Roberts v. Northern Pac Co

• Decision Date: 22 April 1895
• Docket Number: No. 124,124
• Citation: 39 L.Ed. 873,15 S.Ct. 756,158 U.S. 1
• Parties: ROBERTS et al. v. NORTHERN PAC. R. CO
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

158 U.S. 1

15 S.Ct. 756

39 L.Ed. 873

ROBERTS et al.

v NORTHERN PAC. R. CO.

No. 124.

April 22, 1895.

This was a bill in equity filed in the circuit court of the United States for the Western district of Wisconsin in December, 1889, by the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation organized under and by virtue of an act of congress approved July 2, 1864, against David E. Roberts, J. F. Ellis, and Euclid L. Johnson, wherein the complainant sought to quiet its title to certain lands in Douglas county, Wis.

The railroad company claimed title to the lands in question under an agreement of purchase and a deed of conveyance from the county of Douglas. The defendants set up a title under a subsequent deed of conveyance from the same county. After certain pleas and demurrers on behalf of the defendants Roberts and Ellis were overruled, the case was disposed of on bill and answer, and a final decree was rendered in favor of the complainant against Roberts and Ellis, and dismissing the bill without prejudice as to Johnson, from which decree an appeal was taken by Roberts and Ellis to this court.

The record discloses that an agreement was made on December 16, 1880, between the Northern Pacific Railroad Company and the county supervisors of Douglas county, whereby the former undertook to construct, complete, and equip its line of railroad through Douglas county by a route proposed by the county, and to erect certain wharves and docks to make a connection between the railroad and Lake Superior, and in consideration of this the county agreed to sell and convey certain parcels of land which the county had become possessed of by sales for unpaid taxes.

On January 16, 1882, the county board, by resolution, after reciting that the railroad company had complied with the terms of the agreemen, authorized a deed of conveyance of the lands to be executed and delivered to the company. In the deed there was an acknowledgment of the receipt of one dollar in hand paid, and of the performance by the company of its part of the agreement. This deed, dated January 20, 1882, was duly recorded in the office of the register of deeds of Douglas county.

The bill alleged that the company had expended in the construction of the main line from the Northern Pacific junction through Douglas county to Superior, and in the construction of proper depots, side tracks, and connections, the sum of $542,098.78; in the construction of the bay front line to Conner's Point, the terminus called for in the agreement, the sum of $93,423.91; and in the construction of a dock or pier in the bay of the town of Superior the sum of $116,249.73. It was also alleged in the bill, and not denied in the answer, that at the time when the county proposed to dispose of said lands to the company said lands were nontaxable, and yielded no income whatever to the county, and that ever since they were conveyed to the company the latter had in each and every year paid the taxes levied thereon, and had expended large sums of money in the payment of such taxes, to wit, more than $5,000; that its title to said lands remained undisputed by any one during all the time from said January 20, 1882, until the month of July, 1888; and that, in the meantime, the company had sold and conveyed various parcels of said lands to many different persons, and whose titles are based upon said deed of the county to the company.

On the 6th day of July, 1888, and on the 7th day of March, 1889, the county clerk of said county, in pursuance of a resolution of the board of supervisors, made deeds of those dates to the plaintiff in error Roberts for an alleged consideration of $385.

The other facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

William F. Vilas, for appellants.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 4-9 intentionally omitted] John C. Spooner, James McNaught, F. M. Dudley, and A. H. Garland, for appellee.

Mr. Justice SHIRAS, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

So far as those portions of the lands described in the bill of complaint consist of parcels held and used by the railway company for the necessary and useful purposes of their road as a public highway, it is obvious that the title and possession thereof cannot be successfully assailed by the appellants. The latter became purchasers long after the railroad company had entered into visible and notorious possession of these portions of the lands, and had constructed the roads, wharves, and other improvements called for by their contract with the county.

It is well settled that where a railroad company, having the power of eminent domain, has entered into actual possession of land necessary for its corporate purposes, whether with or without the consent of the owner of such lands, a subsequent vendee of the latter takes the land subject to the burden of the railroad; and the right to payment from the railroad company if it entered by virtue of an agreement to pay, or to damages if the entry was unauthorized, belongs to the owner at the time the railroad company took possession.

