Pitcher v. People
| Decision Date | 22 October 1867 |
| Citation | 16 Mich. 142 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
| Parties | John Pitcher v. The People |
Heard October 16, 1867 [Syllabus Material]
Error to Lenawee circuit.
The information in this case charged Pitcher with burglariously entering a certain dwelling-house, with intent to steal, etc. The proof tended to show that the building entered was the complainant's barn, and that the same constituted one of the out-buildings belonging to the dwelling, and that Pitcher stole certain wool therefrom.
It further appeared that, after conviction, Pitcher made full satisfaction to complainant for the value of the wool, and that he then claimed that under the statute providing for satisfaction made in cases of simple larceny, he could not be sentenced to state prison.
On the trial, one Newman--the confederate of Pitcher--on cross-examination, testified to the commission by him of other offenses, and when asked in regard to the larceny by him of certain harness on the night of the burglary, he claimed his privilege on the ground that his answer would tend to criminate him, and which was sustained by the court.
Pitcher was convicted, and sentenced to state prison.
Judgment affirmed.
C. A Stacy and W. W. Osborn, for plaintiff in error:
1. Accomplices are admitted to give evidence under an implied promise of pardon, on condition of their making a full and fair confession of the whole truth; that is, of all the offenses of which they might be questioned, and of all their associates in guilt.
They are not restricted to the crime under investigation: 9 Cow. 707; 4 Mich. 423; 2 Russ. on Cr., 958, note "a."
2. The barn was not within the yard, though located on one side of, and forming by itself a part of the fence inclosing the house-yard. It was not a part of the dwelling-house: Comp. L., §§ 5747, 5754-5758; 1 Russ. on Cr. (7 Am. ed.), 798, note; Whart. Am. Cr. L., § 1562; 1 Bish. Cr. L., 170, citing the Eng. Stat., 7 anp 8 Geo. IV, ch. 29, § 13; 20 N. Y., 52.
3. But the sentence of the court was clearly wrong. The defendant had made satisfaction to the party injured, to the full value of the property stolen, and, by section 5765, the court had no authority to imprison him in the state prison.
The act of stealing the property was simple larceny. It was not a case of compound larceny provided for by our statute.
Reed might have been convicted of burglary for breaking with intent to commit the crime of larceny, but if prosecuted for the act of stealing the property, he could only have been convicted of and punished for a simple larceny.
The sentence was therefore void, and the defendant must be discharged, and there can be no new trial in this case, nor a new judgment rendered: 8 Mich. 117, 125, 537; 3 Id. 207-213; Id., 365; 2 Met. 419; 5 B. and C., 395; 7 Ad. and El., 58.
Wm. L. Stoughton, Attorney-General, for the people:
1. The consent of the witness to answer questions relating to the subject under investigation, would not bar his right to decline to answer others relating to other crimes committed by him: 19 Ves. 295; 5 C. and P., 214; 2 Phil. Ev., 935; 1 Denio 319; 4 Mich. 414.
2. Where burglary is committed in any out-house which is, by law, considered part of the dwelling-house, it must still be laid as done in the dwelling-house: 1 Whart. Cr. L., 1609; 2 East P. C., 512.
a. The term "dwelling-house" comprehends all the out-buildings which are a parcel thereof. It need not be under the same roof. It embraces the entire congregation of buildings, main and auxiliary, including the barn, stables, etc., if parcel of the messuage, though they are not under the same roof or joining contiguous to it: 1 Bish. Cr. L., 165; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 80; 1 Hale P. C., 558; 2 Mich. 250; 3 Humph. 379.
b. It is not essential that the barn, carriage-house, and buildings of the like character, should be in the same inclosure, with that in which the family resides, if situated at a reasonable distance, and with no public way intervening: 1 Bish. Cr. L., 171; 8 Mich. 150; 1 Hayes 102, 242; 31 Me. 523.
The larceny having been connected with the graver offense of burglary, the defendant cannot bring himself within the statute by making satisfaction to the party injured, and thus avoid imprisonment in the state prison: 2 Comp. L., §§ 5764, 5765.
The information charges that one Samuel Reed, on the 5th day of July, 1865, in the night time, feloniously and burglariously broke and entered the dwelling-house of William Moore, in the township of Adrian, with intent the goods and chattels of said William Moore in said dwelling-house to steal, take and carry away, and then and there thirty-nine fleeces of wool, of the goods and chattels of said William Moore did steal, take and carry away, and that said John Pitcher the said thirty-nine fleeces of wool did receive and have, and aid in concealing, well knowing the same to have been so feloniously and burglariously stolen, etc. The proof tended to show that Reed broke into a barn on the premises of Moore, the situation of which, relative to the house, is described by the latter as follows: Pitcher being convicted on this information, made full satisfaction to Moore for the value of the wool stolen, and then claimed that, under § 5765 of the Comp. Laws, it was not competent for the court to sentence him to confinement in the state prison, inasmuch as the larceny by Reed was only a simple larceny; the term "burglarious larceny" being, as is claimed, inapplicable to any offense described in the statutes, and the various compound larcenies, for which the statutes provide penalties, being all with different accessories than those accompanying this case.
It is argued, first, that the act of Reed was not burglary, because the offense as described in the statute in the sections which the prosecution suppose applicable to such a case, is confined to the breaking and entering a "dwelling-house" in the night time, with intent, etc. (Comp. L., §§ 5754 and 5755), and the words "dwelling-house" are so used throughout the chapter where those sections occur, as to show the legislative intent that they should include only the dwelling-house proper, and not the adjoining out-buildings used therewith for domestic purposes (and which would be included by the designation at the common law), inasmuch as all such buildings are distinctively enumerated in other sections by which punishment of unlawful acts therein is provided for.
The statutory definition of burglary in a dwelling-house, is the same as that of the common law; and we must infer that the statute designs simply to provide for the punishment of the common law offense, unless we discover some reason...
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