Bloch v. Ribar

Decision Date21 September 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-3451,97-3451
Citation156 F.3d 673
PartiesCynthia BLOCH and Thomas Bloch, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Sheriff L. John RIBAR, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Richard J. Marco, Sr. (briefed), Steve C. Bailey (argued), Marco, Marco & Bailey, Medina, OH, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Mark D. Landes (argued and briefed), Terri B. Gregori (briefed), Isaac, Brant, Ledman & Teetor, Columbus, OH, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before: GUY, GILMAN, and GODBOLD, * Circuit Judges.

OPINION

GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

Cynthia Bloch and her husband, Thomas Bloch, brought this action against Sheriff L. John Ribar pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he violated their constitutional rights by holding a press conference to release the confidential and highly personal details of Ms. Bloch's rape by an unknown assailant. They claim that Ribar took this action in retaliation for the Blochs publically criticizing the sheriff's lack of diligence in investigating the crime.

The district court granted Ribar's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that he was entitled to qualified immunity on both the retaliation claim and the privacy claim as asserted by the Blochs. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the dismissal of the Blochs' retaliation claim, AFFIRM the dismissal of their privacy claim, and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

Cynthia Bloch was raped by an unknown assailant in Medina County, Ohio on December 29, 1992. She promptly reported the rape to the Medina County Sheriff's Department and gave a detailed statement to the authorities. After the passage of 18 months with no apparent progress in the investigation, the Blochs agreed to be interviewed by the Cleveland Plain Dealer. On July 10, 1994, the newspaper published an article concerning the case, followed by further articles in the Akron Beacon Journal in April and May of 1995. All of these articles were critical of the Medina County Sheriff's Department and of Sheriff Ribar personally.

In response to these articles, Ribar convened a press conference on May 3, 1995 to announce that he was requesting that a grand jury investigate Ms. Bloch's rape claim. During the same press conference, Ribar is alleged to have released "highly personal and extremely humiliating details" of the rape suffered by Ms. Bloch. She claims that Ribar's statements to the press "contained details of the acts perpetrated against her that were so embarrassing she had not even told her husband. Most importantly, the release of these humiliating details was unnecessary, illegal according to the prosecutor, and did absolutely nothing to advance the sheriff's defense." The Blochs aver, moreover, that there was no nexus between the details of the rape released by Ribar and the Blochs' criticism of the investigation. The Blochs contend that as a result of Ribar's actions, they have suffered humiliation, embarrassment, and severe mental distress.

Prior to bringing this action, the Blochs attempted to obtain a copy of Ms. Bloch's statement to the sheriff discussing the details of the rape. Relying on the advice of the local prosecutor, the sheriff refused to give them a copy of the statement, claiming that the statement contained non-public information which was exempt from Ohio's Public Records Law.

The Blochs then brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court, alleging that Ribar both retaliated against them for exercising their first amendment right to criticize public officials and violated their right to privacy by publically revealing confidential and extremely embarrassing personal information. Ribar responded by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Ribar died after the filing of his motion, as set forth in a Suggestion of Death appropriately filed in the record, but we will continue to refer to Ribar as the defendant for the purpose of this opinion.)

Adopting the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, the district court granted Ribar's motion to dismiss both the retaliation claim and the privacy claim on the basis of qualified immunity. As to the retaliation claim, the district court held that "there is no 'clearly established' right to exercise one's First Amendment rights without fear of embarrassing information being revealed in response by a public official exercising his/her First Amendment rights as well." Addressing the Blochs' privacy claim, the district court held that "there is no 'clearly established' constitutional protection regarding the disclosure of private information in general, notwithstanding that such disclosure may be humiliating and/or embarrassing."

On appeal, the Blochs claim that the district court erred by granting qualified immunity to Ribar. They argue that the right to criticize a public official is a clearly established right under the First Amendment. Although they acknowledge that Ribar had a right to defend himself against criticism, they contend that the sensitive information regarding the rape fell outside the scope of his potential defense. In addition, the Blochs allege that Ribar's statements to the press about the sensitive details of the rape were in retaliation for the exercise of their first amendment right to criticize public officials. They support this claim in part with the assertion that "a detective of the sheriff's department visited Mrs. Bloch shortly before the story was published and asked her if she had been talking to the news media. He warned her that she should be careful what she said to the papers because she could be used for 'political purposes.' " The Blochs contend that they have suffered injury as a result of this retaliation.

The Blochs further argue that the district court failed to employ the appropriate test in evaluating their constitutional privacy claim. They assert that the district court should have balanced the Blochs' privacy interests against any public benefit to be gained from disseminating the information. Again they contend that they have suffered injury as a result of this infringement on their privacy.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's decision to dismiss a suit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. See Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir.1996). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court must construe the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, and accept all of her factual allegations as true. See id. at 197. When an allegation is capable of more than one inference, it must be construed in the plaintiff's favor. See Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir.1995). Dismissal pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984).

In addition, we review a district court's finding of qualified immunity de novo. See O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 998 (6th Cir.1994). When the defense of qualified immunity is asserted, the complaint must "include the specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact that will enable the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, will overcome the defense of qualified immunity." Veney v. Hogan, 70 F.3d 917, 922 (6th Cir.1995).

III. ANALYSIS

To successfully establish a prima facie case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove the following two elements: (1) the defendant must be acting under the color of state law, and (2) the offending conduct must deprive the plaintiff of rights secured by federal law. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Because Ribar was acting in his official capacity as the sheriff of Medina County at all times relevant to this lawsuit, it is indisputable that he was acting under the color of state law. As for the second element, the Blochs allege that their constitutional rights were violated when Ribar issued a press release discussing the sensitive details of the rape both in retaliation for the exercise of their first amendment right to criticize public officials and in violation of their right to privacy.

Ribar argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on both claims. The Supreme Court has held that "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Accordingly, the first step in any qualified immunity analysis is to determine whether a clearly established statutory or constitutional right has been violated. Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 262 (6th Cir.1997). If a constitutional right has been violated, we must then consider whether the public official acted "objectively unreasonable in light of [the] clearly established constitutional right[ ]." Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 387 (6th Cir.1994); see Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that "for a plaintiff to make a successful § 1983 claim, '[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' " (quoting Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir.1992))).

A. The Retaliation Claim
1. Constitutional Right Against Retaliation

Without specifically considering the merits of the Blochs' retaliation claim, the district court concluded that "there is no 'clearly established' right to exercise one's First Amendment rights...

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