Brown v. Daytop Village, Inc.

• Decision Date: 31 January 1994
• Citation: 161 Misc.2d 248,613 N.Y.S.2d 1021
• Parties: Mark BROWN, Plaintiff, v. DAYTOP VILLAGE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 1021

613 N.Y.S.2d 1021

161 Misc.2d 248

Mark BROWN, Plaintiff, v. DAYTOP VILLAGE, INC., Defendant.

Supreme Court, Bronx County Special Term.

Jan. 31, 1994.

Dudley & Gardner, New York City (Neveen M. Nesheiwat, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Menagh, Trainor & Mundo, P.C. by Douglas Menagh, New York City, for defendant.

DOMINIC R. MASSARO, Justice.

Prior to the institution of this action, Plaintiff had been arrested and charged with the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law, Sec. 220.39[1]. As a criminal defendant, Mr. Brown was unable to post bail. Seeking an alternative to incarceration, this admitted drug dependent attempted to obtain admission to an in-patient drug treatment program. In due course, Daytop Village, Inc. (hereinafter "Daytop") accepted him, and he was paroled to its custody. ¹

On the day following his parole, Mr. Brown, a Rastafarian, was dismissed from the residential drug treatment program. This because of a refusal to allow the cutting of his rope-like hair strands, referred to as "dreadlocks," pursuant to program regulations. This gives rise to the instant action wherein Plaintiff charges that Daytop's residential drug treatment program is a "clinic" and, as such, under our Human Rights Law (Executive Law, Sec. 292.9), a place of public accommodation which has discriminated against him on the basis of creed ² (Executive Law, Sec. 296.2[a]. He seeks declarative and injunctive relief, in addition to monetary damages, for averred infringement upon the free exercise of his religion. ³ The judgment sought is denied and the matter dismissed.

Pendente lite, by order to show cause, Mr. Brown had sought to obtain a preliminary injunction, enjoining Daytop from refusing to admit him unconditionally into its residential treatment program. Said petition was earlier denied (see Brown v. Daytop Village, Inc., N.Y.L.J., 12/3/92, p. 27).

Daytop's contentions are procedural as well as substantive. As to the latter, they are threefold: that it does not fall within the proscription of the human rights statute because it is neither a "clinic" nor a place of public accommodation within the meaning of sections 292.9 and 296.2(a), respectively. That were it otherwise to be found, the requisite element of intent to discriminate "because of" Mr. Brown's religious belief is lacking. In either event, Defendant maintains that Plaintiff is not entitled to treatment on demand. In the alternative, it challenges the sincerity of Plaintiff's Rastafarian belief.

Interestingly, there have been no reported cases dealing with drug rehabilitation program regulations vis-a-vis the right to religious expression.

I

Treating first with the procedural concern, it is too late in the day to suggest that statutes are not inherently proper subjects of declaratory relief; questions as to the construction of a statute may be entertained in declaratory judgment proceedings commenced in appropriate superior courts, provided there is, as here, an actual or justiciable controversy to be determined. It is beyond cavil that declaratory judgment proceedings are particularly appropriate to determine questions as to the interpretation of a statute, and any rights or entitlements that may flow therefrom; and that courts of equity may issue injunctions considered essential to justice, independent of statutory provisions specifically conferring this inherent power (citations omitted).

Under New York law, "it [is] an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation ... because of the ... creed ... of any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof ..." (emphasis added) (Executive Law, Sec. 296.2[a].

The statutory definition of "place of public accommodation" is found at section 292.9 of the law. It is widely illustrative and inclusive of "clinics." Whether Daytop's residential treatment program falls within this definitional ambit, as claimed by Plaintiff, is a question of fact.

Daytop is a private, Manhattan based not-for-profit organization of wide note. Licensed by the State of New York ⁴ and enjoying significant government support by way of enabling grants and contracts for its services, Daytop has developed and conducts state approved residential and non-residential drug treatment programs. Within this area of expertise, Daytop also provides technical assistance, training and sometimes supervision far beyond the confines of New York. Likewise, it is in consultative status with the United Nations.

