U.S. v. Lyton

Decision Date07 December 1998
Docket NumberNo. 98-2432,98-2432
Citation161 F.3d 1168
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Daniel Franklin LYTON, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

David R. Stickman, Omaha, Nebraska, argued (Jeffre L. Thomas and Jennifer L. Gilg, on the brief), for Appellant.

Michael G. Heavican, Assistant United States Attorney, Omaha, Nebraska, argued (Thomas J. Monaghan, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before WOLLMAN, ROSS and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

ROSS, Circuit Judge.

Daniel Franklin Lyton appeals from a judgment of the district court 1 following his conditional guilty plea to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1). We affirm.

In the afternoon of June 28, 1997, after Nebraska State Trooper Wendy Brehm saw a pick-up truck following a camper too closely, she pulled the truck over to the side of the highway. Nathaniel Turner was driving the truck and Lyton was the passenger. In response to Brehm's request, Turner gave her a California driver's license and a Michigan registration indicating the vehicle was registered to a Charles Laird. In response to questioning, Turner told Brehm that the truck belonged to Lyton and that they had been to Las Vegas, Nevada, to celebrate Lyton's birthday and were returning to Detroit, Michigan.

Brehm then questioned Lyton. He told her the truck belonged to his uncle and that he and Turner were going to stop in Las Vegas, but did not because they ran out of money. Brehm also asked if there were drugs or weapons in the truck. Lyton said no and invited Brehm to check the truck. Brehm then presented Lyton with a consent-to-search form, which he signed.

Looking underneath the truck, Brehm saw two gasoline tanks and what appeared to be tape on one of the tanks. Trooper Bruce Okamato, who had come to the scene, also looked underneath the truck and saw markings indicating the rear tank had been removed and replaced. After tapping on the tank, he believed it contained something other than fuel. Although the gas gauges showed both tanks were full, Okamato could start the truck using the front tank, but could not start it using the rear tank. Brehm then asked Turner to drive the truck and follow her to a garage so that the tanks could be inspected; he complied. Okamato drove Lyton to the garage, where the rear tank was removed and bags of cocaine and a gun were found inside.

After indictment, Lyton filed a motion to suppress, asserting that the stop and detention were illegal and his consent was involuntary. The government responded that Lyton did not have standing to contest the search of the truck because he failed to present evidence that he was using the truck with his uncle's permission. See United States v. Muhammad, 58 F.3d 353, 354 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam) (defendant lacked standing where he failed to present "some evidence of consent or permission from the lawful owner[ ] to give rise to an objectionably reasonable expectation of privacy"). Although the district court agreed that Lyton lacked standing to directly contest the search, it held that he had standing to challenge the stop and detention, but rejected his arguments.

On appeal, Lyton argues that the district court erred in holding that he did not have standing to contest the search of the truck. We note that recently the Supreme Court has observed that "in determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not someone else's) Fourth Amendment rights, the 'definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.' " Minnesota v. Carter, --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 469, --- L.Ed.2d ----, 1998 WL 823045, at * 3 (1998) (No. 97-1147) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)). In any event, we need not decide whether Lyton had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the truck. Even if he did, he has not shown a violation of his rights. See United States v. Thomas, 83 F.3d 259, 260 (8th Cir.1996). Moreover, as the district court noted, Lyton may challenge the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity. See United States v. Portwood, 857 F.2d 1221, 1222 (8th Cir.1988) (passenger may contest legality of stop), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069, 109 S.Ct. 2073, 104 L.Ed.2d 638 (1989).

We now turn to Lyton's arguments concerning his stop and detention. Lyton concedes that " 'any traffic violation, even a minor one, gives an officer probable cause to stop the violator.' " United States v. Pipes, 125 F.3d 638, 640 (8th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Bell, 86 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 372, 136 L.Ed.2d 262 (1996)), cert. denied,--- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1202, 140 L.Ed.2d 330 (1998). Lyton also concedes that it is a violation of Nebraska law if a driver "follow[s] another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent," Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6, 140 (Reissue 1993), but argues that Brehm's testimony that Turner was following too closely was not credible. However, the court credited Brehm's testimony and we defer to its finding. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir.1998) (officer's "observation of [defendant] following a motor vehicle too closely provided probable cause" for stop).

We also reject Lyton's arguments that the detention was illegal. After stopping the truck for the traffic violation, Brehm properly asked questions reasonably related to the stop, including requests for identification and registration and questions relating to presence in the area, destination and purpose. Id. at 1134. In addition, because Turner and Lyton gave inconsistent stories, Brehm was entitled "to expand the scope of the stop and ask additional, more intrusive, questions." United States v. Ramos, 42 F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1134, 115 S.Ct. 2015, 131 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1995); see also United States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356, 358 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 936, 116 S.Ct. 348, 133 L.Ed.2d 245 (1995).

Lyton also argues that his consent to search was not voluntary. Because the stop and detention were lawful, his argument that the search was a product of an illegal stop and...

To continue reading

Request your trial
42 cases
  • U.S. v. Williams
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • December 18, 2001
    ...Williams explicitly told the officers, in plain language, to "go ahead" and search the apartment and Nissan. Cf. United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1171 (8th Cir.1998) (consent voluntary where defendant "invited" officer to check vehicle for guns and drugs); United States v. Nobles, 69 ......
  • State v. Garcia
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
    • February 20, 2002
    ...States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 268 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1998). But see United States v. Garcia, 205 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2000)(holding that officer's inquiries concerning drive......
  • U.S. v. May
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • July 10, 2006
    ...the stop and detention and argue that the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of illegal activity.'"), quoting United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir.1998). However, we conclude that the underlying circumstances, which led to the inventory search of the van, weigh against ......
  • State v. Akuba
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • August 18, 2004
    ...the legality of her own detention. United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 446 n. 3 (8th Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Lyton, 161 F.3d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir.1998)). However, the State argued that Paul did not have standing to challenge Akuba's consent to search the trunk of the car. The ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT