People v. Howard

• Decision Date: 18 June 1990
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Iris HOWARD, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 940

556 N.Y.S.2d 940

162 A.D.2d 615

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Iris HOWARD, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

June 18, 1990.

Steven B. Aptheker, Melville, for appellant.

Carl A. Vergari, Dist. Atty., White Plains (Peter D. Gormanly and Maryanne Luciano, of counsel), for respondent.

Before THOMPSON, J.P., and BROWN, LAWRENCE and EIBER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Westchester County (West, J.), rendered April 9, 1987, convicting him of robbery in the first degree (eight counts), robbery in the second degree (eight counts), grand larceny in the third degree (six counts), and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his oral statements to law enforcement authorities.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant contends that his first statement made to the police was inadmissible since it was made while he was in custody, without Miranda warnings, and that the "public safety exception" should not apply under the facts of this case. He argues further that the second statement made to the police following Miranda warnings was also inadmissible because it was an inevitable outcome of the first. The defendant further claims that the prosecutor's failure to give proper notice of his intention to use his first statement as evidence, in violation of CPL 710.30, bars its use at the trial.

Custodial interrogation in certain circumstances is inherently coercive and unless the suspect is specifically advised of his pre-interrogation rights, statements made by him will be held inadmissible (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, on remand People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 483 N.Y.S.2d 678, 473 N.E.2d 30). The only issue presented here is whether a police officer was justified in failing to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights prior to questioning the defendant at the scene of the crime. In New York v. Quarles (supra), the Supreme Court carved out a limited exception to the Miranda requirement which is triggered when a danger to public safety appears to be present (see, Matter of John C., 130 A.D.2d 246, 253, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223). The exception applies to "a kaleidoscopic situation * * * where spontaneity * * * is necessarily the order of the day[. T]he application of the exception * * * should not be made to depend on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer" (New York v. Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at 656, 104 S.Ct. at 2631). Here, it is reasonable to conclude, as the County Court did, that Quarles applies to the instant situation. The record demonstrates that at the time of the defendant's apprehension, there existed a serious threat to public safety. With scores of people outside the club where a robbery took place and the defendant and one codefendant in custody, the question posed to the defendant as to the number and whereabouts of the remaining robbers was "more for the purpose of clarifying the situation and ascertaining for safety reasons the location of possible weapons, than to secure evidence of a crime" (Matter of John C., supra, 130 A.D.2d at 253, 519 N.Y.S.2d 223; People v. Johnson, 59 N.Y.2d 1014, 466 N.Y.S.2d 957, 453 N.E.2d 1246). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record also demonstrates that...