Willis by Willis v. Anderson Community School Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98-1227,98-1227
• Citation: 158 F.3d 415
• Parties: 130 Ed. Law Rep. 89 James Randall WILLIS II, by his next friend and father, James Randall WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDERSON COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 415

158 F.3d 415

130 Ed. Law Rep. 89

James Randall WILLIS II, by his next friend and father James Randall WILLIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDERSON COMMUNITY SCHOOL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98-1227.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 9, 1998.

Decided Sept. 9, 1998.

As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc Oct. 28, 1998.

Kenneth J. Falk (argued), Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Robert M. Baker, III (argued), William C. Wagner, Johnson, Smith, Pence, Densborn, Wright & Heath, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before CUMMINGS, CUDAHY, and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge.

In December 1997, high school freshman James Willis was suspended for fighting with a fellow student. Upon Willis' return to school and pursuant to the policy of the Anderson Community School Corporation (Corporation), he was informed that he would be tested for drug and alcohol use. When Willis refused to provide a urine sample, he was suspended again and advised that if he refused to submit to the test upon his return, he would be deemed to have admitted unlawful drug use and would be suspended a third time pending expulsion proceedings. Willis filed suit and claimed, in relevant part, that the Corporation's policy violates the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The district court denied Willis' motion for a preliminary injunction and then entered a judgment on the merits in favor of the Corporation. We reverse.

I. The Policy

In 1996, officials from two high schools in Anderson, Indiana, met to discuss growing disciplinary problems and their perception of increased drug and alcohol use among students. In an effort to address the problem, the Corporation organized a committee of parents, community leaders, school officials and personnel. The committee reviewed the drug and alcohol policies of other Indiana school districts, the results of tests administered pursuant to the policies, and literature discussing the causal nexus between substance abuse and disruptive behavior. The committee eventually formulated a testing policy for the Corporation's secondary schools, which was adopted by the school board in August 1997.

In addition to clarifying that the Corporation will test its students on the basis of individualized suspicion, the policy mandates a drug and alcohol test for any student who: possesses or uses tobacco products; is suspended for three or more days for fighting; is habitually truant; or violates any other school rule that results in at least a three-day suspension. ¹ The policy explains that its purpose is "to help identify and intervene with those students who are using drugs as soon as possible and to involve the parents immediately." Students do not receive additional punishment when they test positive, and results are disclosed only to parents and a designated school official. However, students who test positive may be expelled from school if they fail to participate in a drug education program. And, as Willis' story illustrates, a student who refuses to undergo a test is considered to have admitted unlawful substance use.

II. Discussion

Two points are uncontested. First, the Fourth Amendment, which applies to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, protects students from unreasonable searches by public school officials. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 333, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). And second, the collection and testing of urine is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 1300, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997); Schaill by Kross v. Tippecanoe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1311-12 (7th Cir.1988). Taken together, these two propositions mean that the Corporation's drug and alcohol screen is a search that is subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The district court found it was reasonable--and hence constitutional--for the Corporation to search Willis because (1) Willis' conduct created individualized suspicion of drug use, and (2) because the special needs of the Corporation outweighed Willis' privacy interest. We consider each of these findings in turn.

A. Individualized Suspicion

School officials do not need to establish probable cause to justify the search of a student; instead, "such a search is permissible if it is both 'justified at its inception' and 'reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' " Bridgman v. New Trier High Sch. Dist., 128 F.3d 1146, 1149 (7th Cir.1997) (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733). On appeal, Willis challenges only the district court's conclusion that the Corporation's search would have been "justified at its inception." To satisfy this requirement, a student's conduct must " 'create[ ] a reasonable suspicion that a particular regulation or law has been violated, with the search serving to produce evidence of the violation.' " Id. (quoting Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316, 1320 (7th Cir.1993)). We review a finding of reasonable suspicion de novo, giving "due weight" to the inferences the district court drew from the facts. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).

At the outset, our inquiry into whether the Corporation had a reasonable suspicion of drug use seems a bit of a paradox. The deposition testimony of Philip Nikirk, Dean of Students at Anderson High School, reveals that the Corporation required Willis to submit to a urine screen solely because he had been in a fight, which triggered suspension and a mandatory drug test:

Q. Now, did you observe [Willis] after the fight that gave rise to the initial suspension?

A. The teacher brought both of the students down to my office, yes.

Q. Did you observe anything that would make you think he was impaired or under the influence of drugs or alcohol?

A. I had nothing at that time that would give me reasonable suspicion, no.

Q. So the basis for the testing was the fact that a decision was made to suspend him because of the offense of fighting; is that correct?

A. That's correct.

R. 24. Given this testimony, the Corporation's assertion that "Willis' actions established reasonable suspicion of drug or alcohol use," Appellee's Br. at 18, is problematic. The Corporation argues that, in light of the data establishing a "causal nexus" between illegal substances and violent behavior, the fight itself was enough to create reasonable suspicion that Willis was using an illegal substance. We can construe this argument in two ways. From one perspective, the Corporation seems to be contending that fighting alone gives rise to a conclusive presumption of reasonable suspicion and that the Corporation's rule incorporates this presumption. This, however, would belie the very notion of individualized suspicion, which is almost by definition determined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., Bridgman, supra; Cornfield v. Consolidated High Sch. Dist. No. 230, 991 F.2d 1316 (7th Cir.1993). Alternatively, the Corporation may be arguing that its Dean of Students was simply wrong--that in this particular case Willis' conduct created a reasonable suspicion of drug use. Of course, when a school official concludes that a student's conduct creates individualized suspicion of drug or alcohol use, our usual inquiry is whether that conclusion is a reasonable one. See Bridgman, 128 F.3d at 1149. But if the Corporation is arguing that its Dean of Students was incorrect, we would have to turn our traditional inquiry on its head and ask whether it was unreasonable for Dean Nikirk to conclude that Willis' actions did not create individualized suspicion of drug or alcohol use.

In light of these analytical difficulties, perhaps our discussion of the Corporation's alleged reasonable suspicion could end here. But because the Corporation argues the issue at length, we review its data to show why the "causal nexus" between fighting and illegal substance use is not strong enough to support a conclusive presumption of reasonable suspicion. Or, stated a bit differently, we review the Corporation's data to illustrate why it was reasonable for Dean Nikirk to conclude that Willis' actions did not create reasonable suspicion.

The Corporation's data has two core components: the results of drug tests administered at the Corporation's two high schools, and various literature demonstrating "a causal nexus between drug and alcohol abuse and disciplinary problems in schools." Appellee's Br. at 2. With respect to the results of the Corporation's tests, during the first semester the policy was in effect, 40% of all students at Highland High School who were suspended for fighting tested positive. At Anderson High School--where Willis was a freshman--18% of all students suspended for fighting tested positive. The record does not contain information about Highland High School freshmen who were suspended for fighting, but 6% of all Highland freshmen who were screened under the policy tested positive. At Anderson High School, 27% of all freshmen tested positive, but none of the freshmen who were suspended for fighting tested positive.

The professional literature documents a relationship between fighting and the use of unlawful substances. It states, for example, that students who use illegal substances are "more than twice as likely to get into physical fights," and that "50% of users admitted initiating violence." Aggressive and Violent Students, R. 13. In explaining how to recognize drug and alcohol abuse, the literature instructs parents and teachers to look for children who are "defying rules and regulations" and "exhibiting abusive behavior." Adolescent Substance Abuse: Etiology, Treatment, and Prevention, R. 13 at 17-18. It is notable, however, that one of the...