Neighborhood Action Group v. County of Calaveras

Decision Date08 June 1984
Citation203 Cal.Rptr. 401,156 Cal.App.3d 1176
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesNEIGHBORHOOD ACTION GROUP FOR the FIFTH DISTRICT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF CALAVERAS et al., Defendants and Respondents, TEICHERT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Real Party in Interest and Respondent. Civ. 22468.

Berliner & Spiller, Clarence H. McProud and David M. Walters, Nevada City, for plaintiffs and appellants.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., R.H. Connett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joel S. Moskowitz and Mark Urban, Deputy Attys. Gen., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

Jeffrey Tuttle, County Counsel, San Andreas, for defendants and respondents.

McDonough, Holland & Allen, William L. Owen, Sacramento, for real party in interest and respondent.

BLEASE, Associate Justice.

In this case we decide that the issuance of a conditional use permit is ultra vires if the general plan of the issuing entity (see Gov.Code, § 65300 et seq.) 1 does not conform to mandatory statutory criteria which are relevant to the uses sought by the permit.

The controversy arises from the transportation of processed detritus from hydraulic gold mining, California's archetypical environmental dispute. Calaveras County granted Teichert Construction Company a conditional use permit to process hydraulic mine tailings for production of sand and gravel. Plaintiffs seek to invalidate the permit.

The complaint alleges the permit is invalid because the county general plan does not comply with statutory criteria. General demurrers to this claim were sustained without leave to amend. The remaining claims, the adequacy of an environmental impact report (EIR) and the conformity of the use permit with the current general plan, proceeded to trial. The county and Teichert prevailed and judgment was entered. We will conclude it was error to sustain the demurrers and will reverse the judgment. 2

FACTS

The action we review, in administrative mandamus (Code Civ.Proc., § 1094.5), tenders an issue of pleading on demurrer, uninformed (with one exception) by the administrative record. 3

We accordingly accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint. (See e.g. Glaire v. La Lanne-Paris Health Spa., Inc. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 915, 918, 117 Cal.Rptr. 541, 528 P.2d 357.) It alleges the conditional use permit authorizes Teichert to harvest and process sand and gravel from hydraulic mine tailings near the Calaveras River immediately to the South of the town of Jenny Lind. The operation is a large one. It is estimated by Teichert that forty to eighty large tractor-trailer vehicles loaded with sand and gravel will leave the site each day during the peak seasons. A rock crushing plant is to be constructed at the site to reduce the gravel to a useable size. The operation will produce substantial noise, dust and traffic hazards, among other adverse effects.

On October 16, 1980, the Calaveras County Planning Commission approved the conditional use permit and certified its associated final environmental impact report (see Pub.Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) as complete. Appellant Madeline Hobson appealed On April 13, 1981, the Neighborhood appeal was heard by the board of supervisors. Neighborhood objected to the permit on the grounds it "could not legally be approved because the noise, seismic safety and safety elements [of the county's general plan] were inadequate and that the proposed project could not therefore be consistent with [it], that there were significant unmitigated adverse environmental impacts, including noise, dust, aesthetics, road hazards caused by the large trucks, and others, and that the EIR was incomplete due to a failure to discuss culmulative [sic] effects of noise, dust and safety as related to the adjacent George Reed sand and gravel plant, a failure to respond to the significant environment [sic] points raised in the consultation and review process, among others, off site noise, safety and esthetics." Nonetheless, the board of supervisors certified the environmental impact report as complete and approved the use permit.

to the county board of supervisors on behalf of herself and Neighborhood Action Group for the Fifth District (Neighborhood), an unincorporated association of taxpayers residing in the vicinity of the project site. Hobson is a taxpayer residing in Jenny Lind. We collectively refer to Neighborhood and Hobson as Neighborhood.

