Dewey T. Ross Engineering Corporation v. Sonneman

• Citation: 159 S.W.2d 200
• Decision Date: 12 February 1942
• Docket Number: No. 5876.,5876.
• Parties: DEWEY T. ROSS ENGINEERING CORPORATION v. SONNEMAN.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas

159 S.W.2d 200

DEWEY T. ROSS ENGINEERING CORPORATION v. SONNEMAN.

No. 5876.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.

February 12, 1942.

Rehearing Denied February 26, 1942.

Appeal from District Court, Smith County; Nat W. Brooks, Judge.

Action by Herbert H. Sonneman against Dewey T. Ross Engineering Corporation upon an itemized sworn account for certain merchandise allegedly sold by plaintiff to defendant. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Judgment reformed and affirmed.

Pollard, Lawrence & Reeves, of Tyler, for appellant.

McEntire & Shank, of Dallas, for appellee.

HALL, Justice.

This is an action upon an itemized sworn account for certain merchandise allegedly sold by appellee, sole owner of the Brownstown Lumber Company of Brownstown, Illinois, to appellant, Dewey T. Ross Engineering Corporation of Tyler, Texas. The account stated is $2,179.88 and runs from October 5, 1938, to June 22, 1939. In the alternative, appellee alleged that the merchandise itemized in his account was of the reasonable value charged therefor and that same was received and used by appellant. Appellant denied generally, and specifically with sworn denials of eleven items of appellee's account and made tender into court of the sum of $985.81 which it claimed was the total amount owing by it to appellee. Trial was to the court without a jury and resulted in judgment for appellee for $1752.09, together with interest at 6% from date.

Appellant presents eight propositions attacking the findings of the trial court as being without support in the evidence or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

The record discloses that appellant, a Texas corporation, was doing business in the oil fields of Illinois under a permit from that state. In its application for a permit, appellant designated A. B. Everett as its managing agent or general agent in the State of Illinois. It is undisputed that Everett occupied this position with appellant during all the times covering the transactions here in controversy. The evidence shows without dispute that appellant corporation was engaged in the business of erecting and dismantling oil well derricks in the oil fields of Illinois; that in carrying on this character of work it required large amounts of lumber and nails. The evidence also shows without dispute that appellee was engaged in the retail sale of lumber and other building materials and his claim here arises from certain items of lumber and nails alleged to have been sold by him to appellant at the instance and request of A. B. Everett, either in person or through one Jack Hunter.

The trial court found as a fact that A. B. Everett was the agent of appellant in the State of Illinois. This finding is in no way attacked by appellant. Under such circumstances, Everett's "powers are coextensive with the powers of the corporation he represents." Helms v. Home Owners Loan Corp., 129 Tex. 121, 103 S.W.2d 128, 134, and authorities there cited. Everett was "virtually the corporation itself". Sealy Oil Mill & Mfg. Co. v. Bishop Mfg. Co., Tex.Com.App., 235 S.W. 850, 852. It is the contention of appellant, however, that its requirement that a "field order be given for all purchases of material for its account" was not complied with respecting the items of the account here in...