Freeman v. Mercantile Mut. Acc. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 10 May 1892
• Citation: 30 N.E. 1013,156 Mass. 351
• Parties: FREEMAN v. MERCANTILE MUT. ACC. ASS'N.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

156 Mass. 351

30 N.E. 1013

FREEMAN

v.MERCANTILE MUT. ACC. ASS'N.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 10, 1892.

Report from superior court, Suffolk county; JAMES M. BARKER, Judge.

Suit by Annie M. Freeman against the Mercantile Mutual Accident Association upon a policy of insurance. The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, subject to the decision of the supreme court, to which he reported the case. Ordered that judgment be entered on the verdict.

A. Hemenway and F.E. Fitz, for plaintiff.

E. & A.E. Avery, for defendant.

KNOWLTON, J.

The plaintiff claims under a policy or certificate of insurance issued to Knowles Freeman, containing a provision for payment to her of a sum not exceeding $5,000 in case of his death from an accident, and also a provision for a weekly payment to him as an indemnity, against loss of time, if he should be disabled by an accident. The condition on which the plaintiff is entitled to payment is stated in the policy to be upon “proof that the said Knowles Freeman shall have sustained during the continuance of his membership bodily injuries effected through external, violent, and accidental means, within the intent and meaning of the by-laws of said association and the conditions herein recited, and such injuries alone shall have occasioned death within ninety days from the happening thereof.” The first part of the second paragraph of the conditions above referred to is as follows: “That benefits, under this certificate, shall not extend to any case in which there shall be no symptom or visible sign of bodily injury, nor to any case in which death or disability occurs in consequence of disease, or which may have been caused by any surgical operation, or medical or mechanical treatment, unless said operation or treatment shall have been undertaken for the relief of injuries which entitle the member to the benefits of this association, nor to any case except where the injury is the proximate cause of the disability or death.” It was proved that Knowles Freeman died of peritonitis localized in the region of the liver, and the evidence tended to show that it was induced by a fall. There was also evidence indicating that he had previously had peritonitis in the same part, and that the previous disease had produced effects which rendered him very liable to a recurrence of it. The report presents questions arising on the defendant's requests for rulings which relate to the portions of the policy above quoted. The defendant contends that it is not liable in case of a death from disease, even if the disease is caused by an accident. The principal question in the case is, what kind of cause is to be deemed “proximate,” within the meaning of the policy? Where different forces and conditions concur in producing a result, it is often difficult to determine which is properly to be considered the cause, and in dealing with such cases the maxim, causa proxima non remota spectatur, is applied. But this does not mean that the cause or condition which is nearest in time or space to the result is necessarily to be deemed the proximate cause. It means that the law will not go further back in the line of causation than to find the active, efficient, procuring cause, of which the event under consideration is a natural and probable...