THE PINAR DEL RIO

Decision Date10 January 1927
Docket NumberNo. 151.,151.
Citation274 US 732,16 F.2d 984
PartiesTHE PINAR DEL RIO.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Silas B. Axtell, of New York City (Charles A. Ellis, of New York City, of counsel), for appellant.

Kirlin, Woolsey, Campbell, Hickox & Keating, of New York City (Cletus Keating, Vernon S. Jones, and Edward B. Long, all of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.

Before HOUGH, MANTON, and MACK, Circuit Judges.

HOUGH, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above).

The libel is drawn as for a cause of action arising under the general maritime law, and against a vessel of the United States. There is no allegation of the now admitted truth that the steamer was British, no reference to any statute, and it is not alleged that the vessel was unseaworthy.

It is useless to predicate anything on such pleadings, and as no point has been made of their infirmity we shall consider whether, on the facts proven and under any applicable law, libelant has a case.

In order to recover it must appear (1) that there exists a good cause of action for a maritime tort; and (2) that a maritime lien arises through and by the tort.

That libelant is a Spaniard is immaterial; the case is the same as if he had been an Englishman. The Hanna Nielsen (C. C. A.) 273 F. 171, citing The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 365, 5 S. Ct. 860, 29 L. Ed. 152.

If the applicable law is that of Great Britain, it is admitted that no "indemnity" (i. e., damages) can be claimed. Sullivan v. Nitrate, etc., Co. (C. C. A.) 262 F. 371, at page 373.

If that law be the general maritime law, as known and applied in the United States, libelant can recover neither against the vessel nor her owners, for the "improvident and negligent" act of the mate in selecting for libelant's use an insufficient rope. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 23 S. Ct. 483, 47 L. Ed. 760. If the vessel had been unsupplied with good and proper rope, a different question would arise.

There remains the question of the applicability of the Jones Act, § 33.

Whether this section applies at all to foreign vessels within our territorial waters has in our judgment been well discussed in Clark v. Montezuma, etc., Co., 217 App. Div. 172, 216 N. Y. S. 295, but the general question of applicability does not here arise.

Let it be admitted that had this steamer been American, either a libel in personam or an action at law against her owners would have lain under the Jones Act; as much is said in Panama R. R. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375, 390, 44 S. Ct. 391, 68 L. Ed....

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