, Justice.

The defendant makes a very interesting argument in his brief to the effect that it was error for the Court to excuse prospective jurors on the ground that such persons did not believe in capital punishment. He recognizes that this position has been adversely determined in the very recent case of State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453, but requests that the Court reconsider and reverse the ruling therein made. However, this decision was adopted by a unanimous Court within the past few weeks, and the reasoning of it is sound and convincing. The following excerpts, some of which are quotations from other courts, are well chosen and concisely stated in the opinion of Chief Justice Parker:

'It is a general rule that the State in the trial of crimes punishable by death has the right to an impartial jury, and in order to secure it, has the right to challenge for cause any prospective juror who is shown to entertain beliefs regarding capital punishment which would be calculated to prevent him from joining in any verdict carrying the death penalty.

"* * * What (the defendant) is really asserting is the right to have on the jury some who may be prejudiced in his favor--i.e., some who are opposed to one possible penalty with which he is faced. We think he has no such constitutional right. His right is to absolute impartiality.'

"It will readily be seen that this 'balanced' jury, which the defendant envisages, is in reality a 'partisan jury'; if, as he urges, it may include jurors with bias or scruples against capital punishment it must--if it is to have 'balance'--include also those with bias in favor of the death penalty as the punishment for murder. It is settled * * * that under the Statute the verdict must be unanimous both as to guilt and as to punishment. As a result, * * * any juror 'can hang the jury if he cannot have his way' as to the sentence which he deems appropriate. These considerations lead to the conclusion that trials before 'balanced juries,' even on unanimous findings of guilt, would freguently result in disagreements. And disagreements on successive trials would result in practical immunity from murder. We cannot believe that the Statute was intended to have such a tendency.'

"Upon the theory that conscientious scruples against infliction of the death penalty under any circumstances, or equivalent beliefs, equally disqualify a jury for cause in a prosecution for a capital crime, whether the law prescribes the single punishment of death upon conviction, or invests the jury, upon conviction, with a discretionary power to assess death or life imprisonment according to the evidence and circumstances, the rule has become generally accepted that where the jury is vested with such discretion the state may challenge for such cause because it is entitled to the maximum penalty if the proof shall justify it, and to contend throughout the trial and finally to the jury that the character of the crime justifies it."

Fifty-three prospective jurors were examined, sixteen of whom stated that they were opposed to capital punishment, and they were thereupon excused from service. If the argument of the defendant is to be carried to extremes, it would mean that if the State had exhausted its peremptory challenges when these sixteen jurors were examined that the entire jury would have been opposed to capital punishment. It is well-known that in many horrible cases the defendants are anxious to avoid the possibility of a death sentence and will offer, and in fact plead for permission, to enter a plea of guilty which will mean the imposition of a life sentence. However, the Solicitor in many of these cases feels that the public interest requires that a jury, rather than he, should take the responsibility of saving the defendant from the death penalty, if it is to be done, and therefore puts the defendant on trial in which the death penalty is sought.

Every litigant, whether it be the State or the defendant, in a criminal case or the parties in a civil case, is entitled to an impartial jury. Where a juror states in advance that under no circumstances would he accept the contentions and position of a party, he is not impartial to that party but, as a corollary, must necessarily be partial to the adversary.

If a prospective juror stated that under no conditions would he acquit a defendant or that no evidence could cause him to convict the defendant, it should not be claimed that he was an impartial juror. In a case in which the prosecution was relying exclusively upon circumstantial evidence, no court would require the State to accept a juror who stated that under no conditions would he convict a defendant upon circumstantial evidence. Where a venireman states that he has read or heard so much about a case that he had formed the opinion that the defendant was guilty, and he would not under any conditions acquit him, no court would permit such person to serve on the jury; and we can conceive of no reasonable person who would argue that he should. This, however, is merely the corollary of the defendant's position in this case.

The result in this case refutes the argument of the defendant. A jury wholly composed of persons who believe in capital punishment have still not imposed it upon the defendant in a case where the facts overwhelmingly would sustain the death penalty.

The defendant complains of the search of his grandmother's house which resulted in finding a rifle that has been identified as the one which fired the shots into the bodies of Mrs. Nelson and Monty Jones. But it must be remembered (1) that His premises were not searched--they were his grandmother's; (2) His rifle was not taken--it was his grandmother's; (3) She gave permission for the search and has not yet complained of it. Since the Solicitor announced that he was not relying upon the search warrant but upon permission given by the owner of the premises for its search, the question arises as to whether her consent was voluntarily given. While there are decisions that the presence of officers and the announcement that they wish to search premises constitutes a condition in which coercion and intimidation may be present, they are not applicable here.

The defendant sought an order of the Court requiring the State to return the rifle and to suppress evidence regarding it. In support of the motion they offered the affidavit of Mrs. Hattie Leath in which she said: 'On Tuesday, August 2, 1966, at about 2:00 P.M., four white men drove up to her house in two cars. She knew these men to be officers of the Alamance County Sheriff's Department, although they were not in uniform * * * One of the deputies came up on the porch of her house and walked up to the front screened door. She was standing immediately inside the door. The deputy said he had a notice or a warrant or something like that, for searching her house. He did not appear to have any paper in his hand, and he did not read anything to her. After hearing this, she did not stop to think about whether the officers had a right to search her house. She simply answered the officer right away by saying, 'Go ahead,' as she opened the door and stepped out onto the porch. The officers began at once to search the house.'

During the trial the State offered the rifle which was found in the house, and upon objection to its admission, the Court excused the jury, and Mrs. Leath testified in person. Some of her statements are quoted as follows (the emphasis is ours): 'I own my own house; it belongs to me * * * The defendant Wayne Darnell Bumpers was living with me on that date * * * He has been living with me at this place all of his life * * * Sheriff Stockard came out to my home * * * Four of them came. I was busy about my work, and they walked up and said, 'I have a search warrant to search your house,' and I walked out and Told them to come on in * * * I just told him to come on in and go ahead and search, and I went on about my work. I wasn't concerned what he was about. I was just satisfied * * * I told Mr. Stockard to go ahead and look all over the house. I had no objection to them making a search of my house. I was willing to let them look in any room or drawer in my house they wanted to. Nobody threatened me with anything * * * I let them search, and it...