Hinchliffe v. City of San Diego
Decision Date | 25 February 1985 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | Debra HINCHLIFFE, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants and Respondents. D000932. Civ. 31076. |
Thistle & Krinsky, and Christopher L. Ashcraft, San Diego, for petitioner and appellant.
John W. Witt, City Atty., Ronald L. Johnson, Sr. Chief Deputy City Atty., Eugene P. Gordon, Chief Deputy City Atty., and Leslie J. Girard, Deputy City Atty., for defendants and respondents.
Debra Hinchliffe was hired as a probationary police officer. While still on probation, she was discharged without a hearing before the Civil Service Commission (Commission). Claiming section 129 of the San Diego City Charter (Charter) on the date of her hiring granted such a hearing, she sought a writ of mandate. We hold Hinchliffe's hearing rights created by the Charter were not vested so as to be immune from modification by the electorate. Thus, the Charter amendment eliminating commission review for probationary employees did not impinge any constitutionally protected right of previously hired probationary personnel. We affirm the denial of Hinchliffe's petition for writ of mandate.
On July 23, 1979, Hinchliffe was hired as a Police Officer I, a classified service position (Charter § 117) subject to a two-year probationary period. At that time, Charter section 129 provided: (Italics added.) The Commission, however, denied a discharge hearing to probationary employees. In 1980 the Superior Court of San Diego County resolved the conflict between Charter section 129 and Commission practice in Carman v. City of San Diego (Super.Ct.San Diego Co. No. 453263). There, the court ruled a probationary classified employee was entitled to a hearing before the Commission.
Spurred largely by the Carman litigation, on June 3, 1980, the voters amended Charter section 129 to provide: "Upon attaining permanent status pursuant to the Rules of the Civil Service Commission, any officer or employee of the City in the classified service may be removed from office or employment for cause by the appointing authority...." (Italics added.) Approximately five months after the Charter amendment, Hinchliffe was discharged. She appealed to the Commission and the chief of police; the former denied hearing. As provided in a Memorandum of Understanding between the City of San Diego and the San Diego Police Officers Association, Hinchliffe presented her case to the police chief's designee who, after a review of the circumstances, affirmed her dismissal.
On April 20, 1982, Hinchliffe petitioned for mandate under the Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, alleging a vested right to the section 129 protections available at the commencement of her employment, before the 1980 amendment. The trial court denied Hinchliffe's petition.
Under certain circumstances, a public employee, even while on probation, may acquire legally enforceable employment rights to which due process guarantees adhere. (See, e.g., Keenan v. S.F. Unified School Dist., 34 Cal.2d 708, 214 P.2d 382; see also Arnett v. Kennedy (1974) 416 U.S. 134, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15; Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal.3d 194, 124 Cal.Rptr. 14, 539 P.2d 774.) Hinchliffe argues Charter section 129, as written at the time of her hiring, vests a property right to a dismissal-for-cause hearing before the Commission which cannot be removed by later revisions to the Charter.
Public employment, by and large, is not held by contract, but by statute. (Miller v. State of California, 18 Cal.3d 808, 813-814, 135 Cal.Rptr. 386, 557 P.2d 970; Butterworth v. Boyd, 12 Cal.2d 140, 150, 82 P.2d 434; Humbert v. Castro Valley County, 214 Cal.App.2d 1, 13, 29 Cal.Rptr. 158; Risley v. Bd. of Civil Service Commrs., 60 Cal.App.2d 32, 37-38, 140 P.2d 167.) The public employee, thus, can have no vested contractual right in the terms of his or her employment, such terms being subject to change by the proper statutory authority. (Ibid.) Similarly, employees of charter governments work subject to the amendment, revision or repeal of charter provisions affecting their employment. (See Cal. Const., art. XI, §§ 3, 5; Risley v. Bd. of Civil Service Commrs., supra, at p. 37, 140 P.2d 167; Cornell v. Harris, 15 Cal.App.2d 144, 146-147, 59 P.2d 570.) For example, in Risley, city employees argued the pending merger of the city department of water and power with two private utility companies would result in the loss of vested promotion and seniority rights. Addressing this argument, the Court of Appeal stated:
(Risley v. Bd. of Civil Service Commrs., supra, 60 Cal.App.2d 32, 37, 140 P.2d 167, italics added.)
The Supreme Court has more recently recognized this principle in Miller v. State of California, supra, 18 Cal.3d 808, 135 Cal.Rptr. 386, 557 P.2d 970. When the plaintiff in Miller was first hired by the State Controller, the mandatory retirement age was 70. After the plaintiff had worked 31 years, Government Code section 20981 was amended to set the mandatory retirement age at 67. Plaintiff claimed a vested contractual right to mandatory retirement at the age in effect when he was first employed. The court found no such right, stating: (Id., at p. 813, 135 Cal.Rptr. 386, 557 P.2d 970.) We have similarly applied the rule of Miller to a tenured state university professor retired against his will under Government Code section 20981. (Schmier v. Board of Trustees, 74 Cal.App.3d 314, 141 Cal.Rptr. 472.)
However, public employment may give rise to certain obligations which are constitutionally protected. (Kern v. City of Long Beach, 29 Cal.2d 848, 852-853, 179 P.2d 799.) For example, promised compensation creates a contractual right which, once vested, "cannot be eliminated without unconstitutionally impairing the contract obligation." (Olson v. Cory, 27 Cal.3d 532, 538, 178 Cal.Rptr. 568, 636 P.2d 532; Sonoma County Organization of...
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