State v. Williams-Bey

Citation167 Conn.App. 744,164 A.3d 9
Decision Date23 August 2016
Docket NumberAC 37430
CourtConnecticut Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Connecticut v. Tauren WILLIAMS–BEY

Heather Clark, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, Vicki Melchiorre, senior assistant state's attorney, and Melissa E. Patterson, assistant state's attorneys, for the appellee (state).

Lavine, Beach and Alvord, Js.

LAVINE, J.

In recent years, the United States and Connecticut Supreme Courts have made major changes in the jurisprudence relating to juvenile sentencing. The law now requires that juvenile offenders facing life without parole or its functional equivalent are entitled to individual consideration that takes into account the mitigating factors of their youth. This case concerns the important question of where such consideration must be given for juvenile offenders who were sentenced prior to the recent developments in the law. Must it be in the context of a resentencing proceeding, as the defendant claims? Or may it be in the setting of a parole hearing, as the state asserts? We conclude, for the reasons that follow, that a parole hearing provides the class of juveniles under consideration with a constitutionally adequate, pragmatic, and fair opportunity to gain consideration of the mitigating factors of their youth.

The defendant, Tauren Williams–Bey, appeals from the trial court's dismissal of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. The defendant claims that the court erred by concluding that it did not have jurisdiction over his motion after determining that his sentence did not violate the eighth amendment to the United States constitution and article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the constitution of Connecticut. We conclude that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion, but properly concluded that the defendant's federal and state constitutional rights have not been violated.

The defendant's rights have not been violated because, as will be discussed, he will be entitled to have the mitigating factors of his youth considered at a parole hearing pursuant to a recently enacted Connecticut statute and a recently decided United States Supreme Court case. We affirm the conclusion of the trial court as to the defendant's constitutional claims, albeit on alternative grounds. See, e.g., State v. Brown , 242 Conn. 389, 395, 699 A.2d 943 (1997). The form of the judgment is improper and we remand the case with direction to render judgment denying the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. See, e.g., State v. Gemmell , 155 Conn.App. 789, 790, 110 A.3d 1234, cert. denied, 316 Conn. 913, 111 A.3d 886 (2015).

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. On December 20, 1997, the defendant and two friends jumped out of a van and shot at the victim, killing him. At the time, the defendant was sixteen years old. The state charged the defendant with murder as an accessory, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a–54a and General Statutes § 53a–8, and with conspiracy to commit murder, in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a–54a and General Statutes § 53a–48. On January 4, 2000, the defendant pleaded guilty to murder as an accessory in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 53a–54a.1 The court accepted the parties' waiver of the presentence investigation report and continued the case for sentencing. On February 25, 2000, the court, Clifford, J ., sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years in prison. At the time of sentencing, the crime of which the defendant was convicted made him ineligible for parole. General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 54–125a (b) (1). If he were to serve the full sentence, the defendant would not be released until he is fifty-two years old.

The defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence on December 16, 2013, asserting that his sentence violated the eighth amendment as explicated in Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama , 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012). The defendant filed an amended motion to correct on April 2, 2014. In the amended motion, the defendant claimed that his sentence violated the eighth amendment because "the sentence and the manner in which it is imposed fails to provide for a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation ...." The court, Alexander, J ., heard oral argument on the motion on April 2, 2014, and issued a written memorandum of decision on July 29, 2014. At the time, neither State v. Riley , 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1361, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016), nor Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , 317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Semple v. Casiano , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1364, 194 L.Ed.2d 376 (2016), Connecticut's leading cases on juvenile sentencing, had been decided. Riley and Casiano applied Miller retroactively to discretionary life without parole sentences and term of years sentences that are the functional equivalent of life sentences.2 The trial court concluded that because the defendant was not serving a mandatory life without parole sentence, Graham and Miller were inapplicable. It dismissed the motion, concluding that "the defendant's case does not fall within the narrow confines of Graham or Miller , and the relief sought exceeds the jurisdiction of this court."

