Steinway v. Steinway

Decision Date15 May 1900
Citation57 N.E. 312,163 N.Y. 183
PartiesSTEINWAY v. STEINWAY et al.
CourtNew York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.

Action by Henry W. T. Steinway against Charles H. Steinway and others, as executors, to declare void a certain clause in the will of C. F. T. Steinway, deceased. From a judgment of the appellate division, First department (48 N. Y. Supp. 1046), reversing a judgment for plaintiff both on the facts and the law, and directing a final judgment against him, he appeals. Affirmed.

Wheeler H. Peckham, for appellant.

Geo. W. Cotterill and John Delahunty, for respondents.

LANDON, J.

The trial court decided that the thirty-third clause of the last will and testament of Christian Frederick Theodore Steinway, and all other provisions of said will relating to the execution of the alleged trust provided for in said clause, were null and void, and that the 4,000 shares of the capital stock of the Steinway & Sons Corporation, attempted to be disposed of in the thirty-third clause of the will, passed under the thirty-fourth clause to the plaintiff and the other residuary legatees therein named, and directed judgment accordingly. If the thirty-third clause is valid, the plaintiff's ultimate share in said capital stock would not exceed one-twelfth. If it is invalid, and the whole of said capital stock fell into the residuary estate, then his present share thereof is one-ninth. In the latter case, under the judgment of the trial court, one-half of said capital stock is vested in persons other than those to whom the testator intended to bequeath it by the thirty-third clause of his will.

The appellate division reversed the judgment of the special term both upon the law and the facts. As our review is limited by the constitution to questions of law, we must affirm the judgment, unless we find that the reversal upon the facts was an error of law. If there is evidence tending to support a finding of fact by the appellate division which would justify the reversal by that court, then it was not error of law to reverse upon the facts, and we must affirm. Livingston v. City of Albany, 161 N. Y. 602, 56 N. E. 148.

The appellate division seems to have found, and the defendants contend it might have found within the evidence, that before the commencement of this action the plaintiff, with full knowledge of all the facts, and presumably with full knowledge of his legal rights, or, at least, with knowledge that it was doubtful whether any part of the said capital stock fell into the residuary estate, and intending to waive any claim to more, and faithfully to observe the terms of the will, received from the executors upward of $33,000 of the assets of the estate, other than from said stock, in full satisfaction of his interest under the residuary clause, and thereupon released, under his hand and seal, all claim for more; and, in addition to this, that the plaintiff's acts in support of the will, and in taking benefits under it, and inducing the other beneficiaries to act with him in its support, make it so inequitable for him to maintain this action that a court of equity should refuse to assist him.

There is no conflict in the evidence. The plaintiff, however, contends that none of it tends to support the reversal upon the facts; that, in the language of this court in the case cited, ‘there are neither facts nor inferences deducible from conceded facts in opposition to the decision of the trial court.’ We must determine whether this is so. The testator died March 26, 1889, possessed of the 4,000 shares of capital stock in question, of an estimated value of about $1,000,000, and of real estate and other personal property of an estimated value of about $500,000. He was a widower, and never had any children. His parents were dead. His next of kin were his brother William, his sister Dorette Ziegler, and the children of his deceased sister, Wilhelmine Candidus, and of his deceased brothers, Henry, Henry Albert, and Charles. By 32 clauses of his will he disposed of the half million of his estate absolutely and immediately among his brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces, naming them all, and a few other legatees and devisees. The terms of his will in this respect have been fully observed, and this portion of his estate has been settled and closed. The thirty-third clause of his will is as follows: ‘Thirty-third. I give and bequeath all my shares in the corporation of Steinway & Sons, of the city of New York, to my executors and trustees hereinafter named, in trust to be managed by them until the first day of January, in the year 1904, as follows: (a) One-fourth part of such shares in the Steinway & Sons Corporation to and for the benefit of the five children of my sister Wilhelmine Candidus, late of the city of New York, deceased, viz. Louise Deppermann, wife of Gustav Deppermann, of Hamburg, Germany; Albertine S. Ziegler, wife of Henry Ziegler, of New York; and Harry Candidus, Johanne Candidus, and Gustav Candidus; and to pay to them in equal proportions an annual sum representing an income of five per centum on and from such shares, and on the first day of January, 1904, to pay over in equal proportionsto the said five children of Wilhelmine Candidus, deceased, or their heirs, the said shares in the Steinway & Sons Corporation, or the proceeds thereof; to have and to hold to him, her, or them, his, her, or their heirs and assigns, forever. The excess of the annual income of such shares in the Steinway & Sons Corporation, New York, over and above said five per centum, shall be retained by my executors and trustees hereinafter named, as their compensation for the management of such shares, and such excess annually shall be divided pro rata among them or their successors until January 1, 1904.’ Subdivisions ‘b’ and ‘c’ are in the same words, except that in subdivision ‘b’ the four children of his living sister, Dorette Ziegler, naming them, are the beneficiaries of the so-called trust, and in subdivision ‘c’ the three sons of his deceased brother Charles, naming them, of whom the plaintiff is one, are the beneficiaries. Subdivision ‘d’ is in these words: (d) One-fourth part of my shares in the said Steinway & Sons Corporation to and for the benefit of my brother William Steinway, or, in case of his death prior to January 1, 1904, to and for his son George A. Steinway, his daughter, Paula Th. Steinway, and his children by his second wife, Elizabeth C. Steinway, née Ranft, and to pay to him, or, in case of his death, to his said children, an annual sum representing an income of five per centum on and from such shares, and on the first day of January, 1904, to pay over to my said brother William Steinway, or, in case of his death prior to that date, to his said children, as mentioned in this section of this my last will and testament, or their heirs, in equal proportions, the said shares in the Steinway & Sons Corporation, or the proceeds thereof; to have and to hold, to him, her, or them, his, her, or their heirs or assigns, forever.’ To which is added the same provision in the same words as to the excess of the annual income as set forth in subdivisions ‘a,’ ‘b,’ and ‘c.’ The residuary clause of the will is in these words: ‘Thirty-fourth. All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, real and personal, of whatever nature and wherever situated, I give and bequeath as follows: (a) One-third part thereof to my sister Dorette Ziegler, wife of Jacob Ziegler, of the city of New York, to have and to hold unto her, her heirs and assigns, forever; (b) one-third part thereof to my brother William Steinway, of the city of New York, to have and to hold unto him, his heirs and assigns, forever; (c) one-third part thereof to my nephews Henry W. T. Steinway (the plaintiff), Charles H. Steinway, and Frederick Th. Steinway, in equal proportions, to have and to hold unto them, their heirs and assigns, forever.’

