Anderson v. State
| Decision Date | 29 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 02-910.,CR 02-910. |
| Citation | 163 S.W.3d 333,357 Ark. 180 |
| Parties | Justin ANDERSON v. STATE of Arkansas. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Janice Vaughn, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, Little Rock, for appellant.
Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Clayton K. Hodges, Ass't Att'y Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant Justin Anderson appeals his judgment of conviction for capital murder and his death sentence. We affirm his judgment of conviction, but we reverse and remand the case for resentencing.
On the morning of October 12, 2000, eighty-seven-year-old Clara Creech was found shot to death in the front yard of her home. During the investigation into her death, police investigators obtained Anderson's name as a suspect in Ms. Creech's murder. After talking with Anderson's brother, Maurice, who implicated Anderson in the Creech murder, state police officers went to Anderson's home in Lewisville. Anderson was nineteen years old at the time. At about 2:30 p.m. that same day, Anderson, according to Sergeant Jeff Jester of the Arkansas State Police, was advised that he was free to leave, that he was not under arrest, and that the police wanted him to accompany them downtown to answer some questions. He was handcuffed and went with the state police officers to the Lafayette County Sheriff's Office. At some point during this time frame, Anderson was advised of his Miranda rights.
At 5:50 p.m. that afternoon, Anderson completed and signed a Miranda rights form, after being read his rights. State police officers then questioned him regarding Ms. Creech's death. The entire police interrogation lasted approximately six hours, with two to three breaks. At no time during the initial interrogation did Anderson admit to any involvement in Ms. Creech's murder.
Following the initial interview, Maurice Anderson asked to see his brother. After Justin Anderson returned from visiting his brother, Sergeant Jester observed that he was visibly upset. He asked Justin Anderson if he or his brother had killed Ms. Creech. Justin Anderson responded that he had killed Ms. Creech and agreed to give a statement. Upon the arrival of Jerry Digman, a criminal investigator with the Arkansas State Police, Anderson was advised of his right to silence and right to an attorney. The interview, conducted at 1:48 a.m. on October 13, 2000, was tape recorded. At that time, Anderson said he understood his Miranda rights and that he understood he had the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney. He stated that he was ready to talk and told the investigators that he "shot the old lady in the back." He then stated that he hid the gun he had used in a vacuum cleaner. He also provided additional details about the murder, such as what he was wearing at the time.
Specifically, Anderson told police that he shot Ms. Creech at 9:00 a.m. "outside ... by the road" while she was bending down, after he approached her from the back. He further told the investigators that he tried to get into her house by kicking the front door. At that time, Anderson told the investigators that he had found the gun used in the killing behind the trash barrel. He added that he had never shot anybody before, although it had crossed his mind about shooting somebody. He further stated that there was "just something" in him, that life seemed unimportant, and that there was no reason he picked Ms. Creech.
At the conclusion of that interview, Anderson was arrested. He took the investigators to a gun which was located near the Masonic Lodge. On their return to the Lafayette County jail, Investigator Digman mentioned the recent shooting of a truck driver, but Anderson said he did not want to talk about it until they returned to the sheriff's office. On reaching the sheriff's office, Anderson gave a second statement to the investigators at 2:26 a.m. After confirming that he still understood his rights, Anderson admitted to shooting a truck driver whose vehicle was parked at the In and Out (hereinafter, the "Solvey" case).1 He further admitted that he had broken into a home a few weeks before the truck incident to steal the two guns which he had used in shooting the truck driver and Ms. Creech.
Anderson was charged with premeditated and deliberate capital murder. He subsequently moved to suppress his two statements, and that motion was denied. Following an eight-day trial from January 22, 2002, to January 31, 2002, on the charge of capital murder, the jury convicted Anderson and sentenced him to death.
Anderson first contends that he did not make a "knowing and intelligent" waiver of his Miranda rights, because of his diminished mental capacity and his alleged intelligence quotient of 65. He further asserts that he should have been advised of his Miranda rights when he was first handcuffed at his residence and that the state police officers failed to comply with Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.3 in that they did not make it clear that he did not have to go to the sheriff's department. He maintains that his remarks to the police investigators were the result of intimidation, coercion, and promises of leniency and that the State failed to call Lieutenant Cleve Barfield who was a material witness at either the suppression hearing or the trial. To summarize, he contends that he "was a vulnerable 19 year old mentally retarded boy who after 13 hours of interrogation finally told the police what they wanted to hear."2
We first address Anderson's contention that the prosecutors failed to call all material witnesses, specifically Lieutenant Barfield of the state police. Anderson did take the stand in the suppression hearing in the instant case, but he did so only to state that he was not going to testify. Moreover, he did not testify at trial.
We hold that Lieutenant Barfield was not a material witness. In Foreman v. State, 321 Ark. 167, 901 S.W.2d 802 (1995), this court repeated that where an accused has offered testimony that his confession was induced by violence, threats, coercion, or offers of reward, the State has the burden to produce all material witnesses who were connected with the controverted confession or give an adequate explanation of their absence. Here, because Anderson declined to testify, he did not offer testimony that his confession was induced in any way. Where there is no specific evidence to refute, the State's burden to produce all material witnesses does not arise. See Fairchild v. State, 349 Ark. 147, 76 S.W.3d 884 (2002) (). This issue has no merit.
Anderson next claims that his statements were coerced due to his diminished mental abilities. We disagree that this issue was presented to the circuit court at the suppression hearing. A 1996 psychological evaluation report by Dr. Paul Deyoub, which concluded that Anderson at that time had a full-scale IQ of 65, was part of the record, but it was never referred to or entered into evidence during the suppression hearing. Moreover, no argument was made at the hearing regarding the import of this report and its significance on the issue of whether Anderson could give a voluntary statement.3 The 1996 forensic report was submitted to the court during the course of pretrial motions, but it was only submitted in support of Anderson's motion to prohibit the State from seeking the death penalty under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-618 (Repl.1997). This issue is meritless.
Anderson further asserts that he was coerced to give a statement by Maurice. He claims, specifically, in his reply brief that the State neglected to address the state police investigators' use of his brother to coerce his confession. However, a review of Anderson's initial brief on appeal reveals that there was no development of this argument. All that was said was: "Yet, [Maurice] too, played a critical role in coercing Justin into confessing." An argument consisting of one statement is insignificant to mount the issue of coercion on appeal.
Anderson further maintains that he was the victim of a thirteen-hour interrogation, and that the length of time had a coercive effect. Again, we disagree. A review of the record reveals that Anderson signed a Miranda rights waiver form at 5:50 p.m. and that breaks were taken three times: at 5:50 p.m., at 9:00 p.m., and at 11:00 p.m.4 The breaks lasted from "fifteen to thirty minutes, thirty to forty-five minutes." He then gave his two statements: one at 1:48 a.m. and the second at 2:26 a.m.
When reviewing whether a statement was voluntary and not the product of intimidation, coercion, or deception, this court makes an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, reversing only if the trial court was clearly erroneous. See Branscum v. State, 345 Ark. 21, 43 S.W.3d 148 (2001). Relevant factors to be considered include the age, education, and intelligence of the accused; the lack of advice as to his constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of mental or physical punishment. See id. Anderson was nineteen, had previous experience in the criminal justice system, was mirandized on several occasions, and took breaks during the interrogation. Though the length of the interrogation is one factor to be considered, it is not determinative. See Williams v. State, 338 Ark. 97, 991 S.W.2d 565 (1999). In light of the evidence presented to the circuit court, we cannot say that the court erred in concluding that Anderson's statements were voluntarily made and not coerced.
Anderson makes a brief assertion that he should have been mirandized at the time state police...
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