We conclude that the defendant's sentence does not violate the eighth amendment as interpreted by Miller v. Alabama , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. Furthermore, we conclude that even if the sentence violated the eighth amendment pursuant to Miller , in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Montgomery v. Louisiana , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 718, 736, 193 L.Ed. 2d 599 (2016), which decided that conferring parole eligibility on a juvenile offender is a constitutionally adequate remedy for a sentence that violates Miller 's teachings upon retroactive application, and the fact that the defendant will be parole eligible under § 1 of No. 15–84 of the 2015 Public Acts (Public Act 15–84), codified at General Statutes § 54–125a (f), the defendant and those similarly situated have been provided with a constitutionally adequate remedy. In reaching this conclusion we address (1) the recent changes in the law regarding juvenile sentencing, (2) the trial court's jurisdiction over the motion to correct, (3) whether, assuming the defendant's thirty-five year without parole sentence violated the constitutional principles defined in Miller , his eligibility for parole under § 54–125a (f), rather than resentencing, is a constitutionally adequate remedy under the eighth amendment to the United States constitution; and (4) whether parole eligibility, rather than resentencing, is a constitutionally adequate remedy under the constitution of Connecticut. Due to the somewhat complex nature of the issues presented, a detailed analysis is required.

ILAW REGARDING JUVENILE SENTENCING

We first discuss the law regarding juvenile sentencing, as the law in this rapidly evolving area has changed since the defendant filed his motion to correct. The eighth amendment of the United States constitution provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." This provision is applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Furman v. Georgia , 408 U.S. 238, 239–40, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). In Miller , the United States Supreme Court held that sentencing schemes imposing mandatory life without parole sentences on juveniles convicted of homicide offenses violate the eighth amendment. Miller v. Alabama , supra, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. In Graham v. Florida , supra, 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, the court had determined that imposing mandatory sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide crimes likewise constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.3 Specifically, Miller requires that prior to sentencing juveniles to life without parole, a judicial authority must "take into account how children are different [from adults], and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Miller v. Alabama , supra, at 2469. Thus, juvenile offenders facing life without the possibility of parole are entitled to an individualized sentencing that considers the mitigating factors of their youth.

Our Supreme Court has determined that "the holding in Miller implicates not only mandatory sentencing schemes, but also discretionary sentencing schemes that permit a life sentence without parole for a juvenile offender but do not mandate consideration of Miller 's mitigating factors." Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 317 Conn. at 72, 115 A.3d 1031. Thus, in Connecticut, Miller applies to discretionary sentences and term of years sentences that are functionally equivalent to life without parole. Our Supreme Court has addressed what constitutes a functional life without parole sentence. In State v. Riley , supra, 315 Conn. at 641, 110 A.3d 1205, our Supreme Court concluded that an aggregate sentence of 100 years without parole imposed on a juvenile offender violates Miller , and remanded the case for resentencing with consideration of the factors identified in Miller .4 Our Supreme Court has concluded that Miller applies in both direct and collateral review sentencing appeals. See id. (direct appeal); Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, at 54–55, 115 A.3d 1031 (habeas appeal). The defendant in Casiano , whose case was on collateral review, was sentenced to fifty years without parole. In reaching its...

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8 cases
  • State v. Williams-Bey, 37430.
    • United States
    • Appellate Court of Connecticut
    • August 23, 2016
    ...167 Conn.App. 744144 A.3d 467STATE of Connecticutv.Tauren WILLIAMS–BEY.No. 37430.Appellate Court of Connecticut.Argued May 26, 2016.Decided Aug. 23, 2016.144 A.3d 469Heather Clark, New Haven, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).Michele C. Lukban, senior assistant state's attorne......
  • State v. Lopez
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • April 2, 2018
    ...a constitutionally adequate remedy for Connecticut juvenile offenders whose sentences may have violated Miller." State v. Williams-Bey, 164 A.3d 9, 12, 22 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016), remanded on procedural grounds, State v. Williams-Bey, 164 A.3d 31 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017), cert. granted on substa......
  • Frank v. State, TTDCV175007136S
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Connecticut
    • July 12, 2018
    ...(2017), the Connecticut Appellate Court held that § 54125a(f) remediates the state and federal constitutional issues raised by Miller-Graham. Id. Moreover, constitutional protections raised by Miller-Graham are specifically limited to those juveniles who are serving a life-sentence, or its ......
  • Francis v. State
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Connecticut
    • July 12, 2018
    ......at 479-80, 132 S.Ct. 2455] ..". (Emphasis in original.) State v. Taylor G., supra,. 743-44. Controlling authority has since held that §. 54-125a(f) remediates the state and federal constitutional. issues raised by Miller and Graham. See. State v. Williams-Bey, 167 Conn.App. 744, 780-81,. 164 A.3d 9, 31 (2016), cert. granted, 326 Conn. 920, 169 A.3d. 793 (2017). . . The. constitutional protections raised by Miller and. Graham are specifically limited to those individuals. who are juveniles, or those ......
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