There was a considerable amount in the half-million portion of property to be divided under this residuary clause. Respecting this property, the plaintiff and the other residuary legatees, including the defendant William Steinway, a brother of the testator and also a devisee, and a legatee, general, specific, and residuary, under his will, and one of the four executors and trustees named therein, executed an instrument bearing date April 6, 1891, which, after specifying some of the items, and mentioning others as ‘unrealized assets and articles,’ proceeds: ‘Whereas, it is very desirable that the said estate of C. F. Theodore Steinway should be closed up, and final assets distributed and paid over to the heirs at law according to the terms of the deceased's last will and testament: Now, it is hereby agreed that all unsettled assets above referred to be hereby placed in the hands of Mr. William Steinway, one of the deceased's heirs at law, to dispose of, collect, compromise according to his best judgment, will full authority from us to exercise his own discretion, * * * and pay over to us the net proceeds, as follows,’-specifying the proportional share of each residuary legatee as provided in the will, thus: ‘One-ninth thereof to Henry W. T. Steinway (plaintiff), deceased's nephew,’-and continuing: ‘And we, the undersigned, heirs at law of Mr. C. F. Theodore Steinway,deceased, hereby consent and authorize the executors of the said estate to close up same, and make the final distribution to the heirs at law, as directed in deceased's will, and we hereby separately bind ourselves to give a final receipt in duplicate to such executors, on receiving from them such share as provided in said will.’

William Steinway executed the trust thus confided to him, and on October 6, 1891, distributed the net proceeds of the residuary estate among the said residuary legatees, the plaintiff receiving, in addition to $23,000 previously paid him thereon, the sum of $10,743.09, and 11 shares of...

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26 cases
  • Trautz v. Lemp
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 6, 1932
    ...to the immediate vesting of the legacy." Thompson, Construction of Wills, par. 480; Application of Miller, 288 Fed. 760; Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N.Y. 183. (3) There is one so-called exception to the rule that vested interests are not defeated by the rule against perpetuities. The exceptio......
  • Trautz v. Lemp
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 6, 1932
    ...to the immediate vesting of the legacy." Thompson, Construction of Wills, par. 480; Application of Miller, 288 F. 760; Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N.Y. 183. (3) is one so-called exception to the rule that vested interests are not defeated by the rule against perpetuities. The exception to the......
  • State ex rel. City of Grand Island v. Union Pac. R. Co., 32729.
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1950
    ...v. Oneida County, 80 Wis. 267, 50 N.W. 344. People ex rel. City of Buffalo v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R. Co., 156 N.Y. 570,57 N.E. 312, 313, parallels the case at bar upon the foregoing question presented. There is a difference in the wording of the two general saving clause stat......
  • State ex rel. City of Grand Island v. Union Pac. R. Co., 32729
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • June 8, 1950
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