By way of contrast, Daytop's residential drug treatment program is regulated by strict conformance with uniform standards for admission, and thereafter for continued treatment in a "therapeutic community." These uniform standards were early on designed by medically supervised trial and error experimentation. They have since been maintained with a quarter century of regulatory consistency. The essential function of this particular program model is the imposition of behavioral mandates to break--psychologically as well as physically--individuals addicted to drugs away from destructive life patterns. Initially, all residents in a successively formed therapeutic community commence the program on equal footing, that is, in an environmental setting bereft of personal privilege. As each individual progresses in 24 to 36 months of phased therapy, he or she "earns" back, as "privileges," certain elements of their "individual style." This process is designed to teach residents self-discipline and the rewards of managed behavior. Observing that everyone else in the Daytop residential setting must "earn" "privileges" is a crucial lesson aimed at preparing residents for their return to society. Upon a resident "earning" the "privileges" which he or she wants to maintain in a drug-free life, that individual will be considered for honorable discharge from the program.

As one of a plethora of entry-level regulations in its therapeutic methodology, Daytop requires that hair be cut upon admission into the residential drug treatment program, and worn at common length without distinctive style. With this regulation, Plaintiff refused to conform.

II

Clinic is a "common word of clear import" (Sattler v. City Commission on Human Rights, 180 A.D.2d 644, 646, 580 N.Y.S.2d 35 [2d Dept., 1992]. Its plain meaning, as reflected in several widely used dictionaries, is "a facility ... that is devoted to the diagnosis and care of outpatients" (American Heritage Dictionary [3d Ed., 1992]; "a facility ... for diagnosis and treatment of outpatients" (Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary [1986]; "a place ... for the treatment of nonresident patients" (The Random House College Dictionary [Rev.Ed., 1982]; "a center for physical examination and treatment of ambulant patients who are not hospitalized" (Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary [13th Ed., 1977]; or "an institution connected with a hospital or medical school where diagnosis, and treatment are made available to outpatients" (Webster's Third New International Dictionary [1964].

Further, the statutory language encompassing the idea of public accommodation states two aspects: the idea of accommodation in the broad sense of providing convenience and services to the public with little or no restriction, and the idea of place (see U.S. Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 59 N.Y.2d 401, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 452 N.E.2d 1199 [1983].

Assuming, arguendo, that Daytop were to be found a public accommodation under the state's Human Rights Law, at most it would be obliged not to discriminate against plaintiff "because of" creed (Sec. 296.2[a]; no provision exists in the statute requiring a public accommodation to make affirmative accommodations to religious practices of its prospective patrons. Even in the context of employment (where more is required of a covered entity than in the arena of public accommodation), our Court of Appeals requires proof of actual intent to discriminate as a prerequisite before a claim of religious discrimination may be sustained (see Eastern Greyhound Lines v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 27 N.Y.2d 279, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322, 265 N.E.2d 745 [1970]. No such intent has been demonstrated here; indeed, no such intent has been alleged.

It should be recalled in this respect that an alternative means of exercising the claimed right has always been available to this Plaintiff. Daytop's non-residential drug treatment program is designed not to disrupt functional aspects of personal life and is free of residential "therapeutic community" modality. In this instance, Mr. Brown chose not to avail himself of its proffer.

Moreover, as our Court of Appeals also has held, "the two concepts" of " 'religious discrimination and failure to accommodate' ... 'are entirely different' " and (except for an employer's limited obligation with respect to Sabbath and religious holiday observance), the Human Rights Law imposes no duty to accommodate religious practices (see Eastern Greyhound Lines v. New York State Division of Human Rights, supra, at 285, 317 N.Y.S.2d 322, 265 N.E.2d 745, quoting with approval Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335 [6th Cir., 1970], aff'd 402 U.S. 689, 91 S.Ct. 2186, 29 L.Ed.2d 267 [1971].

III

While it has been held "entirely appropriate, indeed necessary, for a court to engage in analysis of the sincerity ... of someone's religious belief in ... the free exercise context" (Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education, 757 F.2d 476, 481 [2d Cir., 1985], aff'd, 479 U.S. 60, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 [1986]; see, also, Benjamin v. Coughlin, 708 F.Supp. 570 [S.D.N.Y., 1989], aff'd, 905 F.2d 571 (2nd Cir.1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 372, 112 L.Ed.2d 335 [1990]; United...