Steinway v. Steinway
Decision Date | 15 May 1900 |
Citation | 57 N.E. 312,163 N.Y. 183 |
Parties | STEINWAY v. STEINWAY et al. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, First department.
Action by Henry W. T. Steinway against Charles H. Steinway and others, as executors, to declare void a certain clause in the will of C. F. T. Steinway, deceased. From a judgment of the appellate division, First department (48 N. Y. Supp. 1046), reversing a judgment for plaintiff both on the facts and the law, and directing a final judgment against him, he appeals. Affirmed.
Wheeler H. Peckham, for appellant.
Geo. W. Cotterill and John Delahunty, for respondents.
The trial court decided that the thirty-third clause of the last will and testament of Christian Frederick Theodore Steinway, and all other provisions of said will relating to the execution of the alleged trust provided for in said clause, were null and void, and that the 4,000 shares of the capital stock of the Steinway & Sons Corporation, attempted to be disposed of in the thirty-third clause of the will, passed under the thirty-fourth clause to the plaintiff and the other residuary legatees therein named, and directed judgment accordingly. If the thirty-third clause is valid, the plaintiff's ultimate share in said capital stock would not exceed one-twelfth. If it is invalid, and the whole of said capital stock fell into the residuary estate, then his present share thereof is one-ninth. In the latter case, under the judgment of the trial court, one-half of said capital stock is vested in persons other than those to whom the testator intended to bequeath it by the thirty-third clause of his will.
The appellate division reversed the judgment of the special term both upon the law and the facts. As our review is limited by the constitution to questions of law, we must affirm the judgment, unless we find that the reversal upon the facts was an error of law. If there is evidence tending to support a finding of fact by the appellate division which would justify the reversal by that court, then it was not error of law to reverse upon the facts, and we must affirm. Livingston v. City of Albany, 161 N. Y. 602, 56 N. E. 148.
The appellate division seems to have found, and the defendants contend it might have found within the evidence, that before the commencement of this action the plaintiff, with full knowledge of all the facts, and presumably with full knowledge of his legal rights, or, at least, with knowledge that it was doubtful whether any part of the said capital stock fell into the residuary estate, and intending to waive any claim to more, and faithfully to observe the terms of the will, received from the executors upward of $33,000 of the assets of the estate, other than from said stock, in full satisfaction of his interest under the residuary clause, and thereupon released, under his hand and seal, all claim for more; and, in addition to this, that the plaintiff's acts in support of the will, and in taking benefits under it, and inducing the other beneficiaries to act with him in its support, make it so inequitable for him to maintain this action that a court of equity should refuse to assist him.
There is no conflict in the evidence. The plaintiff, however, contends that none of it tends to support the reversal upon the facts; that, in the language of this court in the case cited, ‘there are neither facts nor inferences deducible from conceded facts in opposition to the decision of the trial court.’ We must determine whether this is so. The testator died March 26, 1889, possessed of the 4,000 shares of capital stock in question, of an estimated value of about $1,000,000, and of real estate and other personal property of an estimated value of about $500,000. He was a widower, and never had any children. His parents were dead. His next of kin were his brother William, his sister Dorette Ziegler, and the children of his deceased sister, Wilhelmine Candidus, and of his deceased brothers, Henry, Henry Albert, and Charles. By 32 clauses of his will he disposed of the half million of his estate absolutely and immediately among his brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces, naming them all, and a few other legatees and devisees. The terms of his will in this respect have been fully observed, and this portion of his estate has been settled and closed. The thirty-third clause of his will is as follows: Subdivisions ‘b’ and ‘c’ are in the same words, except that in subdivision ‘b’ the four children of his living sister, Dorette Ziegler, naming them, are the beneficiaries of the so-called trust, and in subdivision ‘c’ the three sons of his deceased brother Charles, naming them, of whom the plaintiff is one, are the beneficiaries. Subdivision ‘d’ is in these words: To which is added the same provision in the same words as to the excess of the annual income as set forth in subdivisions ‘a,’ ‘b,’ and ‘c.’ The residuary clause of the will is in these words:
There was a considerable amount in the half-million portion of property to be divided under this residuary clause. Respecting this property, the plaintiff and the other residuary legatees, including the defendant William Steinway, a brother of the testator and also a devisee, and a legatee, general, specific, and residuary, under his will, and one of the four executors and trustees named therein, executed an instrument bearing date April 6, 1891, which, after specifying some of the items, and mentioning others as ‘unrealized assets and articles,’ proceeds: ‘Whereas, it is very desirable that the said estate of C. F. Theodore Steinway should be closed up, and final assets distributed and paid over to the heirs at law according to the terms of the deceased's last will and testament: Now, it is hereby agreed that all unsettled assets above referred to be hereby placed in the hands of Mr. William Steinway, one of the deceased's heirs at law, to dispose of, collect, compromise according to his best judgment, will full authority from us to exercise his own discretion, * * * and pay over to us the net proceeds, as follows,’-specifying the proportional share of each residuary legatee as provided in the will, thus: ‘One-ninth thereof to Henry W. T. Steinway (plaintiff), deceased's nephew,’-and continuing: ‘And we, the undersigned, heirs at law of Mr. C. F. Theodore Steinway,deceased, hereby consent and authorize the executors of the said estate to close up same, and make the final distribution to the heirs at law, as directed in deceased's will, and we hereby separately bind ourselves to give a final receipt in duplicate to such executors, on receiving from them such share as provided in said will.’
William Steinway executed the trust thus confided to him, and on October 6, 1891, distributed the net proceeds of the residuary estate among the said residuary legatees, the plaintiff receiving, in addition to $23,000 previously paid him thereon, the sum of $10,743.09, and 11 shares of...
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...to the immediate vesting of the legacy." Thompson, Construction of Wills, par. 480; Application of Miller, 288 Fed. 760; Steinway v. Steinway, 163 N.Y. 183. (3) There is one so-called exception to the rule that vested interests are not defeated by the rule against perpetuities. The exceptio......
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