Reed v. McCord

Citation160 N.Y. 330,54 N.E. 737
PartiesREED v. McCORD.
Decision Date03 October 1899
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Second department.

Action by Mary Reed, administratrix of the goods, chattels, and effects of Patrick Reed, deceased, against William H. McCord, for damages for personal injuries to plaintiff's intestate causing his death, occasioned by the alleged negligence of defendant. From a judgment of the appellate division (46 N. Y. Supp. 407) affirming a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

O'Brien, J., dissenting.

Jesse Johnson, for appellant.

J. C. Robinson, for respondent.

MARTIN, J.

This action was to recover damages for personal injuries to the plaintiff's intestate which occasioned his death, and was based upon the alleged negligence of the defendant. The plaintiff had a verdict, which was not directed by the court. From the judgment entered thereon an appeal was taken to the appellate division, where it was unanimously affirmed, as appears by the order of affirmance contained in the record. The appellate division subsequently made an order granting the defendant leave to appeal to the court of appeals, and certified that, in its opinion, questions of law were involved which should be reviewed by that court. No definite questions of law were, however, stated or certified.

Only two questions relating to the merits of the controversyare presented by the appellant. The first is whether the evidence was sufficient to justify the submission to the jury of the question of the defendant's negligence. The second arises upon an exception to the admission in evidence of a statement made by the defendant at a coroner's inquest as to the cause of the accident which is the basis of the plaintiff's action.

As to the first, a preliminary question arises as to the jurisdiction of this court, which is whether, under the constitution as amended in 1894, it has any jurisdiction to review the question as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. The provisions of the constitution relating to this subject are as follows: ‘After the last day of December, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-five, the jurisdiction of the court of appeals, except where the judgment is of death, shall be limited to the review of questions of law. No unanimous decision of the appellate division of the supreme court that there is evidence supporting or tending to sustain a finding of fact or a verdict not directed by the court, shall be reviewed by the court of appeals. Except where the judgment is of death, appeals may be taken, as of right, to said court only from judgments or orders entered upon decisions of the appellate division of the supreme court, finally determining actions or special proceedings, and from orders granting new trials on exceptions, where the appellants stipulate that upon affirmance judgment absolute shall be rendered against them. The appellate division in any department may, however, allow an appeal upon any question of law which, in its opinion, ought to be reviewed by the court of appeals. The legislature may further restrict the jurisdiction of the court of appeals and the right of appeal thereto, but the right to appeal shall not depend upon the amount involved.’ Const. N. Y. art. 6, § 9.

It is to be observed that we have the mandate of the constitution to the effect that no unanimous decision of the appellate division that there is evidence supporting or tending to sustain a finding of fact or a verdict not directed shall be reviewed by the court of appeals, and that appeals may be taken, as of right, to this court only from judgments or orders entered upon decisions of the appellate division finally determining actions or special proceedings, and from orders granting new trials on exceptions where the proper stipulation is given. This provision of the constitution has been several times considered by this court. In Szuchy v. Iron Co., 150 N. Y. 219, 44 N. E. 974, it was held that if the trial court erred in deciding that the evidence was sufficient to require the submission of the case to the jury, and the appellate division unanimously affirmed that decision, still the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to review it. It was also held that, even where the refusal of the court to grant a nonsuit presented a question of law, it was not subject to review by this court, and that the provisions of the constitution applied as well where there was an entire absence of proof, so that a question of law was presented, as where the verdict was against the weight of evidence, and a question of fact was to be examined. In Trustees v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 876, the Szuchy Case was cited and approved, and it was there said: ‘Where the affirmance is by an appellate division, and is unanimous, we have no power to examine the record, even to see if there is any evidence to sustain the verdict.’ In People v. Barker, 152 N. Y. 432, 46 N. E. 875, the history, nature, and purpose of the foregoing provisions of the constitution were considered by this court. In that case we reached the conclusion that its purpose was to relieve the overburdened calendar of the court of appeals, by restricting the labors of that court to its proper functions of setting the law, and excluding from its consideration the questions whether a fact or a cause of action or a defense is sufficiently established, after it has been passed upon by the trial court and unanimously affirmed by the appellate division. We think this is the effect of that provision of the constitution, whether the question involved be a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact. In Marden v. Dorthy (decided at this term) 54 N. E. 726, this question arose and O'Brien, J., said: ‘Since the adoption of the present constitution the question whether a finding of fact, or a verdict upon issues of fact, is sustained by evidence, though in its very nature one of law, is not reviewable here, when the court below has decided unanimously that the judgment should be sustained. This one question of law has therefore in such cases been withdrawn from the cognizance of this court, as well as all questions of fact.’

