Chase v. United States

• Decision Date: 10 December 1894
• Docket Number: No. 83,83
• Citation: 155 U.S. 489,39 L.Ed. 234,15 S.Ct. 174
• Parties: CHASE v. UNITED STATES
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

155 U.S. 489

15 S.Ct. 174

39 L.Ed. 234

CHASE

v UNITED STATES.

No. 83.

December 10, 1894.

Addison C. Harris and John C. Chaney, for plaintiff in error.

Sol. Gen. Maxwell, Asst. Atty. Gen. Conrad, and Asst. Atty. Gen. Dodge, for the United States.

Mr. Justice HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.

This writ of error brings up a judgment of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana, dis- missing a suit instituted against the United States by the personal representatives of Hiram W. Chase.

It appears from the statement of facts made by the court below that on the 17th day of July, 1866, John K. Snider leased for a term of ten years a certain lot, with the building thereon, in Lafayette, Ind., to be occupied by the United States as a postoffice; that the building was so occupied until December, 1869, when it was destroyed by fire; that James Montgomery, previous to the fire, became the owner of the property, and entitled to the benefit of the lease; that on the 1st day of May, 1870, Montgomery made a lease, in form to the United States, represented by the postmaster general, for the term of 20 years, and at an annual rental of $1,500, payable in equal quarterly installments, of certain parts of a building which he covenanted to erect upon the same lot. He also covenanted to supply and keep in repair, to the satisfaction of the postmaster general, all boxes and flxtures necessary for a postoffice in that building.

Montgomery erected the required building, and the United States took possession of it. On the 15th day of April, 1870, he assigned his interest in the lease to one Tuttle, who, on the 10th of February, 1871, assigned to Chase, the testator of the plaintiff. Subsequently, May 10, 1886, the government, without complaining of any violation of the terms of the lease, vacated the premises, and refused to pay rent thereafter.

During the occupancy of the premises, Chase laid out and expended for furniture, fixtures, and required changes, the sum of $2,000, and at the time the premises were vacated he was engaged, in conformity with the request of the postal officers, in making other repairs and additions.

The present action was brought on the lease, to recover the amount due for the unexpired term.

The circuit court adjudged that the postmaster general had no authority to execute the lease, and that the government was not liable to suit upon it. For that reason the suit was dismissed. 44 Fed. 732.

Mr. John C. Chaney, for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 491-495 intentionally omitted] Mr. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The first question to be considered involves the jurisdiction of this court to review the judgment below upon writ of error. The United States contends that a judgment rendered in a suit brought under the act of March 3, 1887, entitled 'An act to provide for the bringing of suits against the government of the United States,' and commonly known as the 'Tucker Act,' cannot be re-examined here except upon appeal. 24 Stat. 505, c. 359. So much of that act as can have any bearing upon this case is printed in the margin.¹

Section 1. That the court of claims shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters:

The contention of the government as to the jurisdiction of this court is not well founded. Congress did not intend that cases brought under this act in a district or circuit court of the United States should be brought here by appeal only.

Throughout all the provisions relating to actions commenced in those courts, there is shown a purpose to preserve the dis- tinction between cases at law, cases in equity, and cases in admiralty. The phrases, 'judgment or decree,' 'right of exception or appeal,' 'equity or admiralty,' 'rights of appeal or writs of error,' and 'appeal or writ of error,' taken in connection with the clause in the fourth section relating to the jurisdiction of the respective courts of the United States proceeding under the act, and providing that 'the course of procedure shall be in accordance with the established rules of said respective courts, and of such additions and modifications thereof as said courts may adopt'; with that part of section 7 which in terms refers to the distinction between cases at law and cases in equity and admiralty, and directs that 'if the suit be in equity or admiralty the court shall proceed with the same according to the rules of such courts'; with the express recognition in section 9 of the 'same rights of appeal or writs of error' in any suit brought under this act as were reserved in the statutes of the United States in that behalf at the date of the passage of the act; with the requirement, in the same section, that 'the modes of procedure in claiming and perfecting an appeal or writ of error shall conform in all respects, and as near as may be, to the statutes and rules of court governing appeals and writs of error in like causes'; and with the provision in section 10 making it the duty of the district attorney, when the attorney general shall determine 'whether an appeal or writ of error shall be taken or not' in cases in which 'the judgment or decree' shall be adverse to the government, to cause 'an appeal or writ of error to be perfected in accordance with the terms of the statutes and rules of practice governing the same,'—these phrases, clauses, and provisions make it, we think, reasonably clear that congress intended that the final determination of suits brought under this act in a district or circuit court of the United States shall be reviewed here upon writ of error, if the case be one at law, and upon appeal, if the case is one cognizable in equity or in admiralty, under the existing statutes regulating the jurisdiction of those courts.

But congress, while recognizing the settled distinction between law, equity, and admiralty, did not intend that the records of cases brought against the government under this act should contain all that is required in suits instituted in the courts of the United States under the general statutes regulating their jurisdiction and the modes of procedure therein. Neither the mode of procedure in the court of claims, nor the mode in which cases there determined may be brought here for re-examination, were changed by the act of March 3, 1887. But under that act a judgment of a district or circuit court of the United States, in an action at law brought against the government, will be re-examined here only when the record contains a specific finding of facts, with the conclusions of law thereon. In such cases this court will only inquire whether the judgment below is supported by the facts thus found. And, we think, it was also the purpose of congress to require like specific findings or statements of fact and conclusions of law in cases in equity and in admiralty brought under that act in the district and circuit courts of the United States, and to restrict our inquiry in such cases, as in actions at law, to the sufficiency of the facts so found or stated to support the final judgment.

For the reasons stated, the motion to dismiss the writ of error for want of jurisdiction in this court to review in that mode the final judgment of the court below is overruled.

Was the United States liable upon the written contract of lease which is the foundation of this action?

By the law in force when the lease sued on was executed, it was made the duty of the postmaster general 'to establish postoffices.' By section 3732, Rev. St., it is provided, as did, substantially, the statutes in force when that lease was made, that 'no contract or purchase on behalf of the United States shall be made unless the same is authorized by law, or is under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment, except in the war and navy departments, for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, which, however, shall not exceed the necessities of the current year.' 4 Stat. 102, c. 64, § 1; 12 Stat. 220, c. 84, § 10.

Much stress is placed by counsel for the plaintiff upon the clause making it the duty of the postmaster general to establish postoffices, the contention being that the power to establish a postoffice carries with it authority to lease rooms or a building in which the postmaster may conduct the business of his office. In support of this position, Ware v. U. S., 4 Wall. 617, is cited. But that case does not justify any such interpretation of the act of congress. The question there was as to the power of the postmaster general to discontinue a postoffice that had once been established by him under the authority conferred by the act of 1825 (4 Stat. 102), 'to establish postoffices.' This court, observing that the power to discontinue postoffices is incident to the power to establish them, unless there was some provision in the acts of congress restraining its exercise, said: 'Undoubtedly, congress might discontinue a postoffice which they had previously established by law, and it is difficult to see why the postmaster general may not do the same thing, when acting under an act of congress expressed in the very words of the constitution, from which congress derives its power.' Again: 'Power to establish postoffices and postroads is conferred upon congress, but the policy of the government, from the time the general postoffice was established, has been to delegate the power to designate the places where the mail shall be received and delivered to the postmaster general.' Page 632.

There was no issue in that case as to the extent of the authority of the postmaster general to bind the government by contract for the payment of money or for the lease of a building for a postoffice. That case did not call for any consideration of the general question, whether...