Crane v. Cedar Rapids & I. C. Ry. Co.

Decision Date05 September 1968
Docket NumberNo. 52991,52991
Citation160 N.W.2d 838
PartiesRonald L. CRANE, Appellant, v. CEDAR RAPIDS AND IOWA CITY RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Arthur O. Leff, Iowa City, and Halloran & Alfveby, Minneapolis, Minn., for appellant.

John F. Gaston, Jr., Ted P. Lewis, and Lynch, Dallas, Smith & Harman, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

STUART, Justice.

Plaintiff brought this action in the Linn County District Court to recover damages for personal injuries received when he fell from a runaway railroad box car which he was attempting to stop by applying the brakes. The railroad car had been delivered to Cargill, Inc. by defendant. Plaintiff, an employee of Cargill was engaged in spotting cars for his employer at the time of the accident. He sought to impose liability on defendant by alleging it failed to have the cars equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact as required by 45 U.S.C.A., § 2. The case was submitted to the jury which returned a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff has appealed.

I. Plaintiff's first three errors relate to instructions given or requested instructions refused and depend upon his claim failure of the railroad equipment to perform as required by the Safety Appliance Acts (S.A.A.) 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 1--7, is in itself an actionable wrong which results in absolute liability and contributory negligence is no defense. It is our opinion the defense of contributory negligence was available to defendant and the instructions in this regard were correct.

It is well settled the duty imposed on the railroads by the Safety Appliance Acts is 'an absolute one and the carrier is not excused by any showing of care, however assiduous'. Brady v. Terminal R.R. Assn., 303 U.S. 10, 15, 58 S.Ct. 426, 429, 82 L.Ed. 614, (1937) and citations.

It is also well settled "the nature of the duty imposed by a statute and the benefits resulting from its performance' usually determine what persons are entitled to invoke its protection'. Brady v. Terminal R.R. Assn., supra, loc. cit. 14, 58 S.Ct. loc. cit. 429. The trial court ruled plaintiff was within the class of persons intended to be protected by the S.A.A. This holding is supported by the authorities and is not challenged here. Boyer v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co., 38 Ill.2d 31, 230 N.E.2d 173; Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 1 Cir., 206 F.2d 153; Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 350 U.S. 318, 76 S.Ct. 386, 100 L.Ed. 364; Brady v. Terminal R.R. Assn., supra; Fairport R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 54 S.Ct. 826, 78 L.Ed. 1446.

Employees of carriers are given the further protection of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, (F.E.L.A.). 45 U.S.C.A. Chapter 2. Employees may bring action for personal injury in either the federal or state courts. 45 U.S.C.A. § 56. In actions under F.E.L.A. based on violation of S.A.A. the carrier may not invoke assumption of risk or contributory negligence as a defense. 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 53--54.

Crane as a nonemployee is not entitled to the benefits of the F.E.L.A. and, as the S.A.A. does not provide a remedy, he brought his action in the state court subject to state law.

An examination of the cases convinces us the Safety Appliance Acts impose an absolute duty on the railroad carrier to equip its cars as required by statute and failure of the safety appliance to so operate is negligence per se. In the absence of statutory state law to the contrary, the injured party is required to exercise due care for his own safety and under Iowa law his contributory negligence is a proper defense to be submitted to the jury.

The U.S. Supreme Court first considered the question in Schlemmer v. Buffalo R. & P. Ry. Co., 220 U.S. 590, 31 S.Ct. 561, 55 L.Ed. 596 (1910). There the Pennsylvania trial court submitted the case to the jury under an allegation that defendant had violated 45 U.S.C.A. § 2 by failing to have automatic couplers. The question of contributory negligence was included. The court pointed out that Congress had expressly provided the employee should not be deemed to have assumed the risk '(b)ut there is nothing in the statute absolving the employee from the duty of using ordinary care to protect himself from injury in the use of the car with the appliances actually furnished'. 220 U.S. at 596, 31 S.Ct. at 563.

'In the absence of legislation at the time of the injury complained of, taking away the defense of contributory negligence, it continued to exist, * * *.' 220 U.S. at 597, 31 S.Ct. at 563.

'In view of this record we cannot say that the court, in denying a recovery to the plaintiff, upon the ground of contributory negligence of the deceased, denied to her any rights secured by the Federal statute.' 220 U.S. at 598, 31 S.Ct. at 564.

In Fairport P. & E.R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 54 S.Ct. 826, 78 L.Ed. 1446 (1933), the Supreme Court held the duty imposed by the Safety Appliance Acts 'in respect of power controlled brakes extends to and includes travelers at railway-highway crossings.' 292 U.S. at 597, 54 S.Ct. at 829.

'* * * (T)he trial court instructed the jury, in effect, that, if the violation of the federal act resulted proximately or immediately in the injury complained of, the railroad company was liable. But the jury was also told that, if respondent was guilty of contributory negligence, she could not recover notwithstanding the negligence of petitioner.' 292 U.S. at 593, 54 S.Ct. at 827.

