U.S. v. Mayes
| Citation | 158 F.3d 1215 |
| Decision Date | 29 October 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-6753,96-6753 |
| Parties | 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 231 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Eules MAYES, a.k.a. Tiger, etc.; Willie Harris, a.k.a. Will Low, et al., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) |
John A. Lentine, Wooten & Lentine, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Harris.
Robert M. Shipman, Huntsville, Al, for Nururdin.
Gail Dickinson, Pell City, Al, for Moore.
Kearney Dee Hutsler, Birmingham, AL, for Bryant.
James L. O'Kelley, Birmingham, AL, for Fultz.
W. Davis Lawley, Jr., Birmingham, AL, for Byrd.
Jeffrey H. Dial, Birmingham, AL, for Garrett.
Steve Guthrie, Birmingham, AL, for Baker.
Ann Marshall, Birmingham, AL, for Mimmis.
Guy Burns, Birmingham, AL, for Calhoun.
John C. Robbins, Birmingham, AL, for Mayes.
Jo Alison Taylor, Birmingham, AL, for Nelson.
Caryl Privett, U.S. Atty., Bill L. Barnett, Kathleen Kenney, Birmingham, AL, for United States.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before HATCHETT, Chief Judge, and DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
On October 19, 1995, a prison riot occurred at the Federal Correctional Institution at Talladega, Alabama (FCI Talladega). The appellants are all former FCI Talladega inmates who were prosecuted for their involvement in the riot, and who now challenge their convictions and sentences on several grounds. 1 We find only two issues worthy of discussion: (1) the double jeopardy implications of prison disciplinary sanctions; and (2) whether the appellants were denied a fair trial as a result of being required to appear in court wearing leg irons. We affirm.
The October 1995 riot at FCI Talladega began in the early evening hours and involved 200 to 300 inmates. The riot lasted for more than two hours, and the inmates broke windows, set fires and assaulted corrections officers. Prison authorities ultimately regained control of the facility after using tear gas and firing warning shots into the air. Overall, the rioters caused an estimated $3,000,000 in property damage.
Following the riot, FCI Talladega authorities conducted a large-scale investigation. Over the course of about three weeks, corrections officers interviewed nearly 150 inmates and staff members. As a result of the information obtained during the investigation, corrections officers identified several inmates involved in the disturbance. The Bureau of Prisons subsequently initiated disciplinary proceedings against many of these individuals, including some of the appellants, charging them with various violations of institutional rules and regulations. Most of the appellants generally allege that, after a hearing, they were each found to have committed particular infractions and subjected to some combination of the following sanctions: (1) disciplinary transfers to maximum security prisons; (2) disciplinary segregation for 60 days; (3) disallowance of between 41 and 94 days of accrued good conduct time; (4) temporary losses of telephone, commissary, and/or recreational privileges; and (5) losses of visitation privileges for up to one year.
On February 29, 1996, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of Alabama returned a superseding indictment charging the appellants, as well as four codefendants who are not parties to this appeal, with various offenses in relation to their involvement in the riot. 2 The appellants pleaded not guilty and discovery proceeded.
All of the appellants moved the district court to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that the prior prison disciplinary sanctions precluded the subsequent criminal prosecutions for the same conduct. 3 In a report and recommendation dated April 23, 1996, a magistrate judge concluded that the motions to dismiss should be denied. On May 1, 1996, the district court entered an order overruling the appellants' objections to the report and recommendation and denying the motions to dismiss.
The district court held two hearings in order to determine the appropriate security measures to be taken at the appellants' trial. Over defense counsel's objections, the court determined that the appellants should be physically restrained for the duration of the trial. In reaching this conclusion, the court accepted the recommendation of the United States Marshals Service, whose representatives testified at the hearings regarding the need for extra security precautions. In the Marshals Service's opinion, extra precautions were necessary because of the number of people being tried together and the nature of the charges against them. Accordingly, the Marshals Service proposed a plan for courtroom security during the trial that involved increasing the number of deputy marshals present during the proceedings, controlling the placement of the tables and seating of the parties, and physically restraining the appellants to restrict their movement should a disturbance arise.
With regard to the physical restraints, the Marshals Service recommended that, at minimum, the appellants wear leg irons around their ankles-a form of "shackling." Representatives of the Marshals Service testified that, in their opinions, this would be the least restrictive method of effective restraint.
The court also considered testimony regarding the appellants' collective histories of disciplinary problems and violent behavior. According to one of the deputy marshals, some of the appellants had previously been convicted of violent crimes. Lieutenant William Elston, a correctional supervisor at FCI Talladega, also testified that the appellants' prison files included incident reports for infractions such as assaulting staff, insolence and refusing orders. According to Elston, one of the appellants had even threatened to kill a witness in a prior case. With respect to the appellants' conduct after the riot, Elston testified that he interviewed some of them about the incident, and that a few became so "agitated" and "aggressive" that authorities "had to remove them from [Elston's] office." Elston also stated that one of the appellants kicked a chair and shouted an obscenity just before an arraignment was to begin in Atlanta. Moreover, Elston testified that a lieutenant who escorted some of the appellants on a bus ride to a maximum security prison in Colorado had to stop the bus and threaten to use pepper spray because some of the appellants became "loud and boisterous" upon realizing that "it would be a long time before staff could respond ... if [there were] a problem" while en route. Finally, Elston stated that a lieutenant at the prison in Colorado reported having other minor disciplinary problems with some of the appellants after they were transferred from FCI Talladega.
After hearing all of the evidence, the district court carefully assessed the circumstances and decided to accept the Marshals Service's recommendation to shackle the appellants. To minimize the potential for prejudice, however, the court took several measures to ensure that the leg irons were concealed from the jurors' view. None of the appellants wore the leg irons while testifying, and the jurors never saw the appellants enter or exit the courtroom. All of the appellants were seated on the insides of two tables that were covered with long tablecloths. Two railings were also strategically positioned in the courtroom to obscure the jurors' view of the appellants' legs. Moreover, the chains of the leg irons were covered with a styrofoam-like soft rubber padding and duct tape in order to muffle the sounds of clanging metal.
The trial commenced on May 6, 1996, and on May 30, 1996, the jury returned its verdicts. 4 The district court sentenced the appellants on July 30, 1996, and this appeal followed. 5
The first issue we address is whether the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated when a prisoner is criminally prosecuted for the same behavior that formed the basis for prison disciplinary sanctions. We review de novo the district court's denial of the appellants' motions to dismiss the superseding indictment on double jeopardy grounds. United States v. Benefield, 874 F.2d 1503, 1505 (11th Cir.1989).
The second issue that merits discussion is whether the appellants were denied a fair trial as a result of being required to appear in court wearing leg irons. Our standard of review is abuse of discretion. United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir.) ("The decision to shackle lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned by reviewing courts unless that discretion was abused."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898, 97 S.Ct. 262, 50 L.Ed.2d 182 (1976). 6
The Fifth Amendment states in part that no "person [shall] be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects individuals against three distinct violations: (1) "a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal"; (2) "a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction"; and (3) "multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). The appellants rely upon the third of these types of abuses to argue that the district court erred in denying their motions to dismiss the superseding indictment. 7 Specifically, they contend that the Bureau of Prisons "punished" them with various disciplinary sanctions and that the superseding indictment unconstitutionally subjects them to criminal liability for the same conduct that formed the basis of those disciplinary sanctions.
The appellants' argument is based primarily upon United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 446, ...
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