Causey v. Balog, 96-2350
| Decision Date | 15 December 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-2350,96-2350 |
| Citation | 162 F.3d 795 |
| Parties | 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1241 James CAUSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. George BALOG, Individually, and as current Director of Department of Public Works; Raymond Holland, Individually and as former Assistant Head of Bureau of Transportation of Department of Public Works; Dave Montgomery, Individually and as current Head of Bureau of Transportation of Department of Public Works; Keith Scroggins, Individually and as current Head of Personnel Department of Public Works; Herman Williams, Individually and as prior Commissioner of Department of Transportation; Kurt Schmoke, Mayor of the City of Baltimore; Mary Pat Clarke; Jacqueline McClean; The Board of Estimates of The City of Baltimore; John L. Cain; Nicholas C. D'Adamo, Jr.; Perry Sfikas; Anthony J. Ambridge; Paula Johnson Branch; Carl Stokes; Wilbur E. Cunningham; Martin E. Curran; Martin O'Malley; Lawrence A. Bell; Sheila Dixon; Agnes Welch; Vera P. Hall; Iris G. Reeves; Rochelle Spector; Joseph DiBlasi; Timothy J. Murphy; Melvin L. Stukes; The City Council of Baltimore City, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Mercedes Casado Samborsky, Joppatowne, Maryland, for Appellant. Michael George Raimondi, Office of the City Solicitor, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: James S. Ruckle, Jr., George J. Philipou, Office of the City Solicitor, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Before MURNAGHAN and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and MAGILL, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Senior Judge MAGILL wrote the opinion, in which Judge MURNAGHAN and Judge HAMILTON joined.
James Causey, a sixty-two-year-old white male employee of the City of Baltimore, was transferred and eventually discharged as part of a reorganization and reduction in force. He brought this discrimination action under Title VII, the ADEA, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 against the Mayor, City Council, Board of Estimates, and several individual defendants, seeking recovery for discriminatory discharge, retaliation, and harassment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Causey appeals. We affirm.
Causey, a traffic and transportation engineer with over twenty-five years of experience, began working for the City of Baltimore as Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Transit and Traffic in 1981. Mayor Kurt Schmoke (the Mayor) appointed Causey acting Commissioner of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in December 1987. In May 1988 the Mayor appointed Herman Williams permanent Commissioner of DOT and named Causey Deputy Commissioner I of DOT. After becoming Causey's supervisor, Williams allegedly harassed Causey with verbal abuse, false accusations of wrongdoing, interference with job duties, and threatened termination. In May 1992 the Mayor removed Williams and named a new acting DOT Commissioner.
In October 1992 the City Council eliminated DOT and merged its responsibilities into the Department of Public Works (DPW). Causey's DOT position was eliminated, and he applied for the position of Chief of DPW's new Bureau of Transportation (BOT). George Balog, Director of DPW, appointed Dave Montgomery acting Chief of BOT and named Causey acting Chief of BOT's Traffic Division, a position directly subordinate to Montgomery's. Causey's move from DOT to DPW resulted in a $6,000 reduction in annual pay. According to Causey, he was not fairly considered for the BOT Chief position and was the only DOT executive rehired at reduced pay and rank. On October 28, 1992, Causey filed an EEO charge against the City, claiming his transfer was the result of race and age discrimination.
While working at BOT, Causey claims Montgomery harassed him. For example, Montgomery interfered with Causey's ability to complete projects, limited his access to Montgomery, withheld information, refused to allow him to attend some job-related seminars on job time, imposed unreasonable deadlines, reassigned tasks to subordinates, ignored his advice, and chastised him. Causey believed this treatment was the result of Montgomery's animosity toward his race and age or, in the alternative, was done in retaliation for his EEO charge. Causey filed a second EEO charge against the City in March 1993, alleging retaliatory harassment.
On November 5, 1993, Montgomery and Balog told Causey his position was being abolished due to budgetary constraints. In a letter dated January 12, 1994, Balog specifically informed Causey he was being released because his position was abolished. The Board of Estimates authorized this reorganization and reduction in force. Causey subsequently amended his March EEO charge to claim his termination was also in retaliation for his initial EEO complaint.
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Causey filed a complaint in federal district court asserting violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and state law defamation. The complaint named the Mayor, City Council, Board of Estimates, and several City employees, in their representative and individual capacities, as defendants. After discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Causey filed a motion requesting the court to alter or amend judgment. The district court denied the motion. Causey now appeals the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See United States v. Leak, 123 F.3d 787, 794 (4th Cir.1997).
Causey presented no direct evidence that the defendants intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of his race or age, so he relied on the burden-shifting method of proof established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Henson, 61 F.3d at 274 (applying McDonnell Douglas to ADEA claims). Under McDonnell Douglas, Causey has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. Establishing a prima facie case gives rise to an inference of discrimination, and the burden then shifts to the defendants to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for their action. See id. at 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817; Henson, 61 F.3d at 274. The defendants' burden is only one of production, not persuasion. See Henson, 61 F.3d at 274-75. If the defendants provide evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for their action, Causey bears the ultimate burden of persuasion and must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the proffered reason was pretext for discrimination. See id. at 275.
Causey first contends the district court erred in concluding that the individual defendants could not be personally liable for alleged violations of Title VII and the ADEA. The individual defendants are not subject to personal liability because they were not named as respondents in any of Causey's EEO charges. Causey named only the City of Baltimore as respondent in each of his EEO charges. Under Title VII and the ADEA, a civil action may be brought only "against the respondent named in the charge." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (1994). The purposes of this requirement include putting the charged party on notice of the complaint and allowing the EEOC to attempt reconciliation. See Alvarado v. Board of Trustees of Montgomery Community College, 848 F.2d 457, 460 (4th Cir.1988). In this case, Causey's EEO charge failed to put the individual defendants on notice that they were potentially subject to personal liability for the alleged violations. We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that the individual defendants may not be held personally liable for any alleged violations of Title VII or the ADEA. 1
Causey next argues the City's failure to name him BOT Chief, instead of Montgomery, was discriminatory. The district court concluded Causey established a prima facie case of discrimination, applying a failure to promote test. The City presented evidence that it chose Montgomery to head BOT because he had superior administrative experience. This evidence satisfies the City's burden to provide a legitimate non-discriminatory rationale for its decision. Causey argues this rationale was pretext because he was more qualified than Montgomery. Balog admitted Causey was qualified for the position, but concluded Montgomery's administrative experience, as Chief of DPW's abolished Bureau of Construction, made him better suited to this administrative position. While Causey may have been qualified to fill the BOT Chief position, this Court is not in a position to second guess executive hiring decisions that are based on legitimate, non-discriminatory rationales such as superior administrative experience. See Holmes v. Bevilacqua, 794 F.2d 142, 146-47 (4th Cir.1986) (en banc). Causey's conclusory allegations that the City was attempting to displace older white employees with younger black employees are likewise insufficient to support a finding of pretext. See Goldberg v. B. Green & Co., 836 F.2d 845, 848 (4th Cir.1988). Because Causey did not provide the district court with evidence that the City's decision was based on impermissible factors, we conclude summary judgment was appropriate.
In addition, Causey asserts the district court erred in dismissing his...
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