1550 Laurel Owner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Appellate Div. of the Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.

Decision Date07 November 2018
Docket NumberB288091
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties 1550 LAUREL OWNER’S ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. APPELLATE DIVISION OF the SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; Stephen Munshi, Real Party in Interest.

Law Offices of Joseph C. Watson and Joseph C. Watson, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.

Duane Morris and Michael L. Fox, San Francisco, for Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent Appellate Division of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles.

The Kneafsey Firm, Sean M. Kneafsey and Kurt A. Dreibholz for Real Party in Interest.

Law Office of Jon B. Eisenberg and Jon B. Eisenberg, Oakland; Susan Brandt-Hawley, Glen Ellen, John A. Taylor, Burbank, Michael G. Colantuono, Pasadena, Dennis A. Fischer, Santa Monica, Robert S. Gerstein, Rex Heinke, Los Angeles, Laurie J. Hepler, San Francisco, Robin B. Johansen, Sacramento, Robin Meadow, Los Angeles, and Richard A. Rothschild, Los Angeles, for California Academy of Appellate Lawyers as Amicus Curiae.

EDMON, P. J.

Petitioner 1550 Laurel Owner’s Association, Inc. (the Association), the plaintiff below, seeks a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order—which granted a petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to rule on the merits of a special motion to strike ( Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16 )1 filed by defendant and real party in interest Stephen Munshi (Munshi)—and to enter a new and different order denying Munshi’s petition for writ of mandate.

The essential issue presented is whether a special motion to strike may be brought in a limited civil case. Section 92 enumerates permissible pleadings and motions in limited civil cases. At subdivision (d), it provides that "[m]otions to strike are allowed only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint." (Italics added.) A special motion to strike, or anti-SLAPP motion,2 is one brought on the ground that the cause of action against the defendant arose from defendant’s exercise of the constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection with a public issue so as to require the plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing on the claim ( § 425.16, subd. (b)(1) )—not "on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint." (§ 92, subd. (d), hereafter, § 92(d).) We conclude the restrictive language of section 92(d), which limits the type of motions to strike that may be brought in a limited civil case, precludes the filing of a special motion to strike in such a case. Therefore, we grant the relief requested.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In October 2016, the Association filed a limited civil case against Munshi for breach of a settlement agreement.

Munshi filed a special motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16, contending that the Association’s claims arose out of his protected petitioning activity, and that the Association could not prevail on its claims. In opposition, the Association contended, inter alia, that the special motion to strike violated section 92(d), which states that in a limited civil case, "[m]otions to strike are allowed only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint."

The trial court denied Munshi’s special motion to strike, concluding that a special motion to strike is not permitted in a limited civil case.

Munshi challenged the trial court’s order by way of a petition for writ of mandate to the appellate division of the superior court. The appellate division granted the petition, concluding that section 92(d) does not bar a defendant in a limited civil case from moving to strike a cause of action pursuant to section 425.16. The appellate division directed the trial court to vacate its order and to rule on the merits of Munshi’s special motion to strike.

The Association then petitioned this court for a writ of mandate directing the appellate division to vacate its order. On April 10, 2018, we ordered a stay of trial court proceedings and issued an order to show cause why the Association’s petition should not be granted.3

DISCUSSION

The sole issue before us is whether a special motion to strike may be brought in a limited civil case.

I.Principles of Statutory Interpretation; Standard of Review

In determining whether special motions to strike are cognizable in limited civil cases, we apply well-established rules of statutory interpretation.

" ‘As in any case involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task here is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 [105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129].) We begin by examining the statutory language because the words of a statute are generally the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. ( People v. Watson (2007) 42 Cal.4th 822, 828 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 171 P.3d 1101] ; Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 871 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 891 P.2d 804].) We give the words of the statute their ordinary and usual meaning and view them in their statutory context. ( People v. Watson , supra , at p. 828 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 769, 171 P.3d 1101].) We harmonize the various parts of the enactment by considering them in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. ( People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 975 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 261, 135 P.3d 669] ; Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 487 [30 Cal.Rptr.3d 823, 115 P.3d 98].) ‘If the statute’s text evinces an unmistakable plain meaning, we need go no further.’ ( Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503, 508 [66 Cal.Rptr.3d 52, 167 P.3d 666].)" ( In re C.H . (2011) 53 Cal.4th 94, 100, 133 Cal.Rptr.3d 573, 264 P.3d 357.) " ‘Ultimately we choose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute.’ ( Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co . (2002) 28 Cal.4th 222, 227 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 795, 47 P.3d 639].)" ( Shorts v. Superior Court (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 709, 720, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 392.)

The meaning and construction of a statute is a question of law, which we examine de novo. ( People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co . (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 200, 11 P.3d 956 ; Nist v. Hall (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 40, 45, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 47.)

II.A Complaint in a Limited Civil Case Is Not Subject to a Special Motion to Strike
A. Overview of Procedural Rules Governing Limited Civil Cases

A limited civil case includes "[a] case at law in which the demand, exclusive of interest, or the value of the property in controversy amounts to twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) or less." (§ 86, subd. (a)(1).)4 An unlimited civil case is "[a] civil action or proceeding other than a limited civil case." (§ 88.)

Limited civil cases are governed by the rules of civil procedure generally applicable to all civil actions (§ 90), "[e ]xcept as otherwise provided " by sections 90–100. (§ 91, subd. (a), italics added.) These sections generally streamline the litigation process by, inter alia, limiting permissible pleadings and motions (§ 92), limiting pretrial discovery (§ 94), and permitting the presentation of evidence by affidavits or declarations in lieu of live testimony (§ 98).

As relevant to the present petition, section 92 limits the pleadings and motions that are allowed in limited civil cases. It provides:

"(a) The pleadings allowed are complaints, answers, cross-complaints, answers to cross-complaints and general demurrers.

"(b) The answer need not be verified, even if the complaint or cross-complaint is verified.

"(c) Special demurrers are not allowed.

"(d) Motions to strike are allowed only on the ground that the damages or relief sought are not supported by the allegations of the complaint .

"(e) Except as limited by this section, all other motions are permitted ." (Italics added.)

B. The Appellate Division’s Analysis of Section 92(d)

The issue before us turns on the interpretation of section 92(d), and specifically whether a special motion to strike brought pursuant to section 425.16 is a "motion to strike" within the meaning of section 92(d).

The appellate division concluded: "In subdivision (a) of the anti-SLAPP statute, the Legislature expressed its intent to curb a ‘disturbing increase in lawsuits’ brought to chill First Amendment rights and rights to petition. In that same provision, it mandated the anti-SLAPP legislation be ‘construed broadly’ to serve this purpose. Given this compelling language, and the absence of anti-SLAPP statutes when section 92 was passed, we harmonize the provisions and hold that section 92 does not bar a defendant to a limited civil complaint from moving to strike a cause of action on the ground that it violates section 425.16."

The appellate division reasoned that special motions to strike under section 425.16 are permitted in limited civil cases because such motions are not "motions to strike" within the meaning of section 92(d). The appellate division found that "motions to strike" as used in section 92(d) are only those motions described by section 435 et seq., which " ‘challenge[ ] the legal sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations.’ " It found that, unlike traditional motions to strike under section 435 et seq., special motions to strike under section 425.16 are not motions to strike because they "do[ ] not simply challenge the sufficiency of an underlying complaint," but instead " ‘like a summary judgment motion, pierce[ ] the pleadings and require[ ] an evidentiary showing.’ " The appellate division therefore concluded that there could be "no reason to presume the motions to strike referenced in section 92 include anti-SLAPP motions."

The appellate division properly recognized that...

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