The constitutional convention clearly entertained the opinion that the continued existence of the court of appeals was justified only by the necessity that some tribunal should exist with supreme power to authoritatively declare and settle the law uniformly throughout the state. The court was continued, not that individual suitors might secure their rights, but that the law should be uniformly settled, to the end that the people might understand the principles which regulated their dealings and conduct, and thus, if possible, avoid litigation. It was that necessity alone which induced the adoption of the provisions for a second appeal, and the continuance of a single court to finally determine such principles. Hence, in construing this provision of the amended constitution, the purpose of the amendment as indicated by the proceedings of the convention, as well as the condition of the calendar of the court of appeals at that time, should be borne in mind. In this way we may better understand the purpose and meaning of the language employed. The necessity for a court to thus settle the law for the entire state existed, and therefore such a court must be organized, or the existing one continued. Moreover, the calendar of the court of appeals was then overloaded with work, much of which was unnecessary to settle the law. With those conditions confronting it, the convention determined to continue this court, but to limit the questions it should be permitted to review to those that were necessary to a uniform determination of the law. It was by thus limiting the jurisdiction of this court that it sought to reduce the volume of its business, and still confer upon it jurisdiction to decide such questions. Manifestly the question of the insufficiency or of the absence of evidence to sustain a finding or decision in any particular case would not aid in setting the general law of the state, and for that reason those questions were excluded from its jurisdiction. That this was the purpose of the constitutional convention is rendered apparent by an examination of the statement of the judiciary committee which accompanied its report of the judiciary article to the convention, and from the record of its proceedings. Among other statements of that committee, it was, in substance, said that the clause in the constitution precluding the review of a unanimous decision of the appellate division as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding or verdict closed the door through which, under the Code, the whole question of fact in many cases was brought before the court of appeals; that it did not affect cases of nonsuit, or verdict directed, or reversal by the appellate division, or cases where there was a dissent in that court, but that it did require that when a trial court or...

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    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)
    • April 20, 1936
    ...is a circumstance for the jury to consider, in estimating the value of the evidence, but that is all." See, also, Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737, 740; Fitzgerald v. Lozier Motor Co., 187 Mich. 660, 154 N.W. 67, 69; Binewicz v. Haglin, 103 Minn. 297, 115 N.W. 271, 272, 15 L.R.A.(N......
  • People v. Lane
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    • New York Court of Appeals
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    ...44 N.Y. 156). Since the time, place and circumstances of the admission bear on weight only and not on competency (Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 341, 54 N.E. 737, 740), the mere fact that the statement was made while under arrest does not make it inadmissible (People v. Rogers, 18 N.Y. 9; Pe......
  • People v. Epakchi
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals
    • April 1, 2021
    ...designed to give this Court "supreme power to authoritatively declare and settle the law uniformly throughout the state" (Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 335, 54 N.E. 737 [1899] ).5 A "long-form" information is not one of the accusatory instruments defined in the Criminal Procedure Law (see C......
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    • New York Court of Appeals
    • April 1, 2021
    ...designed to give this Court "supreme power to authoritatively declare and settle the law uniformly throughout the state" (Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 335, 54 N.E. 737 [1899] ).5 A "long-form" information is not one of the accusatory instruments defined in the Criminal Procedure Law (see C......
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17 books & journal articles
  • Hearsay
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive New York Objections - 2019 Contents
    • August 2, 2019
    ...any fact material to the issues are always competent evidence against the party, wherever, whenever, or to whomever made. Reed v. McCord , 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899); People v. Chico , 90 N.Y.2d 585, 665 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1997). he theory on which admissions are held competent is that it is......
  • Hearsay
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive New York Objections - 2021 Contents
    • August 2, 2021
    ...any fact material to the issues are always competent evidence against the party, wherever, whenever, or to whomever made. Reed v. McCord , 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899); People v. Chico , 90 N.Y.2d 585, 665 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1997); Gezelter v. Pecora , 129 A.D.3d 1021, 13 N.Y.S.3d 141 (2d Dept......
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    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive New York Objections - 2014 Contents
    • August 2, 2014
    ...any fact material to the issues are always competent evidence against the party, wherever, whenever, or to whomever made. Reed v. McCord , 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899); People v. Chico , 90 N.Y.2d 585, 665 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1997). The theory on which admissions are held competent is that it i......
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    ...Dept. 2005), § 10:20 Reardon v. Benderson Development Co. Inc., 266 A.D.2d 869, 697 N.Y.S.2d 893 (4th Dept. 1999), § 10:10 Reed v. McCord, 160 N.Y. 330, 54 N.E. 737 (1899), § 5:180 Reeps v. BMW of North America , 94 A.D.3d 475, 941 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1st Dept. 2012), § 18:60 Reese v. New York Ci......
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