Whitley v. Hunt

Decision Date23 October 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-40938,97-40938
Citation158 F.3d 882
PartiesRussell William WHITLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John HUNT, Unit Manager at FCI Texarkana Texas in his individual capacity; Lejean Moore, Case Manager at FCI Texarkana Texas; Kenneth Williams, Counselor at FCI Texarkana Texas in his individual capacity; Bureau of Prisons, Bureau of Prisons in Washington D.C., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Russell William Whitley, Texarkana, TX, pro se.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS Circuit Judge:

Federal prisoner Russell William Whitley appeals the district court's dismissal of his claims challenging the conditions of his confinement in the federal correctional facility at Texarkana, Texas. Whitley is appearing pro se and in forma pauperis. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Russell William Whitley is serving a sentence of thirty months at the federal correctional facility in Texarkana, Texas for drug offenses involving 170 kilograms of cocaine and 1,660 grams of heroin. In May 1997, Whitley filed an action against the Bureau of Prisons and three prison officials, (1) John Hunt, a unit manager, (2) Lejean Moore, a case manager, and (3) Kenneth Williams, a The district court referred Whitley's case to a magistrate judge. The magistrate judge prepared a memorandum recommending that Whitley's claims be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Whitley filed objections. In his objections, Whitley sought to amend his complaint to seek monetary damages only. Whitley clarified that he was no longer requesting that the defendants be terminated and no longer requesting future medical care. Rather, Whitley amended his complaint to request "monetary damages for medical care" in the amount of $1,000,000 from the Bureau of Prisons and $100,000 from each of the individual defendants. Whitley argued that he was not required to pursue administrative remedies prior to bringing suit for monetary damages. Whitley also argued that some of his grievances had been rejected and that further filings would be futile.

counselor. Whitley's original complaint alleges (1) that the defendants endangered his current and future health by forcing Whitley, a non-smoker, to sleep in a smoking dorm for thirteen weeks, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, (2) that the defendants discriminated against him because of his race and because he is from St. Louis, and (3) that the defendants willfully changed his security status from minimum security to low security on the basis of inaccurate information in his presentence report, in violation of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a. Whitley also claims that the defendants have retaliated against him for filing administrative grievances. Whitley's original complaint requests that the Bureau of Prisons pay $1,000,000 in monetary damages and that he be provided future medical care. Whitley's complaint also requests $100,000 from each of the named defendants and that the named defendants be terminated from their positions with the Bureau of Prisons.

The district court overruled Whitley's objections and entered an order dismissing Whitley's claims. Whitley's denial of medical care and discrimination claims were dismissed for non-exhaustion and without prejudice to refiling once administrative remedies were exhausted. Whitley's classification claim was dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). After the district court entered final judgment, Whitley filed a timely notice that he intended to appeal the district court's judgment.

WHITLEY'S DENIAL OF MEDICAL CARE CLAIMS

Whitley claims that the individual defendants and the Bureau or Prisons demonstrated a deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, Whitley claims that he became seriously ill after he was unwillingly incarcerated in a smoking environment for thirteen weeks. The district court dismissed Whitley's claim against the individual defendants and Whitley's claim against the Bureau of Prisons for non-exhaustion.

I.

The district court's dismissal of Whitley's denial of medical care claims for non-exhaustion was based in part upon its view that Whitley was seeking both injunctive and monetary relief. On appeal, Whitley claims that he was not required to pursue administrative remedies prior to filing suit because he was seeking solely monetary relief. We begin, therefore, with an analysis of Whitley's pleadings.

Whitley's original complaint clearly requests both monetary and injunctive relief. In his written objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation, however, Whitley sought to amend his complaint by narrowing his claims to seek only monetary relief. The district court's order gave no effect to Whitley's request.

Whitley was entitled to amend his pleading once as a matter of course, and without leave of court, at any time prior to the time that the defendants answered the lawsuit. See FED.R.CIV.P. 15(a) (providing that a "party may amend the party's pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served"). Although Whitley failed to present the district court with a properly styled amended complaint, his pro se attempt to narrow his pleadings was timely

and should have been given effect as a matter of course. See, e.g., Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 402 (5th Cir.1995). We therefore construe Whitley's pro se complaint as a request for exclusively monetary relief.

II.

Whitley characterizes his denial of medical care claims as constitutional claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court's order dismissing Whitley's denial of medical care claims fails to distinguish between Whitley's claim against the individual defendants and Whitley's claim against the Bureau of Prisons. To the extent Whitley is alleging denial of medical care against the individual prison officials, his claim is in the nature of a Bivens claim. 1 "[A] Bivens claim is available only against government officers in their individual capacities." Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1294 n. 12 (5th Cir.1994). Bivens claims may not, however, be brought against agencies of the federal government. F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 114 S.Ct. 996, 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994). Whitley does not directly identify the basis of his denial of medical care claim against the Bureau of Prisons. Construing Whitley's pleadings liberally, we determine that Whitley's denial of medical care claim against the Bureau of Prisons would be actionable, if at all, only as a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680. See Shah v. Quinlin, 901 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir.1990); see also Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir.1997).

III.

Whitley argues that he was not required to pursue administrative remedies prior to filing his Bivens claim against the individual prison officials because he is seeking exclusively monetary relief, citing McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992).

Title 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e, which now governs a federal prisoner's obligation to pursue administrative remedies prior to bringing a Bivens action against federal officials, was substantially amended by passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub.L. No. 104-134, § 803, 110 Stat. 1321, which became effective April 26, 1996. Those amendments are applicable to Whitley's claims, which were filed in May 1997. Prior to the PLRA, § 1997e provided:

(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available.

(2) The exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required unless the Attorney General has verified or the court has determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this section or are otherwise fair and effective.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (1994). Thus, § 1997e imposed a limited and discretionary exhaustion requirement applicable to § 1983 claims brought by state prisoners only. Although the pre-PLRA version of § 1997e did not require exhaustion by federal prisoners, many courts (including this one) had nonetheless created a comparable exhaustion requirement for actions brought by federal prisoners challenging the conditions of their confinement. See, e.g., Arvie v. Stalder, 53 F.3d 702, 704-05 (5th Cir.1995).

The Supreme Court construed the pre-PLRA version of § 1997e in McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992). McCarthy held that a Section 1997e, as amended by the PLRA, now provides:

federal prisoner seeking solely monetary relief need not pursue administrative remedies prior to filing a Bivens suit against prison authorities. McCarthy was premised in large part upon the dual facts (1) that Congress had not required exhaustion by federal prisoners in § 1997e, and (2) that the Bureau of Prisons did not afford any administrative remedies that would permit the recovery of monetary damages. 112 S.Ct. at 1089-92.

No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.

42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (Supp.1998). Having expanded...

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