GELSTON V. HOYT

• Decision Date: 01 January 1818
• Citation: 16 U. S. 246
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

Gelston v. Hoyt

16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246

ERROR TO THE COURT FOR THE TRIAL OF IMPEACHMENTS

AND CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Syllabus

Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, s. 25, giving appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of the United States from the final judgment or decree of the highest court of law or equity of a state in certain cases, the writ of error may be directed to any court in which the record and judgment on which it is to act may be found, and if the record has been remitted by the highest court, &c., to another court of the state, it may be brought by the writ of error from that court.

The courts of the United States have an exclusive cognizance of the questions of forfeiture upon all seizures made under the laws of the United States, and it is not competent for a state court to entertain or decide such question of forfeiture. If a sentence of condemnation be definitively pronounced by the proper court of the United States, it is conclusive that a forfeiture is incurred; if a sentence of acquittal, it is equally conclusive against the forfeiture, and in either case the question cannot be again litigated in any common law forum.

Where a seizure is made for a supposed forfeiture under a law of the United States, no action of trespass lies in any common law tribunal until a final decree is pronounced upon the proceeding in rem to enforce such forfeiture, for it depends upon the final decree of the court proceeding in rem whether such seizure is to be deemed rightful or tortious, and the action, if brought before such decree is made, is brought too soon.

If a suit be brought against the seizing officer for the supposed trespass while the suit for the forfeiture is depending, the fact of such pendency may be pleaded in abatement or as a temporary bar of the action. If after a decree of condemnation, then that fact may be pleaded as a bar; if after an acquittal with a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, then that may be pleaded as a bar. If after an acquittal without such certificate, then the officer is without any justification for the seizure, and it is definitively settled to be a tortious act. If to an action of trespass in a state court for a seizure, the seizing officer plead the fact of forfeiture in his defense without averring a lis pendens or a condemnation, or an acquittal with a certificate of reasonable cause of seizure, the plea is bad, for it attempts to put in issue the question of forfeiture in a state court.

At common law, any person may, at his peril, seize for a forfeiture to the government, and if the government adopt his seizure and the property is condemned, he is justified. By the Act of 18 February, 1793, ch. 8, s. 27, officers of the revenue are authorized to make seizures of any ship or goods for any breach of the laws of the United States.

The statute of 1794, ch. 50, s. 3, prohibiting the fitting out any ship, &c., for the service of any prince or states to cruise against the subjects, &c., of any other foreign prince or state, does not apply to any new government, unless it has been acknowledged by the United States or by the government of the country to which such new state belonged. And a plea which sets up a forfeiture under that act in fitting out a ship to cruise against such new state must aver such recognition or it is bad. A plea justifying a seizure under this statute need not state the particular prince or state by name against whom the ship was intended to cruise.

A plea justifying a seizure and detention by virtue of the seventh section of the act of 1794, under the express instructions of the President, must aver that the naval or military force of the United States was employed for that purpose and that the seizor belonged to the force so employed. The seventh section of the act was not intended to apply except to cases where a seizure or detention could not be enforced by the ordinary civil power and there was a necessity, in the opinion of the President, to employ naval or military power for this purpose.

To trespass for taking and detaining and converting property, it is sufficient to plead a justification of the taking and detention, and if the plaintiff relies on the conversion, he should reply it by way of new assignment.

A plea alleging a seizure for a forfeiture as a justification should not only state the facts relied on to establish the forfeiture, but aver that thereby the property became and was actually forfeited, and was seized as forfeited.

A forfeiture attaches in rem at the moment the offense is committed, and the property is instantly divested.

The seventh section of the act of 1794 did not authorize the President to order private individuals to seize, but only to employ the military and naval force to enforce a seizure.

An acquittal in the district court is conclusive.

State courts cannot try the question of forfeiture.

Defect of the second plea as containing an argumentative averment.

The rival chiefs in the Island of St. Domingo are not foreign princes or states within the Act of 1794, ch. 50, prohibiting the fitting out any ship for the service of any foreign prince or state to cruise against any other foreign prince or state.

It is the exclusive right of governments to acknowledge new states arising in the revolutions of the world, and until such recognition by our government or by that to which the new state previously belonged, courts of justice are bound to consider the ancient order of things as remaining unchanged.

Page 16 U. S. 248

This cause had been removed into that court by the present plaintiffs in error, by writ of error directed to the supreme court of the said state. In January, 1816, the Court of the State of New York for the Correction of Errors in all things affirmed the judgment which had been rendered by the supreme court of the State of New York in favor of Hoyt, the present defendant in error. And before the coming of the writ of error issued from this Court, the said Court for the Correction of Errors of the State of New York, according to the laws of the State of New York and the practice of that court, had remitted the record, which had been removed from the supreme court of the State of New York to the said supreme court, with a mandate thereon requiring the

Page 16 U. S. 249

supreme court of the State of New York to execute the judgment which had been so rendered by it in favor of the defendant in error. And the said record having been so remitted, the Court of Errors of the State of New York, upon the coming of the said writ of error from this Court, made the following return thereto:

"State of New York, ss."

"The President of the Senate, the senators, chancellor, and judges of the supreme court, in the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the Correction of Errors certify and return to the Supreme Court of the United States that before the coming of their writ of error, the transcript of the record in the cause in the said writ of error mentioned, together with the judgment of this court thereon, and all things touching the same, were duly remitted in pursuance of the statute instituting this court into the Supreme Court of Judicature of this state to the end that further proceedings might be thereupon had, as well for execution as otherwise, as might be agreeable to law and justice, and in which Supreme Court of Judicature the said judgment, and all other proceedings in the said suit now remain of record, and as the same are no longer before or within the cognizance of this court, this court is unable to make any other or further return to the said writ. All which is humbly submitted."

Thereupon the counsel for the plaintiffs in error made an application to the supreme court of the State of New York to stay the proceedings upon said judgment till an application could be made to this Court in respect to the said writ of error. To avoid this delay, the counsel under the advice or suggestion of the judges of the said supreme court of

Page 16 U. S. 250

the State of New York, entered into the following agreement, viz.,

"It is agreed between the attorneys of the above named plaintiffs and defendant in error that the annexed is a true copy of the record and bill of exceptions, returned by the supreme court of the State of New York to the Court of Errors of the said state, and remitted by the said Court of Errors, in the affirmance of the judgment of the said supreme court to the said supreme court. And that the said copy shall be considered by the said Supreme Court of the United States as a true copy of the said record and bill of exceptions, and shall have the same effect as if annexed to the writ of error in the above cause from the said Supreme Court of the United States, and that the clerk of the supreme court of the State of New York transmit the same, with this agreement to the clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, and that the same be annexed by the said clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, to the said writ of error as a true copy of the said record and bill of exceptions."

"Record and Bill of Exceptions."

"City and County of New York, ss. Be it remembered that in the term of January in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and thirteen came Goold Hoyt, by Charles Graham, his attorney, into the Supreme Court of Judicature of the people of the State of New York, before the justices of the people of the State of New York, of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the same people, at the capitol, in the City of Albany, and impleaded David Gelston and Peter A. Schenck, in a certain plea of trespass, on which the said Goold Hoyt

Page 16 U. S. 251

declared against the said David Gelston and Peter A. Schenck in the words following: "

" City and County of New York, ss. Goold Hoyt, plaintiff in this suit, complains of David Gelston and Peter A. Schenck, defendants in the suit, in custody, &c. For that, whereas, the said defendants, on the...