Woolridge v. Abrishami
Decision Date | 06 July 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 744, Sept. Term, 2016,744, Sept. Term, 2016 |
Citation | 233 Md.App. 278,163 A.3d 850 |
Parties | Judith WOOLRIDGE v. Lauren ABRISHAMI, et al. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Howard W. Simcox, Jr. (Sussman & Simcox, Chartered on the brief) all of Gaithersburg, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Micheal A. DeSantis (Hartel, DeSantis & Howie, LLP on the brief) all of Hanover, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Woodward, C.J., Deborah S. Eyler, Graeff, JJ.
This appeal arises from an automobile accident that occurred on May 23, 2014. On that date, 18–year-old Lauren Abrishami ("Lauren"), appellee, who was operating a motor vehicle owned by her mother, Brigitte Abrishami ("Ms. Abrishami"), also an appellee, struck pedestrian Judith Woolridge, appellant, as Ms. Woolridge attempted to cross the street. Ms. Woolridge filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County alleging negligence against Lauren and negligent entrustment against Ms. Abrishami.1 The court ultimately granted Ms. Abrishami's motion for summary judgment and proceeded with a jury trial regarding the negligence claim against Lauren. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that Lauren was negligent, but it also found that Ms. Woolridge was contributorily negligent, thereby precluding recovery.
On appeal, Ms. Woolridge raises four questions for our review, which we have rephrased, as follows:
For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On May 5, 2015, Ms. Woolridge filed a three-count Complaint. In Count I, Ms. Woolridge alleged that, as she was "crossing the street in a crosswalk at Main Street and Market Street East ... in Gaithersburg, Maryland," Lauren negligently made a left turn and struck her, causing injuries. Count III alleged that Ms. Abrishami negligently entrusted Lauren with her vehicle.2 In their Answer, Lauren and Ms. Abrishami asserted several affirmative defenses, including that "Plaintiff was contributorily negligent."
On July 29, 2015, the court issued an "Order for Mandatory Settlement Conference/Pretrial Hearing." It scheduled a pretrial settlement conference and a pretrial hearing on February 18, 2016, and directed the parties to prepare a written joint pretrial statement, which "shall contain," among other things, "a concise statement of all claims and defenses which that party is submitting for trial."3 The order further directed the parties to identify each pattern jury instruction that the parties intended to offer at trial, with an indication of those agreed upon and those not agreed upon.
The Joint Pretrial Statement filed with the court on February 18, 2016, provided, in relevant part, as follows:
Lauren did not include a proposed jury instruction on contributory negligence in the pretrial statement. She did state, however, that she would propose "[a]dditional instructions to be submitted at trial to conform to the evidence," and she reserved the right to "request additional jury instructions based upon the evidence at trial."4
During discovery, Ms. Woolridge asked about Lauren's claim of contributory negligence. Specifically, Plaintiff's Interrogatory Number 8 asked:
The record reflects that Lauren initially provided to opposing counsel an unsigned response, stating:
On May 23, 2016, the day of trial, Lauren provided signed answers, containing the following amended response: "See the Defendant's discovery deposition dated October 5, 2015, at page 40."5 This portion of Lauren's deposition provided:
During her October 5, 2015, deposition, however, Lauren also was asked whether she was aware of anything Ms. Woolridge "could have done to avoid being hit." Lauren responded: She did note, however, that as she slowed the vehicle, Ms. Woolridge
During the time that discovery was proceeding, Ms. Abrishami filed a motion for summary judgment on the claims against her. Counsel for Ms. Abrishami argued that, although Lauren had been driving for only a year, there was not enough evidence to submit to the jury the claim that Ms. Abrishami was negligent in entrusting Lauren to operate the vehicle. Counsel asserted that, although Lauren had one prior "very minor incident," where Lauren hit a curb after her dog climbed on her while she was driving, Ms. Abrishami took corrective action and advised Lauren not to drive with the dog in the car. Thus, counsel stated, Ms. Abrishami had no reason to believe that Lauren would be involved in an accident, and based on Lauren's "completely clear" driving record, an accident was not foreseeable.
Counsel for Ms. Woolridge responded that, in a negligent entrustment claim, three factors must be considered: "youth, inexperience or otherwise," and it is a "fact-based determination[ ]" for the jury. Counsel argued that Lauren, a teenage driver, had been driving less than a year, did not drive the vehicle regularly, and previously had been in an accident while distracted. The accident involving Ms. Woolridge was "another distracted driving scenario as you had with the dogs," and Ms. Abrishami "should have implemented some additional driver training, restrictions, something on this girl, on balance."
Counsel for Ms. Abrishami argued that, contrary to Ms. Woolridge's focus on Lauren's youth and inexperience, the question was whether Lauren had dangerous propensities and Ms. Abrishami knew of those propensities and should have foreseen harm.
During her deposition, Lauren testified that the prior accident occurred in May 2015. She got her driver's license in her senior year of high school, after taking a driver's education class. She took the bus to school, however, and in May 2014, she drove "[f]or errands mostly," and she "rarely left the house." Lauren had not received any traffic tickets prior to the accident involving Ms. Woolridge.
In granting summary judgment on the negligent entrustment claim, the court stated as follows:
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