The court said: 'The federal Safety Appliance Act, as we already have said and this court repeatedly has ruled, imposes absolute duties upon interstate railway carriers and thereby creates correlative rights in favor of such injured persons as come within its purview; but the right to enforce the liability which arises from the breach of duty is derived from the principles of the common law. The act does not affect the defense or contributory negligence, and, since the case comes here from a state court, the validity of that defense must be determined in accordance with applicable state law.' 292 U.S. at 598, 54 S.Ct. at 829.

In 1934 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its position with regard to the defense of contributory negligence in Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 216, 54 S.Ct. 402, 78 L.Ed. 755, and Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry. Co., 292 u.S. 57, 61, 54 S.Ct. 573, 78 L.Ed. 1123.

In Tipton v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 141, 146, 56 S.Ct. 715, 80 L.Ed. 1091 (1935), the court held California was at liberty to afford any appropriate remedy for breach of the duty imposed by the S.A.A. and could limit plaintiff's recovery to workmen's compensation. The court said: 'The Safety Appliance Acts impose an absolute duty upon an employer * * *. The absolute duty imposed necessarily supersedes the common-law duty of the employer. But, unlike the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which gives a right of action for negligence, the Safety Appliance Acts leave the nature and the incidents of the remedy to the law of the states. The Safety Appliance Acts modify the enforcement, by civil action, of the employee's common-law right in only one aspect, namely, by withdrawing the defense of assumption of risk. They do not touch the common or statute law of a state governing venue, limitations, contributory negligence, or recovery for death by wrongful act.' 298 U.S. at 146, 56 S.Ct. at 716.

The U.S. Supreme Court has not overruled or modified these clear holdings. Plaintiff cites more recent cases which he claims show an inclination on the part of the court to treat absolute duty and absolute liability the same.

In Shields v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 350 U.S. 318, 76 S.Ct. 386, 100 L.Ed. 364 (1955), a nonemployee sought damages for personal injuries sustained when a platform near the dome on a tank car broke causing him to fall. The main question was whether this platform was a safety appliance within the S.A.A. The only comment pertinent to our problem here is found in the last paragraph of the opinion. The court said: 'There is no merit in respondent's contention that, since petitioner is not one of its employees, no duty is owed him under § 2 of the Act. Having been upon the dome running board for the purpose of unloading the car, he was a member of one class for whose benefit that device is a safety appliance under the statute. As to him, the violation of the statute must therefore result in absolute liability. Coray v. Southern Pacific Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed. 208; Brady v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 303 U.S. 10, 58 S.Ct. 426, 82 L.Ed. 614; Fairport, P. & E.R. Co. v. Meredith, 292 U.S. 589, 54 S.Ct. 826, 78 L.Ed. 1446; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Layton, 243 U.S. 617, 37 S.Ct. 456, 61 L.Ed. 931.' 350 U.S. at 325, 76 S.Ct. (386) at 391.

The authorities cited do not support the comment on absolute liability. The issue of contributory negligence was not in the case and was not mentioned in the opinion.

Three F.E.L.A. cases, Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S.Ct. 226, 94 L.Ed. 236 (1949); O'Donnell v. Elgin J. & E.R. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 70 S.Ct. 200, 94 L.Ed. 187 (1949); and Affolder v. N.Y.C. & St. L.R. Co., 339 U.S. 96, 70 S.Ct. 509, 94 L.Ed. 683 (1950); contain language which tends to support plaintiff's position, but the issue of contributory negligence was not mentioned.

Whether these cases are harbingers of a change in position by the U.S. Supreme Court or merely imprecise language which frequently appears in dictum, we do not know. The federal statutes have not been changed. The reasons for holding a nonemployee's action is governed by applicable state law seem sound and still exist. In any event, we do not consider it our prerogative to place an interpretation on the federal statutes which differs from that of the U.S. Supreme Court. No one claims contributory negligence is not a defense under Iowa law.

Other federal courts have consistently held contributory negligence is available...

To continue reading

Request your trial
21 cases
  • Wilson v. Nepstad
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 25 Julio 1979
    ...Co., 253 N.W.2d 265, 270 (Iowa 1977) (quoting Hansen v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926)); Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway, 160 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Iowa 1968), Aff'd, 395 U.S. 164, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); Lattner v. Immaculate Conception Church, 255 Iowa 120,......
  • State v. Grady
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 9 Febrero 1971
    ...resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter. * * * (citing authorities).' Crane v. Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway Co., 160 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1968), affirmed 395 U.S. 164, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d Both definitions limit application of the hearsay rule to ......
  • State v. Moritz, 62991
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 18 Junio 1980
    ...plus, of course, that he relied on it. The county attorney's statement would be independently relevant. Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway Co., 160 N.W.2d 838, 845-46 (Iowa 1968), aff'd, 395 U.S. 164, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969); United States v. Wellendorf, 574 F.2d 1289, 1......
  • State v. Kelsey
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 15 Noviembre 1972
    ...recent cases we have defined hearsay. See Daniels v. Bloomquist, 258 Iowa 301, 312, 138 N.W.2d 868, 875; Crane v. Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway Co., 160 N.W.2d 838, 845 (Iowa 1968), affirmed 395 U.S. 164, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176; and State v. Grady, 183 N.W.2d 707, 712 (Iowa 'In ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT