Moore v. Spanish River Land Co.

• Decision Date: 28 February 1935
• Parties: MOORE v. SPANISH RIVER LAND CO. et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

159 So. 673

118 Fla. 549

MOORE v. SPANISH RIVER LAND CO. et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

February 28, 1935

Suit by a taxpayer against the Town of Boca Raton, the Spanish River Land Company and others, which was consolidated with suit by the Town of Boca Raton against John J. Heffernan, who filed a counterclaim. From an adverse decree, Clint Moore appeals.

Modified and affirmed.

BROWN J., dissenting in part. Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; C. E. Chillingworth, judge.

COUNSEL

Giles J. Patterson, of Jacksonville, and Williamson & Cain, of West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Gedney Johnston & Lilienthal, of West Palm Beach, William L. Ransom of New York City, and Metcalf & Finch, of West Palm Beach for appellee.

OPINION

BUFORD Justice.

A taxpayer filed bill of complaint against the town of Boca Raton, and certain other named defendants, seeking to enjoin the town of Boca Raton, its officers and agents, from attempting to raise by taxation moneys wherewith to pay certain lien certificates described in the bill of complaint, and from paying or attempting to pay any moneys of the town on account of interest of any of the lien certificates and to restrain the holders of such lien certificates named in the bill of complaint from instituting or prosecuting any suits or actions upon the lien certificates named and described in the bill of complaint, and by amendment to the bill of complaint sought to enjoin the defendants, George W. Harvey, George W. Harvey Realty Company, and Clint Moore from instituting or prosecuting any suits or actions against the town of Boca Raton for any moneys due or claimed to be due for any work done or materials furnished in the improvement of any streets, and for the improvement of which the lien certificates are alleged to have been issued.

After hearing on testimony pursuant to issues presented by pleadings, the court entered the following order:

'This cause was duly presented by counsel upon motion of Clint Moore to dissolve the temporary restraining order, and the matter was considered by the Court.

'I am of the opinion that the law court is competent to adjudicate the controversy between the municipality and Moore, without recourse to a court of equity.

'There seems to be no interpleader, multiplicity of suits or accounting that would properly confer equitable jurisdiction on this court. The questions of alleged fraud and validity of the contract may be presented in the common law action. Thereupon:

'It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the motion of Clint Moore to dissolve the temporary restraining order be granted, and that the temporary order heretofore entered under date of October 10, 1932, in so far as it pertains to Clint Moore, be vacated.'

This order was entered on the 17th day of February, 1933. On April 20, 1933, the court entered final decree as follows:

'This cause was duly presented by counsel upon final hearing and considered by the court.

'As between the municipality on one hand and the contractor and holder of lien certificates on the other, for the reasons stated in the order of February 17, 1933, I do not believe the municipality can maintain the bill for it has an adequate remedy at law in defense of any action brought by these defendants.

'Insofar as concerns John J. Heffernan, the contract of April 23, 1927, is invalid because never duly authorized by the town or performed by the contractor. The lien certificates were never duly issued or based upon any equitable or legal assessments. Hence, he can maintain no action on either the contract or the certificates.

'Assuming, without deciding, that John J. Heffernan should be recognized as the pro tanto assignee of Moore's cause of action on a quantum meruit basis, the evidence is too meager to show any benefits obtained by the municipality by reason of the alleged improvements, and, if there were any benefits, the evidence is too indefinite to show the amount John J. Heffernan might be entitled to recover. Thereupon,

'It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that as between the municipality and Clint Moore, the bill be dismissed; that as between the municipality and John J. Heffernan the temporary restraining order entered October 10, 1932, be and it is hereby made permanent; that the counter claim of John J. Heffernan be dismissed; that as between the municipality and John J. Heffernan the contract of April 23, 1927 be decreed void; that the lien certificates now held by said John J. Heffernan bearing date July 17, 1929, and bearing the following numbers, to-wit: 208, 442, 443, 471, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 509, 510, 511, 518, 519, 520, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 559, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 640, 720, 721, 722, 743, 759, 760, 778, 790, 821, 822, 823, 834, 835, 836, 843, 844, 845, 856, be and they are hereby cancelled; that costs in this suit in the amount of $----- including compensation of the Special Examiner in the amount of $----- be taxed, one-half against the plaintiff and one-half against the defendant John J. Heffernan, for which let execution issue.

'Done and ordered in Chambers at West Palm Beach, Florida, this 20 day of April, A. D. 1933.'

Appeal from the final decree brings both the order and decree for review.

The...