Drossos v. United States
| Decision Date | 03 January 1927 |
| Docket Number | No. 7147.,7147. |
| Citation | 16 F.2d 833 |
| Parties | DROSSOS v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
F. W. James, of Salt Lake City, Utah (John D. Rice, of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
Edward M. Morrissey, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Salt Lake City, Utah (Charles M. Morris, U. S. Atty., and J. K. Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Salt Lake City, Utah, on the brief), for the United States.
Before LEWIS, Circuit Judge, and MUNGER and FARIS, District Judges.
Plaintiff in error was convicted for violation of the Act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. 825; Comp. Stat. § 8813), for that he procured railroad tickets from the City of Salt Lake, Utah, to the City of Anaconda, Montana, which tickets were to be used and were used by Mrs. Panagoula Georgopoulos (and himself) in going in interstate commerce from Salt Lake City to Anaconda for the purpose of prostitution and debauchery.
Exceptions were saved to instructions given by the court and to the refusal of the court to give those requested by the defendant; and the action of the court in those respects is assigned as error. The evidence in the case is brief, and that part of it on the point to which the instructions given and those denied had reference and were bottomed is summarized thus: Mrs. Georgopoulos resided in Salt Lake City with her husband, he was abusive of her and their three children and his assaults on her were severe, she knew Drossos, he had lived with the Georgopoulos family for awhile, on the morning of June 23, 1923, the woman's husband told her that if she was in the house when he returned he would kill her, she was afraid and left the house with one of her children, she met the defendant and told him her troubles, he advised her to go back home but she told him she intended to kill herself and her little girl, whom she had with her, she wanted him to take her away and said if he would do so she would marry him, she said they would go to Butte, Montana, where they could get married, he bought the tickets and they went together from Salt Lake City to Butte, where they remained four or five days, the little girl was with them, they went from Butte to Anaconda, arriving at Anaconda he went to the court house to get a marriage license, the clerk told him to see the county attorney, he talked to the county attorney, who told him he could not get a marriage license until the woman was divorced, that they could live in the same house but he could not sleep with the woman, the county attorney gave him a written statement, in which it was stated that the attorney had investigated the case and that in event of any trouble he, the attorney, should be notified. Up to this time there is no evidence or circumstantial proof tending to show sexual relations. The proof is to the contrary. After the interview with the county attorney the defendant rented a three-room house which was occupied by him, the woman and the little girl. While living in the three-room house at Anaconda the woman was known as Mrs. Drossos. The defendant testified that when he left Salt Lake City he thought that by going to Montana he could marry the woman, that it was all right to go there and get a license and get married.
The statute makes intent and purpose an element of the crime. If the interstate journey was planned and made with no immoral purpose at the time no crime was committed, no matter what may have occurred thereafter. It is the immoral purpose which renders the interstate commerce criminal. In enacting the statute Congress was regulating interstate commerce. The prostitution, debauchery, etc., named in the statute are beyond federal power when standing alone and unconnected with interstate commerce. Gillette v. United States (C. C. A.) 236 F. 215; Biggerstaff v. United States (C. C. A.) 260 F. 926; Sloan v. United States (C. C. A.) 287 F. 91. The intent and purpose is a fact and must be established by the proof to the satisfaction of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and being an element of the offense itself its existence or nonexistence must be determined by the jury and not by the court. It may be inferred from circumstances. But an immoral purpose first conceived at the end of the journey is not sufficient.
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...v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 571, 34 S.Ct. 347, 58 L.Ed. 728; Roark v. United States, 8 Cir., 17 F.2d 570, 573; Drossos v. United States, 8 Cir., 16 F.2d 833, 834; Tedesco v. United States, 9 Cir., 118 F.2d 737, 741. So, however immoral may be a defendant's conduct, it is beyond federal ......
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