Comer v. Baldwin

• Decision Date: 01 January 1871
• Citation: 16 Minn. 151
• Parties: MICHAEL COMER v. JOSEPH R. BALDWIN.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

16 Minn. 151

MICHAEL COMER

v. JOSEPH R. BALDWIN.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order of the district court, Dakota county, denying a new trial.

The action was brought to recover possession of a deed of real estate alleged to have been executed by defendant to plaintiff, or to have the title to the real estate adjudged to be in plaintiff.

Huddleston & Babcock, for appellant.

Brisbin & Palmer, for respondent.

McMILLAN, J.

This action was tried by a referee. Upon the trial, and after the plaintiff had introduced all his testimony and rested his case, the defendant, by his attorney, moved to dismiss the action upon the grounds: (1) That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (2) that the plaintiff upon his testimony is not entitled to judgment, and the defendant upon such testimony is entitled to a judgment of dismissal.

The motion was granted, and judgment of dismissal ordered by the referee in his report. The plaintiff, after making and settling a case, moved in the district court to set aside the report of the referee and for a new trial, on the ground that the report and decision is not justified by the evidence, and is contrary to law. The latter motion was denied, and the plaintiff appealed to this court.

The important and vital question in the case is whether the deed in question was or was not delivered by Baldwin to Comer. As the plaintiff's testimony upon this point, as given upon the trial before the referee, is before us, it will be more satisfactory to consider the question upon the sufficiency of the proofs offered on the trial, assuming the complaint to be good, as, if these are insufficient, an amendment to the complaint would not be material. To constitute a delivery of a deed effectual in law to pass the title to real estate, not only must the deed be delivered by the grantor, but it must be accepted by the grantee. Parker v. Parker, 1 Gray, 411; Fonda v. Sage, 46 Barb. 124.

A careful examination of all the testimony in the case fully satisfies us that there was no delivery of the deed from Baldwin to Comer, sufficient to pass any title to or interest in the land. The delivery of the deed, the payment of $1,000 of the purchase money, and the delivery of the notes and mortgage for the balance, according to the terms of the verbal agreement, were, in legal effect, parts of one transaction, and in the absence of qualifying circumstances, each essential to and conditioned upon the other. We think it is apparent that at the time Baldwin handed the...