161 U.S. 677 (1896), 722, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Kentucky
|Docket Nº:||No. 722|
|Citation:||161 U.S. 677, 16 S.Ct. 714, 40 L.Ed. 849|
|Party Name:||Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Kentucky|
|Case Date:||March 30, 1896|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued January 14-15, 1895
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY
A power given in a charter of a railroad to connect or unite with other roads refers merely to a physical connection of the tracks, and does not authorize the purchase, or even the lease of such roads or road, or any union of franchises.
The several statutes of Kentucky and of Tennessee relating to the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, which are quoted from or referred to in the opinion of the court, confer upon that company no general right to purchase other roads, or to consolidate with them.
The union referred to in those statutes is limited to a union with a road already connected with the Louisville and Nashville by running into the same town, and has and could have no possible relation to the acquirement of a parallel or competing line.
The third section of the Kentucky act of 1856 reenacting the Tennessee act of 1855, and providing that the Louisville and Nashville Company may "from time to time extend any branch road and may purchase and hold any road constructed by another company" did not confer a general power to purchase roads constructed by other companies regardless of their relations or connections with the Louisville and Nashville road.
A contemporaneous construction of its charter which ratified the purchase of a few short local lines does not justify the company in consolidating with a parallel and competing line between its two termini with a view of destroying the competition which had previously existed between the two lines.
The Chesapeake, Ohio, and Southwestern Railroad Company was never vested with the power to consolidate its capital stock, franchises, or property with that of any other company owning a parallel or competing line. If, from reasons of public policy, a legislature declares that a railway company shall not become the purchaser of a parallel or competing line, the purchase is not the less unlawful because the parties choose to let it take the form of a judicial sale.
Whatever is contrary to public policy or inimical to the public interests is subject to the police power of the state, and is within legislative control, and, in the exertion of such power, the legislature is vested with a large discretion which, if exercised bona fide for the protection of the public, is beyond the reach of judicial inquiry.
Section 201 of the Constitution of the State of Kentucky of 1891, providing that
no railroad, telegraph, telephone, bridge or common carrier company shall consolidate its capital stock, franchises or property, or pool its earnings, in whole or in part, with any other railroad, telegraph, telephone, bridge or common carrier company owning a parallel or competing line or structure, or acquire by purchase, lease or otherwise, any parallel or competing line or structure, or operate the same, nor shall any railroad company or other common carrier combine or make any contract with the owners of any vessel that leaves or makes port in this state, or with any common carrier, by which combination or contract the earnings of the one doing the carrying are to be shared by the other not doing the carrying,
is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, and forbids the consolidation between the Louisville and Nashville Company and the Chesapeake, Ohio and Southwestern Company, which is the subject of controversy in this suit, at least so far as the power to make it remains unexecuted.
[16 S.Ct. 715] This was a bill in equity, styled a "petition," originally filed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky against the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company (hereinafter called the L. & N. Co.), the Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern Railroad Company (hereinafter called the Chesapeake Co.), and several subordinate corporations tributary to the latter, to enjoin the L. & N. Co. (1) from acquiring the control of, or operating, the parallel and competing lines of railroad known as the Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern System, (2) from acquiring or operating the Short Route Railway Transfer Company, a belt line in Louisville, and the Union Depot in Louisville, connected therewith, and also (3) to enjoin the Chesapeake, Ohio & Southwestern System from selling out to, or permitting its roads to be operated by, its competitor, the L. & N. Co.
It was stated substantially in the commonwealth's petition, as its cause of action, that the L. & N. Co. owned and controlled many railroads in Kentucky, as respects which, railroads owned or controlled by the other companies named are parallel and competing; that defendants have made a contract and arrangement whereby the L. & N. Co. is to become the owner, and acquire a control of, the capital stock, franchises, and property of the other defendant companies, to the great injury of the commonwealth, and in violation of section 201 of the state constitution of 1891, which reads as follows:
SEC. 201. No railroad, telegraph, telephone, bridge or common carrier company shall consolidate its capital stock, franchises or property, or pool its earnings, in whole or in part, with any other railroad, telegraph, telephone, bridge or common carrier company owning a parallel or competing line or structure; or acquire, by purchase, lease or otherwise, any parallel or competing line or structure, or operate the same, nor shall any railroad company or other common carrier combine or make any contract with the owners of any vessel that leaves or makes port in this state, or with any common carrier, by which combination or contract the earnings of the one doing the carrying are to be shared by the other not doing the carrying.
In an amended petition, it was stated in substance that the
L. & N. Co. was endeavoring to acquire the capital stock, interest in real property and mortgage securities of the other defendant companies, in order to obtain control, and ultimately purchase at judicial sale, and become the owner of, their franchises and property.
The answer denied the allegation in the form as made, but contained an affirmative statement that the purchase of the stock and securities referred to had already been consummated, and in effect admitted that the L. & N. Co. intended to purchase the franchises and properties at judicial sale.
The L. & N. Co. was incorporated by an Act of the Kentucky legislature approved March 5, 1850, the fourteenth section of which act provided
that the president and board of directors of said company are hereby vested with all powers and rights necessary to the construction of a railroad from the City of Louisville to the Tennessee line in the direction of Nashville, the route to be by them selected and determined, not exceeding sixty-six feet wide, with as many sets of tracks as they may deem necessary, and that they may cause to be made contracts with others for making said railroad or any part of it.
This act was frequently amended in details unnecessary to be noticed here, one of which, adopted March 7, 1854, declared (section 4)
that it shall be lawful for said Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company to unite their road with any other road connecting therewith upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon between the said Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company and such other company as they may desire to unite their said road with.
On December 15, 1855, the Legislature of Tennessee passed an act to amend an act entitled
An act to charter the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, and the several acts amending said act passed by the Legislatures of Kentucky and Tennessee,
under which it had been authorized to construct its road in Tennessee from the Kentucky line to Nashville, the thirteenth section of which act provided as follows:
SEC. 13. Be it further enacted that this act shall take effect from and after its passage, provided nothing herein
contained shall be construed to prevent the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company from admitting branch roads to connect with it at any point or points to be agreed upon between said company [16 S.Ct. 716] and those who have or may subscribe stock for the construction of any branch road. The stock subscribed and the means created to construct such separate branch shall be faithfully applied to that purpose, and said company is hereby vested with the power and the right to issue its bonds under the provisions of this act to obtain means to construct and equip any branch road, the bonds to express on their face the purpose for which they were executed, and to secure their payment may execute a deed of trust, or mortgage, for payment of which the rights, credits, profits, property and franchise, procured for said branch by the use of its means, shall alone be made liable. The credit, rights, or profits of the main stem shall not be used to create means to construct, or be made liable for any debt or liability created to construct, branch roads, nor shall the rights, credit, property, and profits of any branch road be used to create means to construct, or made liable for any debt or liability created to build the main stem, and with a view to such liabilities and profits, said company shall keep separate accounts, exhibiting the stock, property and debts of the main road, and each separate branch.
On January 17, 1856, the Legislature of Kentucky passed an act the first section of which reenacted the act passed by the Legislature of Tennessee in 1855 "in the following sections and words: [here follows a literal copy of the Tennessee act.]" The...
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