Coba v. Tricam Indus., Inc.
Decision Date | 14 May 2015 |
Docket Number | No. SC12–2624.,SC12–2624. |
Citation | 164 So.3d 637 |
Parties | Diana COBA, etc., Petitioner, v. TRICAM INDUSTRIES, INC., et al., Respondents. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Roy D. Wasson of Wasson & Associates, Chartered, Miami, FL; and Orlando D. Cabeza of DeMahy Labrador Drake Victor Payne & Cabeza, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Petitioner.
Jeffrey Arthur Mowers and Cindy Jane Mishcon of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Respondents.
When a jury in a civil case returns with an inconsistent verdict and a party does not object before the jury is discharged, the well-established law has been that the party waives any objections to the inconsistent verdict. The conflict issue presented in this case is whether, in products liability cases, there is a “fundamental nature” exception to this general rule—that is, an exception that does not require a party to immediately object to an inconsistent verdict—where the jury finds that the defendant was negligent in the design of the product but also finds that the product did not contain a design defect.
The decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Tricam Industries, Inc. v. Coba, 100 So.3d 105 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012), applied the “fundamental nature” exception, which was previously recognized by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Nissan Motor Co. v. Alvarez, 891 So.2d 4, 8 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), and the Fifth District Court of Appeal in North American Catamaran Racing Ass'n (NACRA) v. McCollister, 480 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). Application of the “fundamental nature” exception, however, is in express and direct conflict with a line of cases that require a party to object to an inconsistent verdict prior to the discharge of the jury and that require a jury, rather than an appellate court, to resolve an inconsistent verdict. See, e.g., Cocca v. Smith, 821 So.2d 328, 330–31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; Gup v. Cook, 549 So.2d 1081, 1083–84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Consistent with our long-standing precedent, we hold that a party must timely object to an inconsistent verdict under these circumstances or the issue is waived. Thus, we reject the reasoning of the Third District majority and agree with Judge Schwartz's dissent that there is no “fundamental nature” exception to the inconsistent verdict law in a civil case that applies only to products liability cases, because there is “no conceptual or reasoned basis for the distinction and no cognizable way to apply it.” Tricam Indus., 100 So.3d at 115 (Schwartz, J., dissenting).
In applying this exception in this case, the Third District improperly disregarded the jury's determination of liability in favor of the plaintiffs and directed the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the party that failed to raise the inconsistent verdict issue before the jury was discharged. This holding also conflicts with well-established law, which requires a jury—not a court—to resolve the inconsistency.
We accordingly quash Tricam Industries and disapprove of Nissan Motor and NACRA. Because the defendants, Tricam Industries and Home Depot, failed to timely raise their objection to the jury's inconsistent verdict, the trial court did not err in denying the defendants' motion to set aside the verdict, and thus the trial court's judgment should be reinstated.
This case stems from a tragic accident in which Roberto Coba fell from a thirteen-foot aluminum ladder, resulting in his death. Diana Coba, as the personal representative of Roberto Coba's estate, filed an action against Tricam Industries, which manufactured the ladder involved in the accident, and against Home Depot, which sold the ladder. In the complaint, Coba alleged that both Tricam Industries and Home Depot were liable on the basis of strict liability because they designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, or sold a ladder in a defective and dangerous condition. The complaint further alleged that the defendants were also liable under negligence theories because they had a duty to use reasonable care to market, sell, and distribute the ladder in a reasonably safe condition.
At trial, Coba presented testimony from the decedent's daughter and stepson, both of whom were present when the accident occurred. Coba also presented evidence as to whether the ladder had a design defect—evidence that was disputed. As summarized by the Third District:
Tricam Indus., 100 So.3d at 107 (footnote omitted).
Although Coba had initially also claimed that the warnings on the ladder were defective, she later withdrew that claim. The jury was instructed as to the standard for finding a design defect under strict liability and the standard for finding negligence on the basis of design, distribution, and sale of the ladder. Specifically, the jury instructions on these two issues read:
As to negligence, the trial court gave the standard jury instruction at that time:
Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care, which is the care that a reasonably careful person would use under like circumstances. Negligence is doing something that a reasonably careful person would not do under like circumstances, or failing to do something that a reasonably careful person would do under like circumstances.
The trial court then explained the claim of strict liability as follows:
A product is defective if by reason of its design the product is in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user and the product is expected to and does reach the user without substantial change affecting its condition. A product is unreasonably dangerous because of its design if the product fails to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used as intended or in a manner reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.
The trial court also provided the jury with special interrogatories, without objection from either side, in which the question of design defect preceded the question of negligence, and the jury returned the following verdict as to liability issues:
Following the special interrogatories, the jury verdict form directed the jury: “If your answer to either or both Question 1 and 2 is ‘YES', please continue to answer the remaining questions,” at which point the verdict form asked whether the decedent was at fault and to apportion fault. The jury made the following findings:
As to the award of damages, the jury awarded no damages to the estate for medical and funeral expenses, awarded $70,000 to Coba's daughter for the loss of her father's support and services, and awarded $1,500,000 to Coba's daughter for the loss of parental companionship and for pain and...
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