Donegan v. Baltimore & N.Y. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 November 1908
• Docket Number: 49.
• Citation: 165 F. 869
• Parties: DONEGAN v. BALTIMORE & N.Y. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

165 F. 869

DONEGAN v. BALTIMORE & N.Y. RY. CO.

No. 49.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

November 16, 1908

Pinney Thayer & Van Slyke, for plaintiff in error.

J Colton and Cravath, Henderson & De Gersdorff (Lyle H. Hall of counsel), for defendant in error.

Before LACOMBE, COXE, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.

NOYES Circuit Judge.

This was an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff while employed by the defendant upon its railroad. The complaint is based both upon the alleged violation by the defendant of the federal safety appliance act (Act March 2, 1893, c. 196, 27 Stat. 531 (U.S comp. St. 1901, p. 3174)), and upon the alleged negligence of the defendant. Upon the trial the plaintiff put in his case. The defendant thereupon moved to dismiss the complaint, and the court granted the motion.

Upon this writ of error the ultimate question is whether, viewing the testimony from the standpoint most favorable to the plaintiff, and giving him the benefit of all inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom, a case was presented which should have gone to the jury. There was evidence from which the jury would have been warranted in finding these facts: At the time of the accident, May 24, 1906, the plaintiff was employed as rear brakeman on a freight train which ran daily-- starting in the morning-- from St. George, Staten Island, in the state of New York, to Cranford Junction, in the state of New Jersey. On the morning in question the train started from St. George as usual, and ran, picking up freight cars at various points, until it reached the Arlington yard upon Staten Island, where it was rearranged and made up for the run into New Jersey.

The train was composed of 35 cars, with a caboose at the rear. As the train approached Cranford Junction the conductor ordered the plaintiff to cut off the two rear cars upon the main track in the Cranford yard. It was necessary that this cut-off should be made before reaching a switch track leading from the main track into the 'West Yard,' so called, in order that the entrance to such track should not be blocked. As the train drew near the place for making the cut-off it was running at a slow speed-- about two miles an hour-- and the plaintiff, who was upon the caboose, jumped off and ran forward to cut off the two cars as ordered. He attempted to use the uncoupling device provided-- a cut lever-- on the front end of the second car, but it would not work, the chain connecting it with the top of the coupling pin being broken. The plaintiff was out of sight of the engineer and other brakemen, and could not signal them to stop the train. He therefore went between the cars and attempted to raise the pin by hand, but failed to do so, and in endeavoring to step out from between the cars caught his foot in an unblocked frog of a switch leading to a turntable, was unable to extricate it, and was pulled down under the wheels, receiving the injuries complained of. The plaintiff knew the location of the turntable switch, but did not know that the frog was unblocked.

Upon these facts it is obvious that the defendant violated the safety appliance act. The car was not equipped with couplers which could be 'uncoupled without the necessity of men going between the ends of the cars. ' The uncoupling device was broken. The defendant's liability for any injury caused by such violation of the statute was absolute, and not dependent in any degree upon its negligence. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 28 Sup.Ct. 616, 52 L.Ed. 1061.

The inquiry, then, is whether this violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the accident. But such a question cannot ordinarily be determined as a matter of law. It is generally the province of the jury to determine the proximate cause of an injury. As said by Mr. Justice Strong in Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474, 24 L.Ed. 256:

'The true rule is that what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. It is to be determined as a fact in view of the circumstances of fact attending it.'

See also, Choctaw, etc., R. Co. v. Holloway, 191 U.S. 334, 24 Sup.Ct. 102, 48 L.Ed. 207; Southern Pacific Co. v. Yeargin, 109 F. 436, 48 C.C.A. 497; San Francisco, etc., Co. v. Carlson (C.C.A.) 161 F. 859; Missouri,...