Haid v. United States, 10978.

• Decision Date: 07 October 1946
• Docket Number: No. 10978.,10978.
• Citation: 157 F.2d 630
• Parties: HAID v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

157 F.2d 630 (1946)

HAID v. UNITED STATES.

No. 10978.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

October 7, 1946.

Bertil E. Johnson, of Tacoma, Wash., for appellant.

J. Charles Dennis, U. S. Atty., of Seattle, Wash., and Harry Sager, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Tacoma, Wash., for appellee.

Before DENMAN, BONE, and ORR, Circuit Judges.

BONE, Circuit Judge.

Defendant below appeals from a conviction in the district court for the crime of impersonating a federal officer.¹ Appellant was operating a private detective agency and the charges grew out of his efforts to enhance his business. No contention is made upon appeal as to the adequacy of proof and the only assignments of error concern the admissibility of certain evidence.²

Counsel are in agreement that the first five assignments of error raise only one question of law: Should the victims of the alleged impersonations have been allowed to testify that they believed the defendant to be a Government officer?

We shall only discuss, in detail, assignment of error No. 2, concerning the testimony of Ralph Mathwig, because it is typical of all and what we have to say about it is applicable to the other objections. Appellant objected to the following testimony in the court below on the ground that it violated the opinion rule:

"Q. The question is, Mr. Mathwig, what did you believe Mr. Haid to be? A. Well, after Mr. Haid asked me whether my sister had told me about whether he worked for the Government or not, and he showed me the badge, why I took him for a Government employee.

"Q. You took him for that? A. I took him for a Government employee.

"Q. Did you take him for any particular Government employee? A. By the badge, I took him he represented the F.B.I."

Appellant now urges that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting this kind of testimony. On the other hand, the position of the appellee is that the state of mind of the victim is a fact; that it may be proved as any other fact — by the statements of the person himself; finally that the fact is relevant in this case and therefore this testimony was properly admitted.

The law on this point is reasonably clear: This court has already held that the state of mind of an individual is a fact, and further that the person himself may testify directly thereto. Walter v. Rowlands, 9 Cir., 28 F.2d 687; Deal v. United States, 9 Cir., 11 F.2d 3. (The last case was reversed upon another ground by the United States Supreme Court and no criticism was leveled at the holding on this point). See also, 20 Am.Jur. p. 312.

But was the state of mind of the victim, as a fact, relevant in this case? We think that it was. If it is necessary, in establishing the charge, to prove that the victim relied upon the pretense of the impostor, then it becomes necessary to further show that the victim believed in the pretense. Therefore the prosecution faced the necessity of showing the state of the victim's mind. In Littell v. United States, 9 Cir., 169 F. 620, at page 621, this court said:

"The plaintiff in error contends that there was no evidence to go to the jury to show that Mrs. Dabney relied upon the representations of the plaintiff in error that he was an officer of the United States in extending credit to him * * * This contention is not sustainable. * * * She Mrs. Dabney testified that she believed them and relied upon them in advancing money and extending credit. * * * and Mrs. Dabney testified expressly that in lending him the money she relied, not upon the draft, but upon the standing of the plaintiff in error as an officer of the United States." Emphasis supplied.

The purpose of the statute was outlined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74, 36 S.Ct. 19, 22, 60 L.Ed. 155, where the court said:

"It is the aim of the section footnote 1 not merely to protect innocent persons from actual loss through reliance upon false assumptions of Federal authority, but to maintain the general good repute and dignity of the service itself. It is inconsistent with this object, as well as with the letter of the statute, to make the question whether one who has parted with his property upon the strength of a fraudulent representation of federal employment has received an adequate quid pro quo in value determinative." Emphasis supplied.³

If the victim did not believe the misrepresentations, the "good repute and dignity of the service itself" would not suffer, nor would the victim have parted with anything of value in any of the situations here involved.

But the state of the victim's mind, as a fact, is relevant to support another inference. The "intent to defraud" is an essential part of the crime, and the fact that the defendant, by his conduct, has created...