In Navigation Co. v. Decker, 2 Watts, 343, where there was a claim for damages caused to land by the construction of a canal, and where the land had been subsequently conveyed to a third person, it was held by the supreme court of Pennsylvania that such purchaser was not entitled to recover. The court said, per Chief Justice Gibson: 'To this claim it is a decisive objection that the plaintiff has not a title to the damages, which, being in compensation of an injury in the nature of a trespass, could not pass by mere conveyance of the land. In like manner the conveyance of a party wall does not entitle the grantee to contribution from the adjoining owner, it being held in Hart v. Kucher, 5 Serg. & R. 1, that the claim is satisfied by paymentt o the first builder, though the purchaser had not notice of it; and on the same principle it was held in Commonwealth v. Shepard, 3 Pen. & W. 509, that the claim to compensation under the act adjusting the titles to land in Luzerne and Lycoming counties is personal, and does not pass by a conveyance of the lands. Granting the compensation here to be, what it certainly is, the price of a perpetual easement, it is impossible to imagine a title to it in a subsequent grantee of the land subject to the easement.'

And in McFadden v. Johnson, 72 Pa. St. 336, the same court held that the damages to land, occasioned by the construction of a railroad, were a personal claim by the owner when the injury occurred; that they did not run with the land, nor pass by a deed, though not reserved.

Numerous authorities to the same effect may be found collected in 2 Wood, R. R. p. 994; and the conclusion established by the decisions is there said to be that the damages belong to the owner at the time of the taking, and do not pass to a grantee of the land under a deed made subsequent to that time, unless expressly conveyed therein.

So, too, it has been frequently held that if a landowner, knowing that a railroad company has entered upon his land, and is engaged in constructing its road without having complied with the statute, requiring either payment by agreement or proceedings to condemn, remains inactive, and permits them to go on and expend large sums in the work, he will be estopped from maintaining either trespass or ejectment for the entry, and will be regarded as having acquiesced therein, and be restricted to a suit for damages. Railroad Co. v. Ormsby, 7 Dana, 276; Harlow v. Railroad Co., 41 Mich. 336, 2 N. W. 48; Railroad Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494; Pettibone v. Railroad Co., 14 Wis. 443; Railroad Co. v. Goodwin, 111 Ill. 282.

It is not pretended that Roberts, the subsequent purchaser, acted in ignorance of the railroad company's title. On the contrary, in the answer it is alleged that 'the defendant Roberts purchased said lands from said county in good faith, and for the consideration named, which was the actual value of the title to said lands; the value of such title having been greatly impaired, and rendered almost valueless, by the cloud upon the same, created by said resolutions of the county board and such conveyance by the county clerk and such legislative act.' So far, then, from being a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, Roberts actually avows that he bought lands worth over $200,000, and upon which, as alleged in the bill, and not denied in the answer, the railroad company has expended, in the construction of its road and the erection of depots and docks and piers, several hundred thousand dollars, for the nominal sum of $385 and that he secured this bargain because the outstanding and well-known title of the railroad company, originating in the county's contract and deed, confirmed by the act of the legislature, 'greatly impaired and rendered almost valueless' the title so purchased by Roberts.

The conclusion, therefore, seems warranted that, as to those portions of the lands in question which are occupied and used by the railroad company, the county having stood by for years, and permitted the company to proceed in the construction of its road and appurtenances at a vast expense, and having accepted large sums as taxes, would be estopped from interfering with the possession of the railroad company. A fortiori, it follows that Roberts, buying with notice, could not maintain either trespass or ejectment for such portions, nor would he, as such purchaser, be entitled to recover damages for the occupation thereof.

The foregoing observations apply only to those portions of the lands in question which have been actually occupied and used by the railroad company for corporate purposes; or, in other words, to such lands as the railroad company could have condemned by the exercise of its right of eminent domain.

But, a it appears in the bill and answer that considerable portions of the land in dispute are not held or occupied by the...