Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dist., 97-15511

• Decision Date: 19 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-15511,97-15511
• Citation: 158 F.3d 1022
• Parties: 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7838, 98 Daily Journal D.A.R. 10,902 Kathy MONTEIRO, individually, as the legal guardian of her minor daughter Jane Doe, and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE TEMPE UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, and Daniel Perkins, Randy Clawson, Richard Foreman and Steven Rich, individually and in their official capacities as members of the Governing Board of the Tempe Union High School District, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 1022

158 F.3d 1022

98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7838, 98 Daily Journal

D.A.R. 10,902

Kathy MONTEIRO, individually, as the legal guardian of her minor daughter Jane Doe, and on behalf of all other similarly situated individuals Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE TEMPE UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona, and Daniel Perkins Randy Clawson, Richard Foreman and Steven Rich, individually and in their official capacities as members of the Governing Board of the Tempe Union High School District, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 97-15511.

United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 11, 1998.

Decided Oct. 19, 1998.

Stephen G. Montoya, Phoenix, Arizona, for plaintiff-appellant.

Alison Lewis, Teilborg, Sanders & Parks, Phoenix, Arizona, for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona; Stephen M. McNamee, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-96-01236-SMM.

Before: D.W. NELSON, BOOCHEVER, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge REINHARDT; Concurrence by Judge BOOCHEVER.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

More and more frequently we are faced with cases in which two fundamental constitutional rights appear to be at odds. At such times, the job of federal judges is particularly difficult. Here, we confront a case presenting some elements of such a clash. The setting is a freshman English class in Tempe, Arizona, and the competing interests are the First Amendment rights of high school students to receive information or ideas--even when contained in literary works that may in today's world appear to have racist overtones--and the rights of those same students to receive a public education that neither fosters nor acquiesces in a racially hostile environment.

Jane Doe was a student in a freshman English class at McClintock High School, which is part of the defendant Tempe Unified Union High School District ("School District"). The class' required reading included two classic literary works--the novel The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, by Mark Twain, and the short story A Rose for Emily, by William Faulkner. The complaint, brought on Doe's behalf by her mother, Kathy Monteiro, alleged that each of these literary works "contains repeated use of the profane, insulting and racially derogatory term 'nigger.' " It also alleged that neither work is a necessary component of a freshman English class and that none of the assignments in the curriculum refers to Caucasians in a derogatory manner.

According to the complaint, Doe and other similarly situated African-American students suffered psychological injuries and lost educational opportunities due to the required reading of the literary works. The complaint alleged that the School District had notice that Doe suffered these injuries but refused to offer a remedy other than to allow her to study alone in the library while the works were being discussed in class. It further alleged that the assignment of the literary works "created and contributed to a racially hostile educational environment," including increased racial harassment by other students. Finally, it alleged that by its conduct the School District intentionally discriminated against Doe.

In her complaint, Monteiro sought a declaratory judgment, urging that the conduct of the School District violated Doe's rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She also requested a temporary and permanent injunction "prohibiting [the defendants] from committing similar unlawful acts in the future." Monteiro did not, however, seek the exclusion of the literary works from a voluntary reading list

or from inclusion in classroom discussions in which Jane Doe and other African American students [are] not held as a captive student audience or consigned to a separate and unequal educational environment.

Finally, she requested compensatory monetary damages, equitable relief in the form of compensatory education, and attorney fees.

In a memorandum order filed January 2, 1997, the district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Doe failed to state a claim under either the Equal Protection Clause or Title VI because the complaint did not contain specific allegations of fact necessary to sustain a claim of discriminatory intent. The district court also dismissed as moot Monteiro's request for injunctive relief "regarding removal of the literary works from particular English classes" because Doe was no longer a member of the freshman English class and ruled that the case was not proper for class certification because of the absence of any showing that certification under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 would be proper. ¹ The order did not specify whether the dismissal was with prejudice. On that same day, however the district court entered judgment dismissing the complaint and the action.

Monteiro moved for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a) on the ground that the dismissal was improper in light of the complaint's good faith allegations that the School District acted with the requisite discriminatory intent. As an exhibit to the motion Monteiro attached a proposed amended complaint (the "amended complaint") in order to set forth her hostile educational environment claim "with more specificity." The memorandum in support of the motion requested that the court "grant plaintiff a new trial by vacating its summary judgment of January 2, 1997, and allowing plaintiff to proceed with her proposed amended complaint."

The amended complaint reiterates the contentions made in the initial complaint and seeks the same relief. It contains additional allegations, however, regarding the hostile racial environment at the school and the notice afforded the District of the complained-of conduct. It alleges with more particularity that Doe and other African-American students were subjected to racial harassment, orally and by the use of graffiti, prior to the time the literary works were introduced into the classroom, and that such harassment increased as a result of the assignment of those works as required reading. In particular, it alleges that African-American students were called "nigger" by their white peers with increased frequency and intensity after the literary works were assigned. Finally, it alleges that the school district, when notified of incidents of racial harassment, refused to accept the complaints or to take any appropriate remedial measures regarding them.

The district court denied the motion. It first noted that the purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to correct "manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered evidence." It then rejected the amended complaint:

Plaintiff argues that the Court rejected Plaintiff's allegations of discriminatory intent and hostile educational environment. The Court noted in its Order that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint contained numerous legal conclusions. For instance, the Court acknowledged that Plaintiff alleged, in a conclusory fashion, that Defendants acted "with discriminatory intent." Nonetheless, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint alleged no factual allegations which support the proposition that Defendants intentionally discriminated against Plaintiff. Moreover, conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss. Therefore, accepting Plaintiff's allegations as true, Plaintiff's allegations nevertheless fail as a matter of law.

Order filed February 4, 1997 (citation omitted). ²

Monteiro now appeals the orders dismissing the complaint and denying the motion for a new trial. In doing so, she essentially challenges the district court's dismissal of her amended complaint.

I.

We first resolve several procedural issues pertaining to the judge's dismissal of the original complaint and to his entry of judgment dismissing the action. The district court entered judgment the very same day that it granted the District's motion to dismiss the original complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, however, provides that "[a] party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served." Because Monteiro had not yet amended her complaint, and because there had been no answer filed, the district court erred when it did not give Monteiro the opportunity to file an amendment but instead entered judgment dismissing the action.

Instead of amending her complaint, as would have been the appropriate course of action under ordinary circumstances, Monteiro attached the amended complaint to her motion for reconsideration and sought to have her action reinstated in light of its contents. The district court denied her motion on the ground that the amended complaint failed to state a claim as a matter of law. Because under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15, Monteiro should have been permitted to file an amended complaint and because the district court determined that the amended complaint could not survive a motion to dismiss, and on that basis refused to reinstate her action, we will consider on the merits the district court's ruling that the amended complaint failed to state a claim.

II.

Monteiro's amended complaint alleges violations of the Equal Protection clause and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ³ We have held that § 1983 claims based on Equal Protection violations must plead intentional unlawful discrimination or allege facts that are at least susceptible of an inference of discriminatory intent. See De La Cruz v. Tormey, 582 F.2d 45, 58 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 965, 99 S.Ct. 2416, 60 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1979); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976) (requiring showing of intentional discrimination). Under Title VI, however, we have required only that the complaint allege that the defendant is engaging in discrimination, although a showing of intent is necessary at trial. Fobbs v....