Reed v. Moore

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals
Citation319 P.2d 80,156 Cal.App.2d 43
Decision Date11 December 1957
PartiesLucille REED, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Eugene Parker MOORE, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 9253.

Harry A. Ackley, Woodland, for appellant.

Mento, Buchler & Littlefield, Sacramento, for respondent.

WARNE, Justice pro tem.

This is an appeal from a judgment for defendant after the trial court had sustained a demurrer to plaintiff's complaint without leave to amend. The complaint alleged that plaintiff, a married woman, sustained injuries, suffered severe emotional strain, mental shock and fright, followed by physical injury in the form of a miscarriage as the direct and proximate result from plaintiff being an eyewitness to a collision between an automobile in which her husband was riding and an automobile driven by defendant, the collision being caused by defendant's negligence. The complaint further alleged that, at the time of the accident, plaintiff was seated in front of her place of abode approximately 130 feet from the point of impact. Upon oral argument, plaintiff's counsel stipulated that at the time of the accident plaintiff was in fear solely for her husband's safety and could not herself be considered within the zone of danger. We will treat the stipulation as an amendment to the complaint. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Plaintiff contends that recovery may be had in the instant case for emotional distress followed by physical injury, irrespective of impact upon the person of the plaintiff and irrespective of whether the emotional distress is intentionally or negligently caused. In support of her contention she cites Sloane v. Southern California Ry. Co., 111 Cal. 668, 680, 44 P. 320, 32 L.R.A. 193; Medeiros v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 57 Cal.App.2d 707, 135 P.2d 676; Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 298, 176 P. 440, and Cook v. Maier, 33 Cal.App.2d 581, 92 P.2d 434. We do not agree with plaintiff. The cases are not in point and may easily be distinguished from the case at bar. In the Sloane case, supra, the defendant wrongfully deprived plaintiff of her ticket and thereafter, by reason of such wrongful act, excluded her from its car. The negligent act was directed to the plaintiff personally, not to a third person. In the Medeiros case, supra, the defendant negligently permitted a cleaning brush to remain in a bottle of coca cola and plaintiff drank a portion of the contents. The recovery was for injury resulting from mental shock on seeing the disgusting looking object in the bottle from which she had just drunk. Here again, the negligence was directed to the plaintiff personally. In the Cook case, supra, defendant's automobile collided with a second automobile and as a result of said collision, and the negligence of the driver in operating the vehicle, it ran 'on to' a vacant lot owned by plaintiff adjoining her home where, with a loud noise and crash, it collided with a trash burner, thereafter running into a rock and board fence at the corner of her house, all within 15 feet of her, and causing rocks and parts of the fence to be thrown and scattered over plaintiff's property in the direction of plaintiff and about her person. Here again, plaintiffs were allowed to recover for emotional distress caused by fear of personal physical injury to herself. In the Lindley case, supra, plaintiffs suffered physical injury due to fright while repelling an attack by a chimpanzee on plaintiff and her children. There the appellant contended that the trial court should have informed the jury that no recovery may be had on account of fright produced by apprehended danger or peril to a third person and insisted that the authorities were uniform in upholding such rule. The court stated that there is excellent authority to the contrary, citing Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59, Wilkinson v. Downton, L.R. (1897), 2 Q.B. 57, and Chon v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App.Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39. The court did not, however, hold such recovery could be had. The court stated it was not necessary to discuss any conflict of authority on the subject, because, as in the case of Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597, L.R.A.1917A, 394, fear for another was not the only cause of injury. The case, therefore, is authority to sustain the rule that physical injury due to fright or shock as a result of fear for one's own safety is compensable. It is not, however, authority to sustain an action for damages produced by an apprehended danger or peril to a third person. Maury v. United States, D.C., 139 F.Supp. 532. We quote the following from 52 American Jurisprudence, page 417 'As a general rule, no recovery is permitted for a mental or emotional disturbance, or for a bodily illness resulting therefrom, in the absence of a contemporaneous bodily contact or independent cause of action, or an element of wilfulness, wantonness, or maliciousness, in cases in which there is no injury other than one to a third person, even though recovery would have been permitted had the wrong been directed against the plaintiff. The rule is frequently applied to mental or emotional disturbances caused by another's danger, or sympathy for another's suffering. It has been regarded as applicable to a mental or emotional disturbance resulting from an injury not only to a stranger, but also to a relative of the plaintiff, such as a child, sister, fath...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 12 mars 1963
    ...686, 353 P.2d 294, and cases there cited). Finally, the precise question now before us was presented in Reed v. Moore (1957), supra, 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 47(4), 319 P.2d 80. In that case the plaintiff, seated in front of her place of abode, was an eyewitness to a collision approximately 130 f......
  • Thing v. La Chusa
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 27 avril 1989
    ...the general rule of nonliability for nervous shock induced by fear for a third party applied by the Court of Appeal in Reed v. Moore (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 319 P.2d 80: " 'As a general rule, no recovery is permitted for a mental or emotional disturbance, or for a bodily injury or illness......
  • Lawson v. Management Activities, Inc., G019872
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • 27 janvier 1999
    ...pregnant women have been known to suffer miscarriages when they witnessed their spouses injured in a car crash (e.g., Reed v. Moore (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 319 P.2d 80.) The law obviously must differentiate between the two. Cases are not authority for propositions which they did not decid......
  • Dillon v. Legg
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (California)
    • 21 juin 1968
    ...of her children. And as likewise correctly stated in Amaya (p. 302, 29 Cal.Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513), the holding in Reed v. Moore (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 43, 47, 319 P.2d 80, was that a wife who was outside the zone of danger but witnessed a collision in which her husband was injured could not......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT