Worthington v. Waring

• Decision Date: 03 December 1892
• Citation: 32 N.E. 744,157 Mass. 421
• Parties: WORTHINGTON et al. v. WARING et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

157 Mass. 421

32 N.E. 744

WORTHINGTON et al. v. WARING et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

December 3, 1892

COUNSEL

H.A. Dubuque, for appellants.

A.J Jennings, for appellees.

OPINION

FIELD C.J.

We take the substance of the petition to be that the petitioners were weavers by trade, and had been employed by the Narragansett Mills, a corporation in Fall River, and that they demanded higher wages, which the corporation refused to give; and they then left work, and the defendants sent their names to the officers of other mills in Fall River, on a list which is called a "blacklist," and which informed these officers that the petitioners had left the Narragansett Mills on what is called a "strike;" whereupon the defendants conspired together and with the officers of other mills, and agreed not to employ the petitioners, with intent to compel them either to go without work in Fall River or to go back to work for the Narragansett Mills, at such wages as that corporation should see fit to pay them. It does not appear by the petition that any of the petitioners had existing contracts for labor with which the defendants interfered. If the petition sets forth such a conspiracy as constitutes a misdemeanor at common law,--on which we express no opinion,--the remedy is by indictment. If the injury which had been received by the petitioners at the time the petition was filed constitutes a cause of action,--on which we express no opinion,--the remedy is by an action of tort, to be brought by each petitioner separately. The only grievance alleged which is continuing in its nature is the conspiracy not to employ the petitioners, and there are no approved precedents in equity for enjoining the defendants from continuing such a conspiracy, or for compelling the defendants either to employ the petitioners or to procure employment for them with other persons. See Workman v. Smith, 155 Mass. 92, 29 N.E. 198; Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22 N.E. 55; Smith v. Smith, 148 Mass. 1, 18 N.E. 595; Raymond v. Russell, 143 Mass. 295, 9 N.E. 544; Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Manuf'g Co., 114 Mass. 69. It is plain, however, that the petition was drawn with a view to obtain some equitable relief. It is well known that equity has, in general, no jurisdiction to restrain the commission of crimes, or to assess damages for torts already committed. Courts of equity often protect property from threatened injury when the rights of property are equitable, or when, although the rights are legal, the civil and criminal remedies at common law are not adequate; but the rights which the petitioners allege the defendants were violating at the time the petition was filed are personal rights, as distinguished from rights of property. The counsel for the petitioners contends that the petition can be maintained under St.1887, c. 383, and it has been suggested that this suit is partly an action at law and partly a suit in equity; and that, if it cannot be maintained as either the one or the other, it can be maintained under this statute, as partaking somewhat of the nature of both. This statute has been often referred to at the bar as one the meaning of which is not clear, and it becomes necessary to consider it. An examination of it shows that it relates solely to procedure; that it does not purport to change the substantive law, or to create any new cause of action either at law or in equity, or any new kind of relief, either legal or equitable, or to change the jurisdiction of the two courts which are mentioned in the first section. It is provided in the fourth section that "nothing in this act shall be construed to *** extend or limit the power or jurisdiction of the court in proceedings at law or in equity, except as herein expressly provided;" and there is no extension of the power or jurisdiction of either of the courts mentioned expressly provided for in the statute, unless the addition of a new, original process to be used in civil actions at law, made by the first section, is such an extension. The first section, so far as it relates to suits in equity, is taken from Pub.St. c. 151, §§ 1, 5, 6. See St.1880, c. 37; St.1883, c. 223, §§ 1, 11. Cases in equity, under pre-existing statutes, could be commenced by a bill or petition with a writ of subpoena, or by an original writ, with a bill or petition, or with a declaration in an action of contract or tort praying relief in equity inserted in it. But civil actions at law, with some exceptions, could be commenced only by an original writ. Pub.St. c. 161, § 13 et seq. The first section of St.1887, c. 383, permits civil actions at law, except replevin, to be commenced by a bill or petition which is in the nature of a declaration, and by the service of a subpoena which is in the nature of a writ of original summons. With this exception, the statute does not purport to change the law relating to pleadings, nor to abolish the distinction between legal and equitable rights or remedies. The second section provides that "all provisions of law relating to pleadings shall apply to such proceedings, so far as the same are applicable." This is not very intelligible as a statement of what provisions were considered by the legislature to be applicable, but it was probably inserted for the purpose of excluding any inference that the statute was intended to abolish the established forms of pleading. Pub.St. c. 167, and other well-known statutes, contain elaborate provisions regulating pleading and procedure in actions at law; and there is no intimation in St.1887, c. 383, that these provisions were intended to be repealed, and they are not inconsistent with any of the provisions of that statute, except that a bill or petition with a subpoena may be used instead of a common-law writ and a declaration. Pub.St. c. 151, St.1883, c. 223, and other statutes, contain elaborate provisions regulating the pleading and procedure in suits in equity, and there is no intimation in the statute of 1887 that these provisions were intended to be repealed, and they are all consistent with the provisions of that statute. The legislature could, of course, abolish all distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and adopt one form of procedure for all actions; but such a radical change is not to be inferred from a few general words of doubtful import, such as are contained in the third section of this statute. By the Revised Statutes, suits in equity were to be commenced by bill with a subpoena, or by a bill inserted in a writ of original summons, with or without an order for the attachment of property. Rev.St c. 90, § 117; Id. c. 107, § 22. And the supreme judicial court had power "to make and award all such judgments, decrees, orders, and injunctions, to issue all such executions and other writs and processes, and to do all such other acts as may be necessary and proper to carry into full effect all the powers which are or may be given to them by the laws of the commonwealth." Rev.St. c. 81, §§ 5, 6, 9. St.1853, c. 371, was entitled "An act giving equitable remedies in suits at law;" and the principal subjects of equity jurisdiction were, in effect, divided in the first and second sections into two classes; and it was provided that all suits upon one class of subjects "shall be by action of contract setting forth the circumstances of the case, so far as may be necessary, and praying for relief in equity;" and that all suits upon the other class "shall be by action of tort, in which the plaintiff, in addition to his claim for damages, may pray for relief in equity." The supreme judicial court was given exclusive jurisdiction of the suits, and empowered, "as well in term time as vacation," to "make and award all such decrees, judgments, orders, and injunctions, and issue all such executions and other writs and processes, and do all such other acts, as may be necessary or proper to carry into full effect the power to grant such relief." St.1855, c. 194, § 2, provided that "when relief is sought in equity the material facts and circumstances relied on shall be stated with brevity, omitting all immaterial and irrelevant matter, either in the form of a bill or petition to the court, or in a declaration in an action of contract or tort." St.1856, c. 38, § 2, provided that "suits in equity may be commenced by bill or by writ of attachment." The substance of these statutes was incorporated in Gen.St. c. 113, §§ 1, 3, and is now contained in Pub.St. c. 151, §§ 1, 5. Pub.St. c. 153, § 3, provides that the supreme judicial and the superior courts "may make and award such judgments, decrees, orders, and injunctions, and shall issue all writs and processes, necessary or proper to carry into effect the powers granted to them; and, when no form for any such writ or process is prescribed, the court shall frame one in conformity with the principles of law and the usual course of proceedings in the courts of this commonwealth." See Pub.St. c. 151, § 1; St.1883, c. 223, § 1.

The decisions of this court upon the effect of St.1853, c. 371 which provided, in substance, that suits in equity should be by either an action of contract or of tort,...