An issue of concern to Neighborhood is the truck route. The route for the sand and gravel trucks is Milton Road or Jenny Lind Road to Highway 26 and thence to Stockton. "A substantial subdivision of residential lots has been approved along Jenny Lind Road and numerous homes have already been or are in the process of construction. Along Milton Road there are a number of homes already constructed and there are a number of subdivision lots which have been approved." The route traverses "narrow rural roads and will utilize several bridges with a road width of approximately nineteen and one-half (19 1/2) feet. School buses pass over these bridges a number of times each day during the school year." Teichert's operation increases road hazards on the route of the sand and gravel trucks.

The complaint claims the noise element of the Calaveras County general plan does not comply with state statutes. It says: a lawful "noise element would have provided [the county] with standards and an analytic framework by which [it] would have been enabled to make a superior decision [on the use permit] taking into account the severe noise impacts of the project ...." "The combined safety and seismic safety element of the General Plan of the County of Calaveras contains no description of evacuation routes, peak load water supply requirements, minimum road widths, clearances around structures or any mention of mud slides or slope stability." These shortcomings render the elements out of conformity with governing state statutes.

The complaint was filed on May 13, 1981. It requested: the use permit be vacated; the county adopt a general plan in compliance with statutory criteria; and the county abstain from future land use planning actions until such general plan compliance is achieved.

DISCUSSION

I

Neighborhood claims the county's approval of a conditional use permit is ultra vires because the county's general plan was not in compliance with governing statutes. 4 Its premise is that a conditional use permit may not be granted unless the use is consistent with a lawful general plan. 5 The county and Teichert insist a conditional use permit requires no such predicate for its issuance. Alternatively, they argue that any flaw in the general plan has been rendered moot because the California Office of Planning and Research, on August 14, 1981, extended the time for the county to amend its general plan to comply with the challenged statutory criteria. (See Gov.Code, § 65302.6.) We will conclude Neighborhood's legal premise has merit and post hoc absolution is unavailing.

This case tenders two questions: first, does the county have authority to issue a conditional use permit if it has failed to adopt a general plan containing elements, required by state law, which are relevant to the uses authorized by the permit; second, if not, by what remedy may that authority be challenged?

A.

The Planning and Zoning Law of California (see § 65000 ff.) establishes the authority of most local government entities to regulate the use of land. (See § 65850; Topanga Assn. For A Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 518-519, fn. 18, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12.) It commands the county to adopt "a comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of the county ...." (§ 65300.) A general plan is "a statement of development policies and shall include a diagram ... and text setting forth objectives, principles, standards, and plan proposals." It must include designated elements. (§ 65302.) A seismic safety element and a noise element have been required since January 1, 1971, and a safety element since January 1, 1976. (See Stats.1971, ch. 1803; Stats.1975, ch. 1104.)

The general plan is atop the hierarchy of local government law regulating land use. It has been aptly analogized to "a constitution for all future developments." (See O'Loane v. O'Rourke (1965) 231 Cal.App.2d 774, 42 Cal.Rptr. 283.) The Legislature has endorsed this view in finding that "decisions involving the future growth of the state, most of which are made and will continue to be made at the local level, should be guided by an effective planning process, including the local general plan, and should proceed within the framework of officially approved statewide goals and policies directed to land use, population growth and distribution, development, open space, resource preservation and utilization, air and water quality, and other related physical, social and economic development factors." (§ 65030.1.)

Subordinate to the general plan are zoning laws, which regulate the geographic allocation and allowed uses of land. Zoning laws must conform to the adopted general plan. (§ 65860; Resource Defense Fund v. County of Santa Cruz (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 800, 184 Cal.Rptr. 371.) These enactments provide the authority and the criteria for the regulation of land uses. (See §§ 65850, 65851 & 65860; Cal.Zoning Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 1969) ch. 6.)

Zoning laws regulate land uses in two basic ways. Some uses are permitted as a matter of right if the uses conform to the zoning ordinance. Other sensitive land uses require discretionary administrative approval pursuant to criteria in the zoning ordinance. (§ 65901.) They require a conditional use permit. (See Cal.Zoning Practice, supra, § 7.55 et seq.) The reason for discretionary treatment is that these are uses which "cannot be said to be always compatible in some zones while always incompatible in others .... uses that should not be allowed as of...

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