Matlaw Corporation v. War Damage Corporation

Decision Date09 December 1947
Docket NumberNo. 9379.,9379.
Citation164 F.2d 281
PartiesMATLAW CORPORATION v. WAR DAMAGE CORPORATION.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

James E. Watson and Orin DeM. Walker, both of Washington, D. C., Walter Myers, Jr., of Indianapolis, Ind., and Jay E. Darlington, of Hammond, Ind., for appellant.

Peyton Ford, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward H. Hickey, Sp. Asst. to the Atty. Gen., B. Howard Caughran, U. S. Atty., of Indianapolis, Ind., and Richard E. Guggenheim, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before MAJOR and KERNER, Circuit Judges, and LINDLEY, District Judge.

KERNER, Circuit Judge.

By this appeal plaintiff challenges the propriety of the judgment of the District Court dismissing plaintiff's complaint for want of jurisdiction.

Defendant is a corporation, created December 13, 1941, by the Federal Loan Administrator, with the approval of the President of the United States, pursuant to § 5d of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 606b, for the purpose of providing insurance covering damage to property from enemy attack and military action of the United States forces in resisting attack. Prior to July 1, 1942, the War Damage Corporation provided for such insurance without compensation, but by express Congressional enactment Congress added § 5g to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 606 b — 2, requiring that on and after July 1, 1942, the War Damage Corporation should issue insurance policies upon the payment of annual premiums.

Under the terms of War Damage Corporation's charter an authorized capital stock of $100,000,000 was provided, all of which was subscribed for by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. On July 1, 1942, defendant began and thereafter carried on the function of insuring the property of all persons applying for such insurance and issued its policies through any insurance carrier specifically appointed by defendant. It prepared a basic standard form of policy in which it agreed to indemnify the insured against physical loss of or damage to the property described in an attached application, resulting from enemy attack and including any action by the Military, Naval or Air Forces of the United States in resisting enemy attack. November 30, 1942, defendant issued one of these policies to plaintiff on its $80,000 building in Hammond, Indiana, for which plaintiff paid an annual premium of $104 and a second premium of $104 on November 30, 1943.

In its complaint, plaintiff, an Indiana corporation, alleges "that the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs the sum of $3,000 and arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States," and that as a policy holder of the War Damage Corporation it brought its suit on behalf of itself and for all holders of similar policies.

The complaint further alleges that the total amount of money which defendant collected, and holds, as such "net premiums" exceeds $225,000,000; that the total amount of insurance claims paid out by defendant is approximately $223,000; that all insurance claims against defendant have already been paid, or if any yet remain unsettled, these are less than $100,000; that defendant holds the fund as "trustee for the common pro rata benefit of all said policyholders in proportion to the amount of premiums which they paid into the fund, and that they policyholders are equitably entitled to a decree establishing said trust and ordering the pro rata distribution of said trust fund among them."

The complaint further alleges that it plaintiff and all other policyholders whose net premiums have gone into the fund constitute a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, their number being in excess of 100,000 and their members being located in all parts of the United States.

In the District Court defendant, asserting that plaintiff's individual claim totaled at most only $208, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction and that plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action, in that (1) in defining the functions of the War Damage Corporation in § 5g of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, it was clearly the intention of Congress that the surplus funds should not be distributed to the policyholders, but rather should be retained by the United States, and (2) the War Damage Corporation was a stock insurance corporation and its surplus belongs to the stockholders — the United States. The court sustained the motion on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction. In the view we take of this appeal, the only question to be decided is whether the court lacked jurisdiction.

Original jurisdiction of the district courts, except for special acts conferring jurisdiction, is found in Section 24 of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(1). This section provides that jurisdiction exists "where the matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value of $3,000, and (a) arises under the Constitution or laws of the United States, * * *." Concededly, this case arises under the laws of the United States; nevertheless, in order to sue in the District Court, plaintiff must demonstrate that the amount in controversy exceeds the amount of $3,000.

Plaintiff contends that the question is not whether the amount claimed to be due it is $208, but whether the jurisdictional amount is the $225,000,000 which plaintiff claims defendant collected and holds as net premiums. It makes the point that the class members' rights here involved "do not stem from the contract." It insists that the rights of the class members stem from basic principles of equity, and it argues that this is what is called a true class representative action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following § 723c,1 and that the right sought to be enforced is the common right of the class members, but that if the rights of the class members be considered several, plaintiff is entitled to sue for the class because "the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which affect specific property involved in the action," namely, the fund. In other words, plaintiff asserts it may aggregate the alleged claims of other policyholders. With this contention we cannot agree.

In support of its contention plaintiff relies principally on Boesenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 7 Cir., 128 F.2d 245, 141 A.L.R. 565; Citizens Banking Co. v. Monticello State Bank, 8 Cir., 143 F.2d 261; Thompson v. Deal, 67 App.D.C. 327, 92 F.2d 478; and Weeks v. Bareco Oil Co., 7 Cir., 125 F.2d 84. Before proceeding to discuss these cases it is well to say that we are not unmindful of the fact that the Supreme Court has shown increasing liberality in recent decisions permitting the class members to aggregate the value of their individual claims to make up the necessary jurisdictional amount required by Section 24 of the Judicial Code. See Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 59 S.Ct. 725, 83 L.Ed. 1111. But the Supreme Court has never receded from or overruled the familiar rule that when several plaintiffs assert separate and distinct demands in a single suit, the amount involved in each separate controversy must be of the requisite amount to be within the jurisdiction of the district court, and that those amounts cannot be added together to satisfy jurisdictional requirements.

In the Boesenberg v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. case, supra, there was no...

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